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Abstract
In this dissertation, I present research on three topics in development eco-
nomics, with overarching theme being the long-term implications of positive
and negative shocks on rural poor’s economic wellbeing. In the first paper,
based on the joint work with Hope Michelson, Alex Winter-Nelson and Peter
Goldsmith, I estimate the impact of an asset transfer program on household
resilience, where resilience is defined as the probability that a household will
sustain at least the threshold asset level required to support consumption
above the poverty line. Using six rounds of data collected over 42 months in
rural Zambia, I construct a measure of resilience based on households’ con-
ditional welfare distributions to estimate program impacts. The study finds
that the program increased household resilience; beneficiaries’ likelihood of
being non-poor in future periods increased by 44%. The program both in-
creased mean assets and decreased variance, signaling an upward shift in
households’ conditional asset distributions. The method used in the study
demonstrates the added value of the resilience estimation compared with a
conventional impact assessment; numerous households classified as non-poor
are unlikely to remain nonpoor. In the second paper, I analyze the dif-
ferential impact of migration on labor supply of the left-behind household
members in Nepal, where international migration for employment, predomi-
nantly a male phenomenon, increased substantially between 2001 and 2011.
Using the NLSS III data, this study extends the analysis further by incorpo-
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rating the impacts on both extensive and intensive margins and answering
the question of if they are not wage-employed, what the remaining members
in the household engaging in instead. The paper finds that, in response to
out-migration of some family members, women realign their priorities and
reallocate their time from market employment to self-employment and home
production, possibly filling in the roles vacated by the migrants. In contrast,
the income effect dominates the impact of migration on the left-behind men;
that is, men value their leisure more because of the remittances from abroad
and decrease their overall supply of labor. In the final paper, I analyze the
long-term health impacts of the 1996-2006 Nepalese civil conflict using infor-
mation on conflict incidents at the village level, which allows me to identify
the effects of exposure to conflict more accurately than prior studies. More-
over, I am able to track the impact of conflict on health outcomes across
generations. Growth stunting is a known outcome of health shocks in child-
hood, and height has long been recognized as an important factor influencing
individuals’ professional and personal success. I exploit the heterogeneity in
conflict intensity across villages and birth cohorts to document long-term
health and intergenerational impacts. I find that childhood exposure to con-
flict and, in particular, exposure starting in infancy, has highly significant
and negative impacts on final adult height – each additional month of ex-
posure decreases womens height by 1.36 millimeters. Additionally, this is
among the first papers to document the intergenerational impacts of early
childhood conflict exposure. I find that mother’s exposure to conflict in her
childhood is detrimental to her children’s health. Exposed mothers have more
children and live in less wealthy households, likely reducing their ability to
invest during critical periods of their children’s development.
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This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, father, sister, and to the
memory of Khadka.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Empirical evidences suggest that negative shocks have more persistent effects
on poorer households than wealthier ones. How persistent are the impacts
of shocks on rural poor? Do they transmit into the future generations? This
dissertation intends to explore these questions by combining research on three
topics in development economics. The dissertation focuses on understanding
the capital and skill constraint and incomplete labor market rural poor face,
and in particular, long-term implication of positive and negative shocks that
alter these constraints on women’s economic wellbeing, health and poverty
dynamics.
The theory of the bifurcated growth dynamics suggests existence of multi-
ple technologies associated with distinct growth paths. Poor households may
be on a lower growth trajectory that leads to a steady state equilibrium below
poverty line and may lack capacity to switch to a technology that would al-
low them to reach a higher steady state equilibrium and escape poverty trap.
Structural barriers such as credit, skills, and capital constraints, geographi-
cal isolation, social and other economic exclusions prevent poor households
from accessing the more remunerative path. However, big enough shocks can
alter one’s future prospect – while a negative shock can knock a nonpoor
household from its higher growth trajectory to a lower growth path setting
it on a course towards a steady state equilibrium below poverty threshold, a
sufficiently large enough positive shock can alter a poor household’s prospect
by setting it on a course of higher growth. In this dissertation, I explore
welfare impact of such shocks and assess their persistency. While first paper
investigates the impact of a large asset transfer program in rural Zambia that
was designed to ease capital and skill constraint on resilience to poverty, sec-
ond paper explores heterogeneous labor response by gender to a large-scale
international migration for employment in Nepal. In the third paper, I mea-
sure the causal impact of Nepal’s 1996-2006 civil conflict on long-term health,
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including intergenerational health.
Because they lack access to capital and face incomplete labor markets,
livelihood strategies for most of the world’s poor center on casual wage work
and subsistence agriculture. Many anti-poverty programs seek to move the
poor to more secure, reliable, and remunerative streams of income. Such pro-
grams are often motivated by an expectation that sufficiently large transfers
can enable households trapped in poverty to move onto a different growth
trajectory towards a non-poor steady state. While the theory of bifurcated
growth dynamics justifies “big-push” interventions, impact evaluation that
focuses only on the first moment of outcomes ignores the potential for shocks
or stressors to move households who have received transfers back to a low-
level equilibrium. To date, the economic impact evaluation literature has
mostly estimated programmatic effects under an assumption of full certainty.
Retrospective evaluations have focused on the first moment of the household
welfare distribution, rather than on changes in household ability to with-
stand shocks and maintain consumption above a poverty threshold. Such an
approach can say little about resilience to shocks in a dynamic context of
uncertainty. Forward-looking poverty evaluations are obviously critical for
assessing the lasting effects of interventions, as well as for distinguishing be-
tween households that have received a transient welfare boost and those that
have experienced a structural change likely to alter their future economic cir-
cumstances. The first chapter of this dissertation addresses this shortcoming
by operationalizing the concept of resilience in an impact evaluation applica-
tion. I measure resilience as the probability that a household will sustain at
least the level of assets required to support consumption above the poverty
line. Using six rounds of primary data collected from an asset transfer and
training program in rural Zambia, I estimate households’ conditional welfare
distributions and construct measures of resilience to poverty.
The results suggest that the program significantly increased resilience among
participants. Households receiving both training and livestock at the baseline
are 44% more likely to be non-poor than Control households 42 months af-
ter the intervention. Moreover, I find that the program increased headcount
resilience among participant households. While more than 80% of the treat-
ment households are resilient at the endline, the comparable endline head-
count resilience rate for Controls is only 28.6%. Decomposing these effects
into first (central tendency) and second (spread) moments reveals that the
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livestock transfer, and training program has both increased mean household
asset holdings and decreased the variance in asset holdings. The program has
shifted the conditional asset distribution upward and truncated uncertainty
in asset holdings. While comparing resilience results with standard estimates
of program impact on asset poverty, I demonstrate the value of measuring
resilience in the context of impact assessment. The results reveal that many
households classified as non-poor under conventional methods based on mean
asset poverty levels are unlikely to remain non-poor over time. The resilience
measure thus provides new and important insight into households’ longer-
term capacity to escape or remain out of poverty. Additionally, the results
suggest that households that became resilient through the transfer of live-
stock gained access to capital and entered into higher return capital-intensive
self-employment activities.
The second chapter investigates the effects of large-scale international labor
migration on the economic activities of left-behind family members. Positive
impacts of migration on income and consumption are well established in the
literature, but evidence regarding the effects on non-income-based household
outcomes is mixed. In particular, non-migrants tend to assume a larger bur-
den of work to compensate for the loss of the migrant’s local income and
labor. I study this issue in the context of Nepal, where more than two mil-
lion prime-age (mostly male) Nepalese are working outside the country and
the inflow of remittances accounts for 30% of the country’s GDP. Decrease
in labor stock and substantial income from abroad is likely to have profound
effect on labor market and, yet, the impacts of the migration on the non-
income dimensions in Nepal remain relatively unexplored in the literature.
This chapter addresses this issue by documenting the differential impact of
international migration on labor supply of the left-behind family members.
Using nationally representative Nepal Living Standard Survey, I find that
the left-behind women increase their total time spent working; specifically,
women reallocate their time from casual labor to household entrepreneurial
and non-entrepreneurial activities. In contrast, left-behind men reduce over-
all work time; they decrease their time working both in wage and household
activities; that is, men value their leisure more because of the remittances
from abroad and decrease their overall labor supply.
While the first two chapters of the dissertation focus on positive shocks,
the third chapter investigates the longer-term consequences of a catastrophic,
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violent event. While most of the economic literature on the legacies of war is
focused on human capital effects observed during or shortly after the conflict,
the long-term evidences have rarely been established. This paper extends the
literature by producing evidences of the long-term impacts and, in particular,
this is among the first paper to document the intergenerational impacts of
war. Using the most reliable database on the Nepalese civil conflict, I create
individual level data set of the victims of the war with exact geographical
location (village) and date of the incident. This allows me to explore the
variation in conflict intensity at a granular geographical unit (village) and
identify the effects of exposure to conflict more accurately than prior stud-
ies. I exploit the heterogeneity in conflict intensity across villages and birth
cohorts of women interviewed in the 2016 Nepal Demographic Survey. I
find that childhood exposure to conflict and, in particular, exposure starting
in infancy, has highly significant and negative impact on final adult height
additional month of exposure decreases womens height by 1.36 millimeters.
Additionally, this is among the first papers to document the intergenera-
tional impacts of early childhood conflict exposure. I find that mother’s
exposure to conflict in her childhood is detrimental to her children’s health.
Exposed mothers have more children and live in less wealthy households,
likely reducing their ability to invest during critical periods of their childrens
development. These results show that negative impacts of violent conflict
experienced during childhood are not limited to one’s own life and transmit
into second generation as well.
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CHAPTER 2
DO ASSET TRANSFERS BUILD
HOUSEHOLD RESILIENCE?
2.1 Introduction
In response to perceived increases in the severity of climate and economic
shocks in developing countries, anti-poverty programs have begun to priori-
tize household resilience (World Bank, 2016; Hallegatte et al., 2017; Ferna´ndez-
Gimenez et al., 2011, 2012; Venton et al., 2012). Despite considerable dis-
cussion of building resilience through development initiatives, the question of
whether an initiative can alter the likelihood that a household will fall into
poverty in the foreseeable future has rarely been examined empirically.
To date, the economic impact evaluation literature has mostly estimated
programmatic effects under an assumption of full certainty. Retrospective
evaluations have focused on the first moment of the household welfare distri-
bution, rather than on changes in household ability to withstand shocks and
maintain consumption above a poverty threshold. Forward-looking poverty
evaluations are obviously critical for assessing the lasting effects of interven-
tions, as well as for distinguishing between households that have received a
transient welfare boost and those that have experienced a structural change
likely to alter their future economic circumstances.
This paper applies Barrett and Constas’s (2014) moment-based definition
of development resilience: “the capacity over time of a person, household
or other aggregate unit to avoid poverty in the face of various stressors and
in the wake of myriad shocks. If and only if that capacity is and remains
high over time, then the unit is resilient.” Drawing together the methods
and theories related to poverty traps, vulnerability, and ecological resilience,
development resilience is a probabilistic and forward-looking concept that
takes into account both the first and second moments of the household wel-
fare distribution and quantifies the capacity of households to escape poverty
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or remain non-poor over time. We measure household resilience as a prob-
ability of accumulating and retaining a minimum level of assets required to
remain non-poor in the face of diverse shocks and stressors. We employ the
econometric technique proposed by Cisse´ and Barrett (2016) to construct
household-specific resilience scores, and we use these estimated resilience
scores as an outcome variable in our analysis.
The integrated asset transfer program studied in this paper makes a one-
time livestock transfer to participant households, provides training on live-
stock management and other livelihood skills, and provides veterinary and
agricultural extension services. We estimate the causal impacts of the pro-
gram on the mean and variance of outcomes of interest and on development
resilience itself by exploiting the program rollout to overcome problems re-
lated to endogenous household investment and production decisions. Con-
temporaneous with Cisse´ and Ikegami (2016), this research is among the first
to estimate the impact of a development intervention on household resilience.
Reinforcing the results of other recent analyses of livestock transfer pro-
grams (Bandiera et al., 2017; Ahmed et al., 2009; Das and Misha, 2010; Em-
ran et al., 2014; Banerjee et al., 2015; Rawlins et al., 2014; Jodlowski et al.,
2016; Kafle et al., 2016), as well as Dercon (1998) who models livestock acqui-
sition as a stochastic path out of poverty for households, our results show that
this multifaceted “big-push” intervention decreased poverty rates, increased
consumption expenditures, increased livestock production, and increased as-
set holdings and earnings from self-employment. These effects are found to
continue three and half years after the initial round of the intervention, and
to have increased over time. Assuming that the program’s benefits at year 3
are repeated through the 20th year of the intervention, the ratio of program
benefits to costs is approximately 4.5.1
Extending previous work, our results show that the integrated livestock
transfer program significantly increased household development resilience.
The program increases beneficiaries’ likelihood of being non-poor in future
periods; households receiving both training and livestock at the baseline are
44% more likely to be non-poor than Control households 42 months after
1Most early livestock transfer programs, however, were plagued by implementation and
targeting problems and hence have been deemed largely to have failed (Ashley et al., 1999).
India’s Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP), for example, is thought to have
been highly ineffective because of flaws in targeting and design (Dre`ze, 1990; Pulley, 1989).
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the intervention. Moreover, we find that the program increased headcount
resilience among participant households. While more than 80% of the treat-
ment households are resilient at the endline, the comparable endline head-
count resilience rate for Controls is only 28.6%. Decomposing these effects
into first (central tendency) and second (spread) moments reveals that the
livestock transfer and training program has both increased mean household
asset holdings and decreased the variance in asset holdings. The program has
shifted the conditional asset distribution upward and truncated uncertainty
in asset holdings.
Measurement of program impact on resilience is especially relevant to un-
derstanding the impact of asset transfers. Such programs are often moti-
vated by an expectation that sufficiently large transfers can enable house-
holds trapped in poverty to move onto a different growth trajectory towards
a non-poor steady state. Transitioning from a growth dynamic associated
with a low-level equilibrium to one that leads to a non-poor equilibrium
state may be impossible without asset transfers or other programs to enable
sufficient fixed investment. While the theory of bifurcated growth dynam-
ics justifies “big-push” interventions, impact evaluation that focuses only on
the first moment of outcomes ignores the potential for shocks or stressors to
move households who have received transfers back to a low-level equilibrium.
Development resilience, in contrast, quantifies the probability that a benefi-
ciary household might move back into poverty and permits assessment of an
intervention’s effect on that probability.
By comparing resilience results with standard estimates of program impact
on asset poverty, we demonstrate the value of measuring resilience in the
context of impact assessment. Though both resilience and the conventional
impact measures show that the program improved the welfare of recipients,
we find notable differences in magnitudes across the methods. Differences are
most striking for households observed around the asset poverty threshold.
We find that while a substantial number of households who received partial
treatment from the program gained sufficient assets to be classified as non-
poor at the midline, they demonstrated too low a probability of remaining
non-poor over time to be classified as resilient. This discrepancy points to
the practical significance of failing to account for nonlinearities in welfare
dynamics and limiting analysis to the first moment in the distributions of
welfare outcomes. In this case, resilience measurement provides more insight
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about household status than conventional measures.
The next section of this paper presents the theory of development resilience
and discusses a primary mechanism through which a transfer program is likely
to affect poor households’ livelihoods. Section 3 explains the empirical im-
plementation of the development resilience concept. Section 4 describes the
program setting, the intervention and the research design. Program treat-
ment effects are presented in section 5; development resilience results and
their comparison with impact evaluation results are presented in section 6.
Section 7 explores the mechanism of program impacts by presenting evidence
on reallocation of household labor. Section 8 compares program benefits
relative to costs. Section 9 concludes by discussing the merits of estimat-
ing development resilience in impact evaluation and possible limitations and
drawbacks to development resilience.
2.2 Development Resilience
Resilience as a development concept draws on ideas from ecology, engineering
and economics. Resilience has roots in ecology focusing on the capacity of a
system to maintain functionality when shocked (Holling, 1973) as well as on
the systems ability to persist, renew, and redevelop (Holling, 1996) in the face
of uncertainty and perturbations.2 The concept of vulnerability in economics
is closely related to ecological resilience, and refers to a probabilistic ex-ante
measure of the likelihood that future consumption will fall below a defined
(normative) poverty threshold (Chaudhuri et al., 2002; Calvo and Dercon,
2007; Ligon and Schechter, 2003; Christiaensen and Subbarao, 2005).
Development resilience builds on the concept of vulnerability in two impor-
tant ways. First, the vulnerability measurement literature is predominantly
concerned with the immediate impacts of shocks and does not account for
exposure to stressors. Resilience, on the other hand, focuses on the longer-
term impacts of both shocks and stressors. The emphasis on stressors is
important in light of studies such as Rockmore’s (2017) study of conflict in
Northern Uganda, which finds that aggregate welfare losses from insecurity
are larger than the realized violence. Second, the emphasis of the vulner-
ability literature on the immediate impact of shocks largely ignores welfare
2See Folke (2006) for a review of resilience in the ecology literature.
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path dynamics. In contrast, development resilience is the study of well-being
dynamics incorporating the possibility of nonlinear welfare growth paths.
Operationally, these differences mean that while analysis of vulnerability can
be implemented using cross sectional or short term panel data exploiting het-
erogeneity among the households or individuals within a sample, resilience
measurement requires data collected over a longer time frame to exploit the
inter-temporal variation of a household or individual.
This paper follows Barrett and Constas’s (2014) conceptualization of re-
silience: the capacity over time of a person, household or other aggregate unit
to avoid poverty in the face of various stressors and in the wake of myriad
shocks. If and only if that capacity is and remains high over time, then the
unit is resilient.
Barrett and Constas (2014) use a conditional moment function for well-
being in a multiple equilibiria poverty trap to represent resilience, mk(Wt+s |
Wt, εt), where m
k is a kth moment of well-being at time t+ s and s > 0; with
resilience a function of well-being Wt and random shock εt at time t. The
deterministic relationship between Wt and Wt+s typically employed in the
poverty trap literature is replaced with a conditional moment growth func-
tion and associated conditional dynamic transitional distribution functions.
Although demonstrated using a multiple equilibria poverty trap, Barrett and
Constas’s (2014) resilience concept does not require a nonlinear path dynamic
with multiple steady-state equilibria and is equally relevant in the case of the
existence of a single steady-state equilibrium below the poverty line. A house-
hold’s development resilience can be measured as the cumulative probability
above the dynamic poverty threshold in the case of multiple equilibria and
as the cumulative probability above the static poverty line W¯ in the case of
a single equilibrium. Unless the entire probability distribution sits above W¯ ,
there exists some probability that the household will fall into poverty. As
less of the probability distribution falls below the poverty threshold, a house-
hold becomes more resilient. The likelihood of falling into poverty therefore
depends on the household’s level of well-being at time t and the dispersion
in the distribution of outcomes.
As a simple descriptor, this resilience measure provides a consistent es-
timate of the true population conditional poverty level. However, a simple
conditional mean of poverty status should provide a similar result. For exam-
ple, if there were a single asset type or uniform asset types and iid shocks and
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stressors, a non-parametric regression of poverty status in time t on treatment
should provide the same answer as the resilience calculation based the con-
ditional moment functions. Nonetheless, estimating the conditional moment
functions offers additional value in two ways. First, estimation of the value
of the polynomial on lagged wealth allows for nonlinear persistence, which
can enhance both forecasting and identification of heterogeneous response
to common wealth shocks. The practical significance of this is suggested by
studies such as Jalan and Ravallion (2001) and Lokshin and Ravallion (2004),
which demonstrate that the same negative shocks have more persistent ef-
fects on poorer households than wealthier ones. The second advantage of the
method is that it allows distinguishing whether the estimated relationship
between wealth and resilience is driven by effects on conditional mean or
on conditional variance. Simple theory and the prior literature (Rosenzweig
and Binswanger, 1993) would suggest the effect of an asset transfer program
is likely to be mainly in the conditional mean as decreasing absolute risk
aversion should lead wealthier households to pursue higher return, higher
variance strategies. Estimation of the conditional moment functions per-
mits one to test that theory directly; a simple descriptive of the conditional
poverty rate cannot provide these insights. For example, we find that nu-
merous households are non-poor based on their mean asset holdings but are
not resilient to remain non-poor over time once we account for the estimated
asset holding variance (Section 2.6.1).
Resilience theory implies that development policies and interventions should
focus on increasing household capital, decreasing downside risk and changing
underlying development-impeding structural characteristics at time t (Bar-
rett and Constas, 2014). The intervention analyzed in this paper is focused
on enacting precisely these sorts of changes: transferring improved breeds of
livestock, providing livelihood skills through training, and providing agricul-
tural and veterinary extension services. To reflect the program, we define
resilience exclusively in asset space and understand it as the capacity of a
household to hold productive asset stock above a minimum critical asset
poverty threshold (either dynamic or static) over time. Increasing resilience
therefore means increasing the probability of holding assets above the de-
fined threshold. Such an improvement could be the result of increases in the
conditional mean asset stock, a decrease in the conditional variance or both.
Given potential stochastic welfare outcomes related to uncertainty in herd
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dynamics and to the variety of risks households are exposed to, assessing
the programmatic effects beyond the first moment of the outcomes of inter-
est may provide greater insight about the status of the program recipients.
This is especially true in the presence of bifurcating dynamics (Carter et al.,
2007; Barrett et al., 2016). For example, a negative shock could imply a
draw below the dynamic asset poverty threshold, setting the household on a
trajectory towards a lower level equilibrium. As with negative shocks, large
enough positive nudges have the potential to move the poor onto a path to-
wards a non-poor, higher resilience state. Limiting the analysis to the first
moment in the distributions of welfare outcomes, however, will not provide
such insights.
2.3 Development Resilience Measurement
We construct resilience scores using the econometric technique proposed by
Cisse´ and Barrett (2016) and applied in different contexts by Upton et al.
(2016) and Cisse´ and Ikegami (2016). We then use the estimated resilience
scores as outcome variables in an impact evaluation of the livestock transfer
program. First, assuming a first-order Markov processes, the mean (indicated
by the M subscript) stochastic asset level of household i at time t, (Wit), is
modeled as a polynomial function of its lagged asset (Wi,t−1), a vector of
household characteristics, Xit, and its exposure to random shocks εit:
Wit =
k∑
j=1
βMjW
j
i,t−1 + γMXit + εMit (2.1)
Included in the household characteristics are indicators for survey wave dum-
mies and the interaction between each treatment assignment and survey wave
dummy. The polynomial lagged asset measures are included to allow for S-
shaped dynamics that are typical of multiple equilibria poverty traps, where
k = 3 is its most parsimonious parametric specification (Barrett et al., 2006).
Assuming E[εMit] = 0, the first conditional moment (µ1it) is predicted as:
µˆ1it = E[Wit] =
k∑
j=1
βˆMjW
j
i,t−1 + γˆMXit (2.2)
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Following Just and Pope (1979) and Antle (1983), residuals from the first
moment equation can be used to model the second moment (subscript V ) as
below:
εˆ2Mit =
k∑
j=1
βV jW
j
i,t−1 + γVXit + εV it (2.3)
Again, assuming E[εV it] = 0, the predicted variance of a household i at time
t (µ2it) then is:
µˆ2it =
k∑
j=1
βˆV jW
j
i,t−1 + γˆVXit (2.4)
The first two moments are sufficient to describe household i’s conditional
transition distribution function of asset holding at time t if Wi,t−1 is dis-
tributed normally, lognormally or gamma. Once the function is identified,
the development resilience of a household i at time t (ρˆit) is the probability
that the household will hold assets above a critical asset poverty threshold
(W¯ ) at period t:
ρˆit ≡ P
(
Wit ≥ W¯
)
= F¯Wit
(
W¯ ; µˆ1it(Wit, Xit), µˆ2it(Wit, Xit)
)
(2.5)
where F¯ (.) is the assumed cumulative distribution function. Since the re-
silience measure increases with the upward shift of the conditional transi-
tional distribution, greater resilience will be achieved by increasing the con-
ditional mean, decreasing the conditional variance when mean is above the
minimum threshold, W¯ , or both. The next section describes the intervention
studied in the paper.
2.4 Program Intervention and Research Design
The Copperbelt Rural Livelihoods Enhancement Support Project (CRLESP)
was implemented by Heifer International with funding from Elanco Animal
Health (USA). The project operated in twelve rural communities in Zambia’s
Copperbelt province. The region, which relied heavily on copper, has gone
through a difficult economic transition over the last three decades resulting
in the loss of employment and loss of remittances in rural areas (World Bank,
2007). Many dislocated mine workers have turned to agriculture. Despite the
availability of good quality farm land, limited asset holdings, limited farm
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and livestock management skills, and credit and market constraints have
contributed to low agricultural and economic productivity, food insecurity,
and poor child nutrition (Heifer International, 2010).
2.4.1 The Intervention
The CRLESP encouraged poor households to engage in commercial livestock
activities through livestock transfers, training on livestock management and
basic household livelihood skills, and provision of agricultural extension and
veterinary services. Further, the program attempted to mitigate poor health
and raise awareness regarding HIV/AIDS, and the importance of improved
hygiene and sanitation through various community health trainings. Com-
munities and households had to pass a screening process and follow a set of
guidelines to qualify for program participation. Community members first
organized themselves into groups and submitted an application to one of
Heifers Zambia offices. Households in approved groups had to demonstrate
their eligibility, which was contingent on commitment to participate in train-
ing activities, commitment to construct an animal shed, and payment into
a community insurance fund. The screening excluded the poorest members
of the community but the program participants were poor; about 60% of
the households in our survey lived on less than USD 1.90 purchasing power
parity (PPP) per person per day at baseline. Similarly, households with
professional employment or sufficient assets to generate reliable income were
screened out of the recipient pool.3
Due to the implementer’s capacity constraints, the program was imple-
mented in phases based on a queue that was established using date of ap-
plication. Communities earlier in the queue received support in the initial
round, while other qualified communities, referred to as “Prospectives”, were
wait-listed until a future date when resources would become available. How-
ever, every community in the target district had equal opportunity to apply
at the same time. Heifer Zambia advertised the program intensively through
the local media and through the government agricultural extension agents
3The screening process implies that the group may not represent the population of
Zambia or the Copperbelt. In addition, individuals self-selected into groups (and hence
into the program) to have access to livestock. Participant households, therefore, may differ
from a typical Zambian household in preferences and other unobservable factors.
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working in the region. The information dissemination across the communi-
ties regarding the program and application process was consistent in timing
and content. Geographically, there is no significant disparity in distance to
Heifers regional office in Ndola, Zambia from these communities. Applica-
tions were primarily submitted by women-led self-help groups. Groups based
in twelve different communities qualified for the program. The sample for
this study consisted of groups from the three communities scheduled to re-
ceive services around the time of the planned baseline survey plus groups
from communities that were slated to receive services in the next opportu-
nity. The communities that had already begun to receive services and those
that were further down in the queue were excluded from the study. While all
households in groups identified to receive treatment at the baseline received
livelihood skill trainings and associated benefits of enhanced social capital,
resource constraints meant only a randomly selected subset of these house-
holds could received livestock at the start of the project; we refer to these
early recipients as “Originals”. Depending on the ecological and market con-
ditions of their location, Originals were given either a pregnant dairy cow,
two pregnant draft cattle or one male and seven female meat goats. A bull
was also given to each group that received draft or dairy cattle to service
members’ donated animals. Irrespective of animal type, the monetary value
of the livestock transfer was similar across recipients, USD 1629 PPP on av-
erage. Originals were required to pass on a female offspring for each female
animal they received through the program to the members of their groups
that did not receive a transfer in the initial round. These second-phase re-
cipients are referred to as a “Pass on the Gift” (POG) households. While
Originals received full treatment (training and productive assets) and POGs
received partial treatment (training at the baseline and a lower value asset
transfer after a delay), Prospective households, which are spatially separate
from other groups, received neither.
2.4.2 Data and Research Design
The project collected six rounds of detailed demographic and socioeconomic
information from sampled households. The baseline included 106 Original,
111 POG and 67 Control households and was conducted in January and
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February of 2012, overlapping with the timing of the initial livestock transfer.
Follow-up surveys began six months later and were conducted July/August
2012, January/February 2013, July/August 2013, January/February 2015
and July/August 2015.4
We exploit the rollout of the program to identify the program impacts.
Since both the early recipients (Originals) and future recipients (Prospec-
tives) passed identical screening, self-selected for participation, and have
equivalent eligibility, we assume the two groups to be comparable on un-
observables and treat the Prospectives as a pseudo Control group. These
two groups differ on timing of application to the program only. Correla-
tion between unobservable group characteristics and application timing could
threaten identification, but observable data provide no evidence that such
correlation exists. Furthermore, the Original and Control households reside
in different villages and spillover across communities is unlikely. Nonetheless,
a challenge to our identification is that Control households might alter their
behavior in the anticipation of receiving the livestock transfer.5 Jodlowski
et al. (2016) find no such anticipatory behavior in the first four rounds of the
panel. We acknowledge that the experimental design based on the hetero-
geneity in the application timing is not a pure RCT, however, the window
between the call for application and choosing the program recipients was
very narrow.6 Given the rural setting with limited transportation and com-
munication infrastructure, we believe the heterogeneity in application timing
between the first three and the next two communities is random rather than
systematic. Based on equal eligibility, the fact that Controls went through
4The household surveys collected household consumption and asset holdings. We utilize
community-level food prices collected during the baseline survey to calculate households’
food expenditures. Regarding asset values, for each household we calculated a per unit
value for each asset owned. We used the median of the asset unit values in the community
as the community level price/value for each asset. All monetary amounts in the paper
are PPP-adjusted USD terms and are deflated using CPI to 2012 prices using PPP and
CPI published by the World Bank. In 2012, 1 USD was equivalent to 2.5 PPP adjusted
Zambian Kwacha.
5For example, the Control households might begin focusing on livestock and give up
other activities in expectation of the arrival of the livestock. This kind of anticipatory
behavior would bias the treatment effect downward if returns from livestock are at least as
high as the other activities. An upward bias could emerge if households divest from some
income generating activities or decrease total labor supply in advance of the transfer and
and hence appear worse off than they otherwise would (Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter and
Card, 1985).
6Unfortunately, we do not have exact dates but Heifer Zambia staff report that appli-
cations were submitted within a short period of time - on the order of 1-2 weeks.
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the same selection process as treated households, observation from our field
visits, focus group meetings, and multiple discussions with the implement-
ing staff and extension agents in the field, we believe that the Prospective
household are appropriate counterfactuals.
Although the POGs were left out of the initial livestock transfer at ran-
dom and come from the same groups as the Originals, we do not use POGs
as a comparison group in the analysis for three reasons. First, the POGs
received all the trainings regarding animal management, livelihood skills and
health at the same time as the Originals, which could affect management of
farm animals and other productive assets they already owned. Second, POG
households started receiving immature animals from the Originals as early
as six months after the baseline, therefore, anticipatory behavior among the
POGs could be a factor. Third, POG households reside in the same commu-
nities as the Originals and are more likely to experience project spillovers.
An additional complication is the significant heterogeneity in the timing of
asset transfer to POG households; while some households received livestock
as early as six months after the baseline, others waited up to 36 months. We
normalize the timing of transfer and perform an event-study analysis on the
outcomes of interest to check the appropriateness of POG households as a
comparison group for Originals (Appendix A.3). The results suggest POG
households are not a suitable comparison group for the Originals. Thus, we
use the POG households in our analysis as a second treatment group.
Table 2.1 provides baseline balance tests for the Treatment and Control
groups. The tests suggest no significant differences in means between the
Control and Original households asset and revenue and income variables
(Panels B and D). We do see differences in household size (Panel A), poverty
status (per capita), and per capita household expenditures (Panel C). All
household characteristics in Panel A are balanced except the household size.
Compared to the Controls, Original household have more nonelderly female
adult members and children. In the presence of economies of scale, failure
to adjust the consumption for household size may lead to overestimation
of poverty for large households and underestimation for small households,
driving the differences in per capita expenditures and poverty status. The
household-level (as opposed to per capita) expenditures between the groups
is balanced (Panel C: line 3). We assume that the variation in poverty and
expenditure variables at the baseline (Panel C) does not reflect a system-
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atic difference in groups ability to organize, willingness to participate in the
program, or capability to rear animals; rather, differences are likely due to
relatively small sample sizes and differences in household size. As a robust-
ness check, we adjust the household size using the OECD adult equivalency
(ae) method and report adult equivalence adjusted poverty and expendi-
ture variables in Panel E. The poverty rates between the groups using the
adult equivalence correction are statistically equivalent. The differences in
per capita expenditures between the groups are still significant but small
in magnitude. Moreover, one may expect richer farmers to be better orga-
nized and apply earlier; however, this is not the case as Control households
are less likely to be poor than the treated households. Similarly, if greater
poverty reflects lesser livestock entrepreneurial ability, our strategy, should
underestimate the program effects. To control for any unobserved individual
heterogeneity, we use household fixed effects in our estimation.
The attrition rate of 13% (Table 2.2) is comparable to other asset transfer
program evaluations with similar durations and survey lags (Banerjee et al.,
2015; Bandiera et al., 2017). POG households are less likely than the Control
households to be interviewed in all six rounds. Original households, on the
other hand are as likely to be followed throughout the panel as the Control
households and we find no difference in attrition by baseline outcomes and
characteristics. For our analysis we restrict the sample to the 247 households
interviewed in all six survey rounds.
2.5 Program Treatment Effects
We begin the program evaluation with the standard first-moment impact as-
sessment both to motivate our resilience estimations and to demonstrate that
measuring a positive asset change is a necessary but not sufficient compo-
nent of determining changes in household development resilience. Exploiting
the experimental variation caused by the rollout of the program into two
treatment arms and a control group, we estimate the following difference-in-
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differences/fixed-effect specification:
yit =α +
2∑
t=1
βt(Tt ×Originali) +
2∑
t=1
δt(Tt × POGi) +
2∑
t=1
Tt
+Originali + POGi + ηi + εit
(2.6)
where yit is an outcome of interest for household i at time t and t takes
the values of 0, 1 and 2 for 2012 baseline, 2013 midline and 2015 endline
respectively. Although the project collected five rounds of follow-up surveys,
the information collected was not identical across rounds. Depending on the
availability of data on the outcome variable, we define 2013 midline (time
1) either as 12 months or 18 months, and 2015 endline (time 2) either as
36 months or 42 months post baseline. Tt are indicator variables that re-
fer to survey waves. Originali and POGi are indicators for two treatment
arms. As the household’s timing of application to the program determined
the treatment status, we include household fixed effects ηi to control for un-
observed heterogeneity and cluster the error term εit at the household level.
As a result, the coefficients on Originali and POGi in Equation (2.6) are not
identified. The equation, nonetheless, can be treated as the garden variety
difference-in-difference specification.
βt and δt are the coefficients of interest, which under the assumptions of
“parallel trends” and stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) iden-
tify intent-to-treat (ITT) effects of the program on Original and POG groups
respectively. As discussed in the research design, we expect both assumptions
to hold. First, pre-treatment, the Control (Prospective) group is identified
through a process identical to that of the Original and POG groups. Sec-
ond, Equation (2.6) controls for all household-specific time-invariant factors
and time-varying factors that are equal across all groups. Third, we ex-
pect zero spillovers across treatment and comparison communities because
of their relative geographical separation and hence SUTVA holds. SUTVA
between the two treatment groups, however, may not hold as both Original
and POG groups reside in the same communities. Hence, we cannot explic-
itly distinguish between the pure program effects and the general equilibrium
responses induced by the program in the community and this is an impor-
tant distinction. Nonetheless, the spillovers within the communities are due
to the program itself; the coefficients, therefore, can be viewed as the over-
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all program treatment effects. Similarly, complete compliance implies that
the coefficients also identify treatment-on the treated (TOT) impact of the
program.
2.5.1 Productive Assets and Household Durables
Table 2.3 presents the program impacts on accumulation of productive and
durable assets using Equation (2.6). Information on the full asset portfolio
was collected in the baseline and in follow up survey waves of July/August
2013 and July/August 2015 (18 and 42 months after baseline); we refer to
these follow up rounds as time 1 and 2 in the table.
First we analyze whether beneficiary households undertake the livestock
activities prescribed by the program and measure the direct impact on live-
stock holdings and earnings. Table 2.3 reports impacts on herd size and
quarterly income from livestock related activities. Originals received an av-
erage of 0.88 tropical livestock units (TLU), which is not included in the
baseline herd size. A one-unit TLU gain, 0.99 to be precise, relative to
the Controls one year post-intervention represents an increase of 0.11 TLU
above the transfer amount, meaning the recipients had begun to increase
their holdings beyond the initial transfer. The Originals’ gains are particu-
larly notable since they are required to pass on female offspring to POGs.
Within one year, the value of the Originals’ livestock holdings increased by
USD 460.6 per capita relative to the Control households. Half of the increase
was due to the initial livestock gift.7 Moreover, an increase of USD 64.6 in
quarterly income from selling livestock and livestock products during that
time period implies that the transfers were productive within the first year
of the intervention. Among POGs we find a small increase in herd size and
herd value but no significant effect on livestock revenue in the first year, con-
7In the first wave of the transfers, the Original households received livestock worth
about USD 1629, about 229 per capita, which is not included in the baseline asset value.
Therefore, 49.8% (= 229/460.6) of the first year rise in the value of livestock can be
attributed to the transfer itself. The per capita change in the herd size may not directly
reflect the change in the value of herd size because; first the value of the same type of
livestock may change over time in the community - after seeing the benefits, livestock
may become more valuable or the presence of too many livestock may decrease the price
etc. Second, we calculate the value of herd size using the method described above and
use country-level CPI to deflate the value to the baseline. However, if the increase in the
price of animal is more than the CPI adjustment, we may face this discrepancy, which is
exactly the case.
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sistent with POGs receiving immature animals after the Originals’ donated
livestock produce offspring.
Three years after the baseline, intervention effects are large among both
the Originals and POGs. Relative to the Control group, the herd size of
the Original households increases by 1.11 TLU or 92% of the baseline mean,
and POGs’ herd size increase by about one TLU unit. The gains in herd
sizes are associated with increases in livestock-based revenue for both groups.
The Originals experience an increase in livestock-based revenues of 821.6%
(USD 110.7) relative to the baseline. POGs, meanwhile, see an increase of
USD 72.1 (imprecisely estimated) in income from livestock. Comparing the
Originals’ 18 and 42 month impacts indicates that the program effects are
sustained with continued growth in herd size and related earnings. After
42 months, the value of animals owned by Originals has increased by 261%
(USD 497.1) relative to the baseline, which is 141% net of the transfer value.
The 18 month and 42 month impacts on POG households’ livestock values
are USD 173.8 and 305.5 respectively. Because the livestock transfers to
POGs were spread over the period analyzed, we are unable to separate out
the direct transfer value from the added value generated after the transfer.
Finding that the treatment effects grow after the initial transfer suggests the
transfers helped households sustain economic growth and perhaps provided
a path out of poverty. The resilience estimations will test this hypothesis.
Aggregating across asset types, Table 2.3 shows that by three years post-
intervention total household asset value increased by 124.6% (USD 495.7)
among the Originals. The increment is robust relative to the first-year incre-
ment of USD 477.1 (with the p-value of 0.825 on the equality between the
two periods’ impacts). The impacts are significant among POG households
as well: USD 279.3 and 294.5 after one and three years post-intervention,
respectively. The growth in livestock assets is the major component driving
the aggregate change. Overall, these results suggest that the poor households
in rural Copperbelt province are able to take on and sustain livestock rearing
activities that are likely to be more rewarding than the available alternatives.
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2.5.2 Consumption Expenditure, Food Security, and Asset
Poverty
We analyze program impacts on poverty status, consumption expenditures,
a subjective food security measure and asset poverty status at 12 and 36
months after the intervention using Equation (2.6) and present the results in
Table 2.4. These two survey rounds occurred in the same season as the base-
line and are therefore more appropriate for analysis of consumption impacts
than the later rounds used in analysis of assets in Table 2.3. Relative to the
Control group, the share of Original households with expenditure below the
USD 1.90 poverty line drops by 22.0 percentage points (pp) after one year.
The impact is even greater after three years: 31.4pp drop or 50.3% decrease
from the baseline mean. The impact on the partially treated POG group is
more modest and is statistically insignificant.
Relative to the Controls, the weekly per capita total expenditure of the
Originals increases by USD 7.47 or 58.8% of the baseline mean after three
years. This is higher relative to the one-year effect of USD 3.34 indicat-
ing increase in gains over time. Although positive, gains among POGs are
not precisely estimated. Columns 2 and 3 decompose the total expendi-
tures into food and nonfood expenditures. Three-year gains of 3.72 and 3.75
USD among the Originals in food and nonfood expenditures, respectively,
relative to the Controls are significantly greater than the one-year impacts.
Consumption changes for POGs are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Because of the program design, all POG households received training but
not every POG received animals early enough to be productive or affect con-
sumption over the observed time-period. These effects are comparable to
Kafle et al. (2016) which analyzed data from the first 18 months of the same
program. Although consumption expenditures show no evidence of impact
for POGs, significantly higher shares of both Original and POG households
consider themselves to be food secure compared to the Controls (Column 5).
Based on the relationship between consumption and assets, explored in
Appendix A.2.2, we estimate an asset poverty line at USD 308 (PPP) per
capita. This asset poverty line represents the per capita asset wealth that is
associated with consumption at the expenditure poverty line. As the table
shows, we find a significant reduction in the number of Original and POG
households below this threshold, compared to the Control group. While
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POGs show little change with respect to the expenditure poverty line, we
find that the program has successfully moved some of them above the asset
poverty line. The apparent decrease in the magnitude of the treatment effects
on asset poverty over-time among the Original group raises concern about
sustainability of impacts, however, the test of equality of the treatment effects
between the two periods is negative. Indeed, three-year impacts for both the
treatment groups (Original and POG households) are statistically equal if not
higher in magnitude than the one-year impacts for almost all the outcomes
considered in this section. These findings suggests that program impacts do
not dissipate and likely increase over time.8
Given the sequence of program implementation, the possibility that the
early entrants (Originals) may crowd out others in the community from live-
stock rearing activities is of concern. Our results show no evidence of such
crowding out. Although we cannot entirely rule out the general equilibrium
responses to greater demand for livestock labor or increased local supply of
milk, meat, or animal traction, the differences in treatment effects between
the Originals and the POGs are mostly attributable to delayed impacts rather
than to accrual of unique benefits to early adopters. The differences diminish
over time in almost all the outcomes considered in this section. In particu-
lar for herd size, the outcome that is directly affected by the program and
is most likely to be affected by the Originals’ head start, we observe that
POGs experience the same impact as the Originals (1.03 vs 1.11) three years
after the baseline. Rather than early adopters crowding out others, we see
evidence that the differences in treatment effects between the two groups are
likely to disappear over time.
2.6 Effects on Development Resilience
We model resilience explicitly in asset space because assets serve as an input
for future household asset accumulation and hence welfare gains. Information
on assets in the panel was collected at baseline and 18 months, 36 months and
42 months after the baseline. Given the structure of the data and Markov
8Analyses of heterogeneity in impacts using quantile regression methods in Ap-
pendix A.5 shows that these effects are consistent across quantiles, though weaker at
the extremes.
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first-order path dynamics, we can recover parameters only on the last three
rounds in the regression setting. Equation (2.1) reduces to:
Wit = α +
k∑
j=1
βjW
j
i,t−1 +
∑
l
3∑
t=1
γlt(Tt ×Dl) +
3∑
t=2
δtTt + θZit + εit (2.7)
where Wit is asset value of household i at time t in natural log. Time period
t takes the values of 0, 1, 2, and 3 for baseline, 18, 36 and 42 months after
the baseline respectively. Tt are indicators for survey waves 18 months, 36
months and 42 months. Dl, where l ∈ (Originali, POGi), are dummy vari-
ables for the two treatment arms. Zit refer to family composition and other
characteristics that influence asset accumulation, and εit are random shocks
that household i faces. The originals received pregnant livestock during or
soon after the baseline survey. The initial recipients reap benefits (milk,
meat, ploughing, increase in herd size etc.) from the transfers well within 18
months. Therefore, we add transfer values to the Originals’ baseline asset
values, which serve as the lagged term for the survey round 4 (18 months)
or t = 1 in the specification. Figure A.2 in Appendix A.2, which provides
discussion on model selection, shows that the cubic fit and locally weighted
regression (Lowess smoothing) of asset values on lagged values follow each
other closely. We choose cubic (k = 3) as our preferred functional form.
Asset values are non-negative for all the households in the sample. Conse-
quently, we assume the dependent variable to be distributed Poisson and fit
a GLM log link using maximum likelihood on the mean. Using the parame-
ter estimates from Equation (2.7), we predict the first moment of the asset
distribution of household i at time t as in Equation (2.2). Squared residuals
from Equation (2.7) are used to estimate Equation (2.3),9 which recovers
parameters to predict the second moment (Equation 2.4). We calculate each
household’s probability density function (pdf) of asset holdings for each pe-
riod assuming the conditional transition distribution function to be gamma
distribution.10 We convert the poverty line of USD 1.90 PPP into an asset
poverty line (W¯ ) of USD 308 PPP as shown in Figure A.3 (Appendix A.2.2).
9Because variance must be nonnegative, we, again, assume the dependent variable to
be distributed Poisson and fit GLM log link using maximum likelihood.
10The parameters (shape and scale) for Gamma distribution are: Wt | Wt−1 ∼
Γ(
µ21t
µ2t
,
µ2t
µ1t
).
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Using the calculated minimum asset threshold, we estimate each household’s
development resilience in each period (ρit).
2.6.1 Resilience Treatment Effects and Headcount Resilient
Rate
In order to assess the program’s impact on development resilience, we follow
Cisse´ and Barrett (2016) that ∂ρˆit/∂Xit is a characteristic Xi’s impact on
development resilience and estimate the following specification:
ρˆit = α +
k∑
j=1
βjW
j
i,t−1 +
∑
l
3∑
t=1
γlt(Tt ×Dl) +
3∑
t=2
δtTt + θZit + εit (2.8)
Note that:
∂ρˆit
∂(Tt ×Dl) = γˆlt
= E[ρˆit | W ji,t−1, Zit, Tt, Dl = 1]
− E[ρˆit | W ji,t−1, Zit, Tt, Dl = 0]
where t ∈ [1, 2, 3]
(2.9)
which are the differences of the conditional means between the treatment and
Control groups at time t. The causal inference of the program’s impacts, γit,
is based on the conditional independence assumption:
E[ρˆ0it | W ji,t−1, Zit, Tt, Dl] = E[ρˆ0it | W ji,t−1, Zit, Tt] (2.10)
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, the treatment assignment was quasi-randomized
with each group having equal eligibility into the program. Pre-intervention,
the Treatment and Control groups are balanced on observables, including
mean assets (Table 2.1). We expect both the first and second moments
of the asset holding to be equivalent between the Treatments and Control
households prior to the intervention.
Panel A in Table 2.5 presents the estimated average marginal treatment
effects on development resilience, measured as the share of the probability
distribution of asset holding of a household that is above the asset poverty
line.11 Relative to the Controls, both the Originals and POGs have signifi-
11Since the resilience outcome is measured in fractions i.e. ρˆit ∈ [0, 1], we assume the
dependent variable is distributed binomially and fit the GLM logit link regression using
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cantly higher resilience to poverty in all the three rounds. The development
resilience score is 0.228 points or 87.7% higher for the Originals after 18
months of the treatment than the Controls. Similarly, the Originals are
41.3% (0.145 points) and 44.1% (0.167 points) more resilient than the Con-
trols at 36 and 42 months post-intervention respectively. Among POGs,
the program has increased household development resilience by 73.8% (0.192
points), 31.6% (0.111 points) and 29.0% (0.110 points) after 18, 36 and 42
months respectively. Although significantly higher in all rounds relative to
the Controls, the impact appears to decrease in magnitude over time for both
treatment groups. To provide evidence on this we test whether the 36 and
42 months impacts are equivalent to impacts 18 months post-intervention.
The tests of equality of impacts between rounds, however, show no such ev-
idence (with all the p-values from the tests above 0.35). These results are
consistent with the treatment effects in Table 2.3, where the program im-
pacts on asset values are also robust over time. Both the resilience and the
difference-in-difference results suggest that the program has improved house-
holds welfare. Resilience results, in addition, show that the program has
improved households ability to remain non-poor into the future.
Household resilience increases if the conditional mean of asset values in-
creases, if the conditional variance decreases when the conditional mean is
above the minimum threshold W¯ , or both. Estimating Equation (2.8) us-
ing predicted conditional household-time specific mean and variance as the
dependent variables reveals that the mean asset holding among the treated
groups increases compared to the Controls in all rounds (Panel B).12 More-
over, the impacts on mean outcomes are similar for Originals and POGs. The
impacts on the variance are significant for the Originals but are statistically
insignificant for POGs (Panel C). While the conditional asset spread among
the Originals drops significantly relative to the Controls (except in round 5),
the asset spread for the POGs is equivalent to that of the Controls.
The absence of an effect on asset spread for the POGs likely reflects the
heterogeneity in the timing of livestock transfer to the POGs, and the Just
maximum likelihood. We calculate the standard errors of the parameter estimates by
bootstrapping the whole process (from mean specification to the resilience specification)
and clustering at household level using 400 replications.
12Because both the first and second moments are nonnegative, we assume the dependent
variables are distributed Poisson and fit the GLM log link regression using maximum
likelihood.
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and Pope (1979) and Antle (1983) method we use to calculate variance, which
depends on the predictive power of the explanatory variables (lagged assets)
and does not distinguish between positive and negative shocks. While the
transfer value is included in Originals’ baseline assets, the delayed transfer
to the POGs is not. Therefore, though positive, the transfer acts as a shock
and is likely to increase residuals in Equation (2.2) among POGs that receive
the transfer. In the earlier rounds, because of the lower value asset transfer
and the fact that only a few POGs had received transfers, there is no change
in the estimated residuals compared to the Controls. The βˆV ’s for POGs in
Equation (2.3) are statistically equivalent to zero (not shown). Similarly, in
the later rounds, although more POGs received their gifts, the immature an-
imal early POG recipients received is likely to mature and stabilize in value.
The difference in the transfer timing, therefore, is likely to lead to hetero-
geneous estimated residuals in Equation (2.2). Figure A.1 in Appendix A.1
reports the relationship between assets and estimated variance in our sample.
The U-shaped curves suggest households at the extremes face higher asset
volatility. Similarly, POGs, in general, face the highest level of variance in
their asset holding 18 month post-intervention but as more and more POGs
receive their transfer and for longer periods, the variance decreases and the
distribution moves closer to that of Originals. In addition, the limited impact
of the treatment in terms of reducing the dispersion of outcomes for POGs
explains the smaller estimated program impact on POGs resilience compared
to the Originals (Panel A).
Relating these results to the theoretical mechanism discussed in Section 2.2
suggests that the program shifted the first-moment dynamic growth path
upward for both the treated groups. While the conditional transition distri-
bution associated with the first-moment shrinks for the Originals, it remains
unchanged for the POGs. Both cases, however, imply increasing resilience
when the expected asset value is above the poverty line. In short, these re-
sults together with the difference-in-difference specification imply that the
program has increased households’ asset holdings and decreased their prob-
ability of falling into poverty.
Figure 2.1 presents the headcount resilience rate by treatment groups for
each survey wave. We define household i to be resilient at time t if its proba-
bility of falling below the asset poverty line (i.e. its estimated resilience, ρˆit)
is greater than a minimum normative threshold (R¯) at time t i.e. Rit = 1
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if ρˆit > R¯; 0 otherwise.
13 Eighteen months after the initial treatment, most
of the originals (77.1%) are resilient compared to only 18.2% and 17.5% of
the POGs and Controls respectively. The number increases slightly for the
Originals after 36 and 42 months of the intervention more than 80% become
asset resilient. Similarly, the headcount resilience rate among the POG and
Control households increases in later periods but more so for POGs. The
gap between the number of resilient POG and Control households widens
noticeably over time. However, among POGs the resilience treatment effects
(the difference of average resilience scores between POGs and Controls) pre-
sented in Table 2.5 Panel A decreases over time. The distribution of resilience
scores among the Control group, thus, is likely to be positively skewed in the
later periods, whereas the distribution among POGs is likely to be more
symmetric.
2.6.2 Resilience vs Impact Evaluation Measures
To provide the direct comparison between resilience and standard impact
evaluation methods, we compare asset poverty rates and resilience rates.
While households with an asset value above the calculated asset poverty
threshold of USD 308 are defined as asset non-poor, households with es-
timated resilience score of 0.5 and above are classified as resilient. The
treatment effects from the difference-in-difference specification for the two
outcomes are reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A.1. While Originals are
47.0% less likely to be asset poor, they are 59.6% more resilient compared
to the Controls 18 months post-intervention. Similarly, 42 months post-
treatment Originals are more likely to be resilient than asset non-poor (52.7%
vs 39.0%).
The difference in the effect size between the two outcomes is more pro-
nounced among the POGs. Although the POG households are significantly
more likely (24.3%) to be asset non-poor compared to the Controls at 18
13The resilience threshold (R¯) is comparable to poverty line used in headcount poverty
calculation; a unit is classified as resilient if it is above the threshold and non-resilient if
below. Unlike the poverty line, which is generally rooted to some necessary expenditure
requirement for household’s functioning, the resilience threshold is arbitrary. We set the
initial resilience threshold at 0.5 (R¯ = 0.5) and present the headcount resilience rate by
treatment groups for each survey wave. The threshold of 0.5 is greater than the 0.25 used
in Upton et al. (2016) but lower than 0.8 used in Cisse´ and Barrett (2016). However, we
also calculate headcount resilience rate using 0.8 for sensitivity.
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months after intervention, there is no difference in resilience rates between
the two groups. We observe a similar pattern even after increasing the re-
silience threshold to 0.8 and changing distribution and functional form of
the asset holding (Figure 2.2). This result emerges because a relatively high
number of POG households are observed just above the asset poverty thresh-
old with sufficient assets to be classified as asset non-poor but with inade-
quate probability of holding onto assets above the threshold in the future to
be classified as resilient. In order to investigate this possibility, we report
Kernel density household asset distribution over time by treatment status
in Figure 2.3 (Panel A). While more Control households are likely to be
observed above the threshold at the baseline compared to the POGs, the
pattern reverses after 18 months, which is likely to generate significant pos-
itive treatment effects on POGs in the difference-in-difference estimations.
However, we see no such clear pattern in resilience score distribution among
Control and POG households that are above the resilience threshold (Fig-
ure 2.3: Panel B). Moreover, among the asset non-poor households at 18
months post-baseline, significantly fewer POG households are development
resilient compared to their Control counterparts (37.0% vs 42.9% results not
shown). In such scenarios, the standard static measurements such as asset
poverty headcount might be misleading. The resilience measure, on the other
hand, provides the likelihood of one’s future outcome relative to the thresh-
old given its present status. Hence, the resilience measurement yields more
insight about households’ capacity to escape or remain out of poverty.
2.6.3 Robustness Check
We re-estimate the effects on resilience using an alternative functional form,
an alternative distributional assumption and an alternative estimation tech-
nique. Column 1 of Table 2.6 presents the program impacts assuming the
polynomial lagged asset to be quadratic i.e. k = 2 to incorporate the single-
steady- state equilibrium poverty trap discussed in Section 2.2. Column
2 presents the estimates assuming Wt−1 to be normally distributed. Both
sets of the estimates are comparable (in significance and magnitude) to the
initial results presented in Table 2.5. Additionally, we estimate effects on
resilience using OLS and again find results to be consistent with the earlier
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estimates. Figure 2.2 presents headcount asset resilience rates using alter-
native resilience thresholds. Figure 2.2a and Figure 2.2d are resilience rate
using R¯ = 0.8 as the resilience cutoff i.e. a household is development re-
silient only if its resilience measure is above 0.8 (ρit > 0.8) assuming Wt−1
to be distributed gamma and normal respectively. As expected, the count
of resilient households decreases across the treatment groups and over-time
(about 20% less) in both methods. Originals, nonetheless, are the most re-
silient across all survey waves. Functional form and distribution assumptions
appear to be of no significance in the resilience rate calculation for our esti-
mations. While Figure 2.2b shows the headcount resilience rates using the
quadratic functional form, Figure 2.2c shows the headcount rates assuming a
normal distribution. Estimates of the number of resilient households across
the treatment groups in both specifications are consistent with the initial
estimates. The estimated program impacts on asset resilience are robust
across the choices of threshold, functional form, distributional assumption,
and estimation technique.
2.7 Mechanism
We find that a time-limited integrated asset transfer program led to sustained
gains in household consumption, income, asset holdings, and resilience. While
we find no evidence of a bifurcated growth path inducing a poverty trap, the
conditions in the research site suggest a single low-level equilibrium in ab-
sence of the intervention. In this setting, a large one-time asset and skill
transfer is likely to ease households’ capital and skill constraints and shift
their growth curve in a northeast direction, which represents improvements
both in well-being and resilience. Similarly, the program is likely to help
households transition to more remunerative technologies, which, again, im-
proves well-being and resilience. Lack of access to capital alone, however,
is not a sufficient condition to keep poor in persistent poverty if they can
sell their labor optimally. While the poor are generally endowed with labor
but few productive assets, imperfections in rural labor markets can prevent
them from fully utilizing their labor resources and prompt them to accept
low-paying casual jobs (Bardhan, 1984; Dre`ze, 1988; Rose, 2001; Banerjee
and Duflo, 2007; Kaur, 2014; Bandiera et al., 2017). A one-time productive
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asset transfer and training program, however, is likely to break the barriers
the rural poor face in accessing capital, facilitating entry into higher return
activities and moving them from a low-level growth path to a higher level
one (Bandiera et al., 2017).
The program analyzed here intended to use livestock transfer and training
to enable households to engage in more capital intensive self-employment.
Analysis of adults’ occupation choices and households’ income from different
streams can reveal whether change in labor allocation was actually part of
the mechanism by which this program achieved impact. Table 2.7 shows that
the program prompted households to take on self-employment activities and
leave casual labor. Adult women in the Original households are 20.4% and
16.2% (23.6% increase relative to the baseline) more likely to be engaged in
self-employment 36 and 42 months after the intervention. Additionally, three
and one half years after the baseline, Original households have decreased
participation in casual labor employment by 7.5% a decrease of 157.7%
since the baseline relative to Controls.
Three years after the baseline, quarterly income from selling livestock prod-
ucts and cattle increases by 821% among Originals - an increase of USD 111
relative to Controls, which is significantly greater than the one-year increase
of USD 64.6. Although statistically insignificant, POG households also ex-
perience increases in their quarterly income from livestock rearing (USD 72)
in the three years since baseline relative to Control households. In addition
to increased income from livestock, the results show treated households shift
out of paid employment – relative to the Controls both the Originals’ and
POGs’ paid income decreases in both periods. The results for total revenue
show that shifts out of casual employment into livestock activities led to sub-
stantial increases in household revenues. Overall, these results suggest that
the transfer of livestock and skills helped remove the barriers to entry into
higher return labor activities which is consistent with a more stable asset
base and greater resilience.
2.8 Cost-Benefit Analysis
A number of observers have called for increased attention to the costs of
achieving impacts associated with asset transfers. Table 2.8 presents con-
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ventional benefit-cost measures for project assessment and extends them to
indicate the cost of achieving increases in resilience. Details of the cost-
benefit calculation are presented in Appendix A.4. In total, the direct costs
of the program amount to USD 1853 per household 1629 for livestock and
224 for equipment and supplies. Most of the program costs, however, are
indirect and related to supervision and program implementation (USD 2474
per household), which are spread over the duration of the program. Costs
include staff wages and salary support for veterinarians and agricultural ex-
perts for the duration of the program. In addition, indirect costs include
training, evaluation, travel and vehicle operation and other office expenses.
The total program cost is USD 5009 per household for the full duration of
the program. Compared to similar programs, this cost is higher than the
BRAC program, USD 1363 (Bandiera et al., 2017), but comparable to the
six Graduation programs, ranging from USD 1455 to 5962 (Banerjee et al.,
2015).
Following Banerjee et al. (2015) and Bandiera et al. (2017) gains in house-
hold nondurable consumption are the core benefit measure. Estimated changes
in household consumption expenditures are calculated by multiplying the
weekly treatment impacts with average household size (7.1 in year one and
6.3 in year three) times 52. Year two impacts are assumed to be equal to
the gains in year one. Similarly, we assume year three consumption gains to
persist after the third year through year 20 and we report net present value of
future gains in year four and beyond. We add year 3 asset gains and the to-
tal benefits amount to USD 22299 over the 20 year time horizon. Additional
indirect benefits such as gains in human capital through better nutrition,
increase school expenditure on children etc., however, are not accounted for
in the analysis. Similarly, the program promotes social cohesion and learn-
ing; the potential gains through these avenues are difficult to capture. Our
benefit analysis, therefore, underestimates true program benefits.
Row 7 shows the benefit ratio of the program, which is obtained dividing
the total benefit by the total program cost. On average the benefit from the
program is 4.45 times higher than its cost. The ratio is comparable to the
findings from other livestock transfer programs. It is slightly higher than
the ratios reported in Banerjee et al. (2015) (ranges from 2.6 to -1.9) and in
Bandiera et al. (2017), which is 3.21. The ratio of benefit to cost is robust
to different values of the discount rate and different time horizons.
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Row 8 presents the calculated internal rates of return (IRR), which are
based on the estimated changes in household nondurable consumption ex-
penditures and calculated as the discount rate at which the net present value
of the benefits are equal to the program cost. We follow Bandiera et al.
(2017) and assume these gains last for a period of 20 years. The IRR is 24%
at the mean – clearly exceeding the formal lending interest rate of 12.1% at
the beginning of the project(World Development Indicators, 2017).14 This
implies that households in rural Zambia can finance these high-return activ-
ities if provided the access to formal credit. The IRR is robust to different
values of the social discount rate and different program benefit time-horizons.
Panel C in Table 2.8 focuses on the cost of improving the resilience head-
count by one percent at different resilience cutoffs. Costs are calculated as
total transfer value divided by the gains in resilience headcount rate (see Ap-
pendix A.4.1). The original transfer value of USD 2145 (USD 1853 inflated
to year 3) helped increase headcount resilience by 20.8% among the treated
group (Original + POG) compared to the Control group at the 0.8 resilience
cutoff 18 months post-intervention. If households are distributed uniformly
over asset-holdings, an investment of USD 103 into the program moves 1%
of the non-resilient households into resilience after 18 months of the invest-
ment, such that they have less than a 20% probability of falling into poverty
in the future.15 Consistent with the treatment effects (Table 2.3), the cost
of increasing headcount resilience by 1% decreases after three and half years
(USD 84); a greater number of treated households become resilient as trans-
fers become more productive and/or higher numbers of the POGs receive
transfers over time. As expected, the cost is lower at the 0.5 resilience cutoff
- USD 100 and USD 58 at 18 and 42 months post-transfer, respectively.
14Internal rates of return are heterogeneous across livestock transfer programs. While
the rate varies from 6.9% to 23.4% in the six Graduation pilots (Banerjee et al., 2015),
Bandiera et al. (2017) report the rate of 22% for BRAC program in Bangladesh. The IRR
for cash transfer programs are similar to the livestock transfer programs. Blattman et al.
(2016) report IRR of 24% for a cash transfer of USD 150 towards non-farm self-employment
activities along with training and follow-up supervision to ultra-poor in post-war Uganda.
15For this to hold households either have equal livestock rearing abilities or the abilities
are orthogonal to the baseline assets. Since all households (treated and control) self-select
themselves into the program and quasi-random treatment assignment means, on average,
livestock rearing abilities between the groups are equal.
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2.9 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper implements a quantifiable measure of household resilience and
demonstrates its application and relevance in the context of an impact eval-
uation. Results from the impact evaluation find that a one-off transfer of
assets and training increased household development resilience; the inter-
vention shifted the conditional transition distribution of households’ asset
holdings upward, increasing expected asset holdings and decreasing condi-
tional variance. Findings demonstrate that attention to conditional variance
in impact on assets provides important insights into program effectiveness
and persistence of estimated effects.
Resilience as a household outcome offers three important advantages for
impact analysis. First, because it is based on the full distribution of house-
hold welfare, the development resilience measure provides a more complete
picture of intervention impacts, yielding insights into household capacity to
avoid falling into poverty in the foreseeable future. In particular, estima-
tion of the conditional moment functions allows for nonlinear persistence,
which can improve forecasting of households’ future states. In addition, the
conditional moment functions make it possible to distinguish whether esti-
mated effects are primarily attributable to changes in the conditional mean
or the conditional variance. These inferences are especially significant for
households at or near the poverty threshold. Our finding that a substantial
share of households in the analysis are asset non-poor and yet not resilient
illustrates this point. Resilience measurement yields policy-relevant insights
into household well-being that conventional measures like poverty headcount
miss.
Second, because conventional methods use cross-sectional variation as a
proxy for inter-temporal variation, they offer only limited insight into longer-
term household welfare status. In contrast, the resilience estimation imple-
mented in this paper exploits inter-temporal variance in prior periods to pre-
dict future outcomes based on estimated poverty dynamics. Third, central
to poverty traps theory is the possible existence of nonlinear welfare path
dynamics. With regard to policy, such dynamics have important implica-
tions, most notably that one-time “big-push” interventions can indeed foster
a sustainable trajectory out of poverty. While the impact evaluation litera-
ture largely ignores the possibility of such nonlinear dynamics, the concept
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of resilience, rooted in poverty trap theory, takes into account the potential
importance of such nonlinearities.
Measurement of development resilience as proposed by Barrett and Con-
stas (2014) and implemented here does have important limitations. First,
the measure is sensitive to assumptions governing its estimation. Central
to quantifying development resilience is the estimation of higher order mo-
ments of the welfare distribution using techniques from Just and Pope (1979)
and Antle (1983) and the method relies on the goodness-of-fit of the first mo-
ment regression equation. The resilience estimate is therefore sensitive to the
choice of explanatory variables and weighs negative shocks as equally as pos-
itive shocks. Moreover, the measure could have a perverse implication: for a
household with a mean asset level just below the poverty threshold, increas-
ing variability would raise measured resilience. Finally, the method applied
here is data intensive, as multiple rounds of follow-up data are required to
estimate the probability distributions on wealth. Nonetheless, at different
levels of population aggregation, the concept of development resilience and
its measurement complement and in many cases serve as an improvement
over conventional impact evaluations focused only on the first moments of
outcomes.
Given the science-based predictions of increasingly frequent natural disas-
ters, unstable weather patterns, macroeconomic shocks, and other humani-
tarian emergencies, anti-poverty interventions will continue to focus on bol-
stering the capacity of poor households to mitigate risks. Our resilience esti-
mation results suggest that the multifaceted approach focused on improving
well-being through transfers, decreasing downside risk, and changing under-
lying structural barriers to economic progress, can have lasting impact on
households’ ability to accumulate and retain productive assets and to with-
stand covariate and idiosyncratic shocks. We argue, moreover, that resilience
theory can guide development practitioners in the design and evaluation of
future anti-poverty programs. Our findings suggest that standard impact
evaluation measurements are insufficient to establish households’ resilience
against future poverty spells and should be complemented, where possible,
by estimation and evaluation of higher moments of the household welfare
distribution. Researchers and practitioners interested in understanding and
evaluating household well-being using resilience will need to rethink their
impact evaluation plans by, for example, shifting to the collection of high-
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frequency data over longer time periods. The contributions in terms of policy
design and assessment could be considerable and are important areas for fu-
ture work.
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2.10 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Headcount Resilience Rate (Gamma, W¯ = 308, R¯ = 0.5 and
k = 3)
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Notes: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are calculated using 400 replications.
Standard errors are clustered at household level. Household i at time t is classified
as resilient, Rit, if its resilience score is greater than 0.5 i.e. Rit = 1 if ρˆit > R¯;
0 otherwise; where ,R¯ = 0.5. Expected assets of each household in each round is as-
sumed to follow gamma distribution with first and second moments estimated from path
dynamic equations using GLM with Poisson family and log link function.
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Figure 2.2: Headcount Resilience Rate - Robustness Checks
(a) Gamma, W¯ = 308, R¯ = 0.8 and
k = 3
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(b) Gamma, W¯ = 308, R¯ = 0.5 and
k = 2
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(c) Normal, W¯ = 308, R¯ = 0.5 and k = 3
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
R
es
ili
en
ce
 H
ea
dc
ou
nt
18 Months 36 Months 42 Months
Original POG Control Original POG Control Original POG Control
(d) Normal, W¯ = 308, R¯ = 0.8 and
k = 3
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Notes: Expected assets of each household in each round is assumed to follow a gamma
distribution in Figure 2.2a and 2.2b, and a normal distribution in Figure 2.2c and 2.2d.
First and second moments estimated from path dynamic equations using GLM with Pois-
son family and log link function with polynomial lagged asset to be cubic i.e. k = 3 is a
preferred functional form except Figure 2.2b where k = 2.
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Figure 2.3: Kernel density estimate of asset and resilience
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Notes: Panel A shows Kernel density estimate of household asset by treatment groups
at the baseline and 18 months post-intervention. While the vertical solid lines represent
asset poverty threshold of 5.73 (log(W¯ ) = 5.73 =⇒ W¯ = 308 USD PPP per person), the
dash vertical line in A2 is the asset poverty threshold plus the half of standard deviation
of asset distribution among the Controls 18 months post-intervention. Panel B shows
Kernel density estimate of resilience at 18 months after the baseline. The vertical solid
line represents resilience threshold of 0.5.
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Table 2.1: Baseline characteristics and balance
Means (SD) Test of equality of means [P-val]
(1) (2) (3) (4) Original= (5) POG=
Original POG Control Control Control
Panel A: Demography
Head is female 0.283 0.252 0.209 0.267 0.506
(0.453) (0.436) (0.410)
Head is illiterate 0.057 0.090 0.030 0.385 0.081
(0.232) (0.288) (0.171)
Head is married 0.821 0.874 0.791 0.635 0.163
(0.385) (0.333) (0.410)
Household size 7.377 6.928 5.627 0.000 0.000
(2.799) (2.762) (2.059)
Household size (Adult equivalence) 4.862 4.491 3.807 0.000 0.002
(1.717) (1.666) (1.282)
Panel B: Assets
Herd size (TLU) 1.162 0.741 1.233 0.849 0.173
(1.930) (1.797) (2.595)
Total asset value (Per capita) 382.054 222.757 460.133 0.453 0.013
(551.714) (346.283) (728.025)
Asset non-poor 0.302 0.144 0.328 0.718 0.006
(0.461) (0.353) (0.473)
Panel C: Poverty & Expenditure
Poverty status (Below USD 1.90) 0.623 0.622 0.418 0.008 0.008
(0.487) (0.487) (0.497)
Total weekly expenditure (Per capita) 12.872 13.340 18.298 0.003 0.007
(9.574) (10.028) (12.693)
Total weekly expenditure (HH level) 86.384 80.834 88.731 0.787 0.335
(55.898) (48.458) (55.276)
Panel D: Revenue & Income
Total revenue last year (Per capita) 527.539 543.884 1083.991 0.103 0.114
(724.437) (768.995) (2727.464)
Livestock revenue last 3 months (Per capita) 13.603 19.640 78.138 0.120 0.160
(40.139) (54.555) (336.992)
Crops revenue last year (Per capita) 301.593 332.440 240.678 0.295 0.173
(475.180) (602.685) (287.585)
Other labor & non-labor income 32.015 26.666 106.658 0.250 0.214
last 3 months (Per capita) (98.283) (55.531) (523.726)
Panel D: Poverty & Expenditure
Per adult equivalence)
Poverty status (Below USD 1.90) 0.349 0.333 0.239 0.117 0.172
(0.479) (0.474) (0.430)
Total weekly expenditure 19.054 19.907 26.020 0.007 0.015
(Per adult equivalence) (13.893) (13.466) (17.622)
Notes: All monetary amounts are measured in USD PPP-adjusted. Household assets refer to value of livestock, durables, agricultural tools, and
livestock equipment. The expenditure items covered are: food, clothing, household durables, schooling, medical, alcohol-tobacco, fuel and other
home expenditures. Other labor and non-labor income refers to paid income and micro-enterprise profits. Total revenue last year is calculated
by adding yearly revenues from crops and livestock, paid income, micro-enterprise profits, remittance and other transfers (total revenue = 4×
livestock revenue last 3 months + 4× other labor and non-labor income last 3 months + crops revenue last year + remittances and other transfers
last year). Poverty status is a binary variable equal to 1 if per day per person (or per adult equivalence) expenditure is below the 1.90 USD
poverty line, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2.2: Attrition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Original -0.035 -0.046 -0.021 -0.149
(0.052) (0.053) (0.093) (0.300)
POG -0.148*** -0.151*** -0.094 -0.876***
(0.051) (0.053) (0.091) (0.279)
Total per capita expenditure -0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
Herd size (TLU) -0.000 -0.025
(0.014) (0.031)
Total per capita assets 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Total per capita expenditure × Original -0.003
(0.005)
Total per capita expenditure × POG -0.008*
(0.005)
Herd size (TLU) × Original 0.024
(0.039)
Herd size (TLU) × POG 0.039
(0.038)
Total per capita assets × Original 0.000
(0.000)
Total per capita assets × POG 0.000
(0.000)
Baseline characteristics Yes
Baseline characteristics interacted with Treatment Yes
Attrition Rate: Baseline to Endline 0.130
Test: OG and all OG interacted jointly 0 [p-val] 0.738 0.0900
Test: POG and all POG interacted jointly 0 [p-val] 0.00502 9.76e-05
Adjusted R-squared 0.028 0.027 0.031 0.109
Observations 284 284 284 284
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. OLS estimates are reported based on
the sample of households observed at baseline. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the
household is observed in all 6 survey waves (baseline, 6 months, 12 months, 18 months, 36 months, and 42 months
post-intervention), and zero otherwise.
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Table 2.6: Treatment effects on household resilience - robustness checks
OLS
Gamma Normal Gamma Normal
(k = 2) (k = 3) (k = 3) (k = 3)
Time 1 Original (18 months from baseline) 0.237*** 0.226*** 0.228*** 0.225***
(0.0567) (0.0563) (0.0573) (0.0575)
Time 1 POG (18 months from baseline) 0.186*** 0.198*** 0.179*** 0.185***
(0.0534) (0.0556) (0.0518) (0.0540)
Time 2 Original (36 monhts from baseline) 0.157*** 0.143*** 0.137*** 0.136***
(0.0514) (0.0510) (0.0516) (0.0514)
Time 2 POG (36 monhts from baseline) 0.118** 0.116** 0.110** 0.114**
(0.0469) (0.0480) (0.0476) (0.0486)
Time 3 Original (42 months from baseline) 0.167*** 0.162** 0.156*** 0.151**
(0.0629) (0.0629) (0.0600) (0.0603)
Time 3 POG (42 months from baseline) 0.113** 0.108* 0.111** 0.110*
(0.0561) (0.0576) (0.0563) (0.0574)
Test of Equality of Impacts [p-value]
Original: Time 1 = Time 2 0.381 0.368 0.000 0.000
Original: Time 1 = Time 3 0.456 0.496 0.000 0.000
POG: Time 1 = Time 2 0.460 0.373 0.000 0.000
POG: Time 1 = Time 3 0.437 0.342 0.000 0.000
Observations 741 741 741 741
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Each column in the table represents a
separate regression. Column 1 reports average marginal treatment effects estimated using generalized linear
model (GLM) with binomial family and logit link function with polynomial lagged asset to be quadratic
(k = 2) in the path dynamics equation. Column 2 shows average marginal treatment effects estimated using
GLM with binomial family and logit link function assuming conditional transition distribution function to
be normal. Columns 3 and 4 show treatment effects from OLS assuming conditional transitional distribution
function to be gamma and normal respectively.
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Table 2.8: Cost-benefit analysis
Panel A. External parameters
a Direct asset transfer costs at year 0 1853
b Training, salaries, supervision etc. at year 0 2474
c Total costs at year 0 (a+b) 4327
d Total costs discounted at year 3 5009
Social Discount = 5%
Year 3 PPP Exchange = 2.94
Panel B. Estimated Benefits
1 Year 1 change in annual nondurable consumption expenditure 1293.9
2 Year 2 change in annual nondurable consumption expenditure,
assuming treatment effect equal to year 1 1293.9
3 Year 3 change in annual nondurable expenditure 1418.3
4 From year 4 till year 20 NPV change in nondurable expenditure,
assuming year 3 gains persist 15990.2
5 Year 3 change in asset value 2302.7
6 Total Benefits (1+2+3+4+5) 22299.0
7 Benefits/Cost ratio (assuming benefits last 20 years from transfer date) 4.45
Sensitivity to different time horizons/discount rates
i Benefits last 5 years post-intervention 1.79
ii Benefits last 10 years post-intervention 2.90
iii Social discount = 7% 3.80
iv Social discount = 10% 3.07
8 IRR (assuming benefits last 20 years from transfer date) 0.24
i Benefits last 5 years post-intervention 0.10
ii Benefits last 10 years post-intervention 0.22
iii Social discount = 7% 0.23
iv Social discount = 10% 0.22
Panel C. Cost of increasing headcount resilient rate by 1%
Resilience threshold cutoff R¯ = 0.5 R¯ = 0.8
i Year 1 post-intervention (USD) 99.83 102.95
ii Year 3 post-intervention (USD) 58.22 83.64
Notes: Panel A reports per household costs. Direct asset transfer cost equal to the value of livestock (1629 USD),
horticulture (20 USD) and agricultural equipment and supplies (204 USD) transfers. Household nondurable consumption
includes both food (own production and purchased) and nonfood expenditures (clothing, schooling, medical, alcohol-
tobacco , transportation, cosmetics, fuel and other home expenditures). Annual changes in household consumption are
calculated multiplying treatment effects with average household size in the year (7.1 in year one and 6.3 in year three)
times 52. Assets equal the value of herd size, agricultural tools, durables and livestock equipment minus the value of
transfer. Internal rate of return (IRR) is based on estimated nondurable consumption gains, assuming that these last for
20 years. Year 1 and year 3 in panel C refer to 18 and 42 months after the intervention respectively. The average cost of
increasing head count resilience by one percent is the value of the transfer divided by the gains in the headcount resilient
rate (see Appendix A.4.1).
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CHAPTER 3
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION ON LABOR SUPPLY IN
NEPAL
3.1 Introduction
One-fifth of the 30% poverty reduction in Nepal occurring between 1995 and
2004 is attributed to work-related international migration and remittances
sent home (Lokshin et al., 2010). More than two million prime-age (mostly
male) Nepalese are working outside the country and the inflow of remit-
tances accounts for 30% of the country’s GDP (Ministry of Finance, 2014).
Decrease in labor stock and substantial income from abroad is likely to have
profound effect on labor market and, yet, the impacts of the migration on
the non-income dimensions in Nepal remain relatively unexplored. The paper
addresses this issue by documenting the differential impact of international
migration on labor supply of the left-behind family members.
Traditionally, the literature on the household-level impacts of migration
has focused on income and consumption of the left-behind families. There
is a general consensus among this literature that temporary out-migration
for employment helps increase income and reduce poverty (Adams and Page,
2005, summarizes the results of microlevel analysis in several countries).1
However, a relatively new strand of the literature focusing on the non-
consumption dimension of left-behind family members’ wellbeing provides
more mixed evidence. These new studies suggest that male migration de-
creases non-migrating women’s labor market participation and increases their
labor supply in farming and unpaid family work (Lokshin and Glinskaya,
1Remittances help smooth consumption (Yang and Choi, 2007), provide mutual insur-
ance (Stark and Lucas, 1988), relax credit constraints (Yang, 2008) and alleviate liquidity
constraints (Taylor et al., 2003) allowing non-migrating members to engage in higher remu-
nerative activities. At the same time, other community members may benefit from positive
spillovers: Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2010) find children in communities with higher mi-
grants have greater school attendance and McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) find migration
reduces inequality in sending communities in the long run.
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2009, in Nepal; Binzel and Assaad, 2011, in Egypt; Mu and van de Walle,
2011, in China; Mendola and Carletto, 2012, in Albania). Similarly, migra-
tion has negative effect on the left-behind elderly parents’ health (Antman,
2010) and on children’s educational attainment (Antman, 2011; McKenzie
and Rapoport, 2011). So, how beneficial is international migration for the
left-behind members? Murard (2016) provides a more complete theoreti-
cal framework incorporating both household consumption and labor supply.
Using data from Mexico, the paper finds that temporary migration for em-
ployment leads to both increase in consumption expenditure and farm labor
of household members staying behind. The consumption gains, however, are
too large to be purely explained by the endogenous increase in non-migrant’s
labor supply.
This paper contributes to the growing literature of migration’s impacts on
non-income based outcomes and, in particular, this is among the first pa-
pers to investigate the impact of international migration on time allocation
and leisure consumption by gender in Nepal. To my knowledge, Lokshin
and Glinskaya (2009) is the only other study that explores this topic in the
Nepalese setting. However, they limit their analysis to women’s labor sup-
ply for wage-employment and exclusively on extensive margin. Using the
2003/04 round of Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS II) data, Lokshin
and Glinskaya (2009) find that men’s migration from Nepal has discouraging
effect on women labor force participation. In contrast, this paper uses the
2010/11 round of NLSS, when work-related international migration was at
record high, and incorporates both extensive and intensive margins by gen-
der. This is especially important given the traditional roles of rearing children
and household chores women assume within the household and society, the
left-behind women are expected to be affected differently than men. One of
the most salient features of the employment related emigration in Nepal is
that it is predominantly a male phenomenon. With males migrating abroad,
the authority over household decision making may shift to women. However,
the shift may be accompanied by extra responsibilities requiring extra hours
of work or it might compel women to give up their jobs to assume the new
roles. Additional important distinction between the papers is the timing of
the surveys: while the NLSS II was implemented during a critical phase of
the Maoist insurgency in the country, the NLSS III data was collected well
after the end of the civil conflict.
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The primary identification strategy of the paper relies on an instrumental
variable (IV) approach using a popular instrument in migration literature
i.e. historical migration networks. Specifically, using the 2001 Nepal Cen-
sus, I compute the percentage of international migrants from a village as an
instrument for migration in 2010/11. A decade lagged migration shares are
unlikely to affect local economic conditions and hence, labor supply decisions.
Furthermore, I use GDP growth between 2001 and 2011 of the most popular
destination countries interacted with the local level decade lagged migration
shares as an additional instrument and results are robust.
The analysis has four major findings. First, solely on extensive margin,
having international migrants in the family discourage the left-behind mem-
bers from participating in wage-employment. This is true for both male
and female members. However, female members significantly increase par-
ticipation in self-employment, almost entirely through subsistence farming.
Whereas, having migrants in the household does not affect male members’
decisions to participate in self-employment. Second, both self-employed and
wage-employed adults decrease their weekly hours of labor supply. Third,
while women staying behind significantly increase labor time in household
activities, I observe no such impact among men. Fourth, when analyzing
the aggregate time allocation (wage work + self-employment + household
activities), I find 0 effect of migration on women’s overall labor supply and
significantly negative effect on men’s. Therefore, women staying behind re-
align their priorities and reallocate their time from wage-employment to farm
and household activities, while men value their leisure more because of the
remittances from abroad and decrease their overall supply of labor.
These are reasonable findings in a country with the traditional household
norms and social culture that is likely to see women as subordinate to men.
In order to understand the intra-household bargaining channel for labor allo-
cation decisions further, I limit the sample to staying behind women members
only and observe that unlike other women in the family, household heads are
less likely to participate in wage-employment and do not increase participa-
tion in self-employment either. On top of already having greater say in family
decision making, household heads are the likeliest recipients of transfer from
abroad, which in turn, may further increase bargaining power.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways.
First, it complements Lokshin and Glinskaya (2009) by extending the anal-
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ysis of women’s wage-employment on both extensive and intensive margins.
Second, the paper also includes males’ labor supply to investigate the pres-
ence of differential impact between men and women in Nepal. The most
important contribution of the paper is that it analyses the time allocation
of left-behind members beyond their time in self-employment and market
work. That is, it answers the question of if they are not employed, what do
members of migrants sending household do instead. This is an important
question that the literature, including the studies in other country settings,
has mostly ignored. Furthermore, by adding the total time spent in the mar-
ket, self-employment and household activities, the paper investigates whether
migration and remittances increase the consumption of leisure as the mi-
croeconomic theory predicts. The answer may have important implications
towards the effect on an individual’s welfare gains, which have been rarely
explored in previous studies. By dissecting the analysis in these multiple
ways, this study provides one of the most complete pictures of migration’s
impact on labor supply of the remaining family members.
The results presented in the paper have important policy implications.
They highlight the need for tailored policy initiatives targeting specific sub-
populations. Male-dominated migration pushes females to give up wage-
employment and increase labor supply in their own farms. Labor markets in
rural Nepal tend to be incomplete and not fully integrated due to informa-
tion asymmetry, lack of mobility, and lack of strong institutional implemen-
tations. Policy initiatives should be focused on these aspects to improve the
rural wage labor markets thus allowing households to hire workers to replace
those who migrate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
of out-bound migration from Nepal, brief scenario of current labor market
in Nepal, and the motivation for the paper. Section 3 describes the data set
used for the analysis while empirical strategy and identification is discussed
in section 4. The findings of the analysis are presented in section 5 and
section 6 concludes the paper.
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3.2 Background and Motivation
3.2.1 Emigration from and Remittances to Nepal
With 25.2% of its population earning less than US$ 1.25 per day (World
Bank, 2014b), Nepal is one of the least-economically-developed nations in
the world. However, with recent international labor treaties, Nepal has been
experiencing large outflows of migrants and hence, remittance inflows from
abroad. Figure (3.1) presents the historical international migration trend
from Nepal. Close to 2 million Nepalese, 7.3% of the population, were living
abroad during the census in 2011. This is a substantial increase compared
to earlier decades. Only 3.2% (0.76 million), and 3.4% (0.66 million) of the
population was living abroad in 2001 and 1991 respectively. The rise in
numbers of Nepalese living abroad in the last decade is mainly due to low
skilled employment related migration. The Foreign Employment Act of 2007
- which was designed to provide security, protect the welfare of migrants,
provide migrants with education and training before leaving the country,
and monitor the businesses that facilitate migration processes - along with
the bilateral labor treaties that Nepal signed2 have facilitated the migration
process. The end of the Maoist insurgency, during which mobility within
the country was severely restrained and government offices were destroyed,
making it difficult to obtain travel documents, also helped improve conditions
to migrate internationally.
Figure (B.1) shows migration trends to the top five destination countries
for labor employment.3 Malaysia, Qatar, and UAE, countries Nepal signed
treaties with, are among the most favored destinations for work. India, not
shown in the figure, is the largest recipient country of Nepalese workers. Due
to the open border the two countries share, it is difficult to track migrants
2Nepal signed major international labor treaties in last decade, with Qatar (2005),
UAE and Korea (2007), Bahrain (2008), Japan (2009), and Malaysia (started process in
2007), with the aim to protect migrants and facilitate the migration process.
3 Workers going abroad are required to obtain labor-permits from the Department of
Foreign Employment. Migrants can apply on their own or can apply through foreign-
employment recruiting agencies. The numbers reported in Figure (B.1) are those who
opted to apply through the recruiting agencies and were issued the permit. Many of the
females migrating abroad from Nepal tend to migrate along with their male household
members and not necessarily for employment purposes. Therefore, NLSS, which asks if
the household has members abroad, is likely to have a higher percentage of female migrants
in the sample than reported here.
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and most workers migrating to India do not report to the Department of
Foreign Employment, which keeps the records. Additionally, many workers
migrating to countries other than India travel through India, so labor-related
migration might be significantly higher than is officially reported. With these
outflows of workers, it is not surprising that remittances have become major
financial flows to Nepal.
Remittance income has become a major factor in the economic develop-
ment of Nepal. According to the Ministry of Finance (2014), Nepalese house-
holds received 430 and 560 billion rupees accounting for 25.7% and 29.1%
of the GDP in fiscal years 2012-13 and 2013-14 respectively. About 32% of
Nepalese households received remittances in 2004 (World Bank, 2006). At a
country level, remittances have helped sustain balance of payments covering
169.5% of imports and are equivalent to 82.9% of the foreign reserves in 2013
(World Bank, 2014a). This trend is likely to continue in the near future as
the growth in outflows of migrant workers is on the rise. Migrant outflow
grew by 16% between 2012 and 2013 (World Bank, 2014a). Remittances sent
through unofficial channels could be as large. Thus, resource inflows from
abroad are becoming an increasingly larger share of household budgets to
growing number of families in Nepal.
3.2.2 Employment
International migration and paid-employment are male-dominated phenom-
ena in Nepal. The labor migration trend by gender is presented in Figure
(B.2).3 Among labor-related migrants, only 6.0% (about 23 thousand), 6.2%
(about 28 thousand) and 5.6% (about 30 thousand) of migrants were fe-
male in 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively. In my sample, 15.6% of migrants
are female.3 Similarly, there is a variation in labor market participation
across gender. Among working age (18 - 60 years) males, 49.8% of them
reported to be paid employees and 70.9% of them reported participating in
self-employment, mostly subsistence farming. Among females, only 23.1%
reported to be paid employees while 66.3% of them reported participating
in self-employment. This is not surprising given the strong social and tradi-
tional family norms in Nepal, which discourage women from participating in
paid-work, and where women mostly engage in taking care of children and
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household chores (CEDAW, 2003). However, with males migrating abroad,
the authority over household consumption and investment might shift to fe-
male members. Women might become more involved in making decisions on
labor market participation as well. Besides continuing to care for children
and engaging in household chores, women in Nepal often take up men’s roles
in family farming and enterprises when male members are abroad (Nandini,
1999). Similarly, women play key roles in deciding the use of remittances
and running bazaar economics when husbands are away (Brown and Con-
neil, 1993). The male-dominated international migration in Nepal may affect
non-migrant male and female members in the household differently.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
For this study I use the 2010-2011 round of Nepal Living Standard Survey
(NLSS III) as the primary data source. It is a nationally representative
survey of households and communities that is conducted by the Central Bu-
reau of Statistics (CBS) Nepal, with assistance from the World Bank. It
was administered between February 2010 and February 2011. It has a panel
component of 1,128 households. Half of the households were followed from
the first round and the other half from the second round. The cross-sectional
sample has 5,988 households, which was selected in three stages.4 The sur-
vey collected detailed information on multiple topics related to household
welfare. The survey provides rich information on household consumption,
sociodemographic composition of households, health and education attain-
ment of the members, labor market outcomes of the household members, and
the source of a wide range of household incomes. It contains detailed infor-
mation on time-allocation for wage-employment and household production
of every household members. Households were also asked to provide infor-
mation on remittances received by the households in the previous 12 months
and identified the age, gender, educational attainment, and the destination
country of the remittance sender.
This study uses 7,108 NLSS III households from both the cross-section
and panel components that have complete information on the variables used
4For detailed description of the sample design and the methodology, see
http://cbs.gov.np/
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in the analysis. 33.1% (2,212) of the households in the sample reported
having at least a member abroad in 2010-11. Characteristics of migrants
are reported in table (B.1). Migrants tend to be young (mean age of 28),
dominated by males (84.4%) and mostly composed of the daughters/sons
of the household head. They tend to have achieved some grade level of
education, 53.7% have completed 1 to 10 grade while 20.3% have completed
grade 10 (School Leaving Certificate) and intermediate level (high school).
India and the Middle East seem to be the favored destinations for most of
the migrants, 44.4% and 24.7% respectively. Although, remittances coming
from abroad tend to be relatively large, there are very little difference in total
and non-wage household incomes (Figure 3.2); households with migrant have
a slightly higher total and non-wage incomes.
A total of 16,879 working age adults (ages 18-60) are used for the analysis.
4,985 boys and 5,195 girls (both ages 6-17) are added in the sample for the
analysis of time allocation in household activities. Adults from households
with and without migrants differ on demographics, household composition,
their labor market outcomes, and communities they reside in. Table 3.1
reports the descriptive statistics of the 16,879 adults used in the analysis.
Adults from migrating families, both male and female, are less likely to be
employed in wage-employment but are more likely to be involved in self-
employment activities compared to the adults from non-migrating families.
Consistent with the theory, (for bottom 70% of the houseeholds) adults de-
crease wage-employment with household non-wage income (Figure 3.3). Mi-
gration seems to have a disincentive effect on wage-employment; adults from
migrating families are less likely to have wage-work over all of non-wage
household income distribution.5
Adults from migrating families are older by a year and have achieved a year
less education than those in households with no migrants. When comparing
only female members, females from families with a migrant are more likely to
be married and head the household when compared to females from families
with no migrants. This is the opposite when comparing male members.
Adults from families with at least one member abroad have larger household
sizes and are more likely to come from a family with a female head. Most
5These results are suggestive, they do not not account for the fact that the adult most
likely to be the wage earner in the family might be more likely to migrate, leaving adults
that are intrinsically less likely to have wage employment behind.
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of the agriculture in Nepal is subsistence farming, so households own small
amounts of land. Migrating families tend to own more land compared to
non-migrating families. At the community level, migrant-sending families
live areas with sightly lower unemployment rates, literacy rates, and higher
poverty rates.
3.4 Empirical Specification and Identification Strategy
The goal of the analysis is to evaluate the impact of migration on the la-
bor market outcomes of the left-behind household members. The simplest
strategy is to estimate the following equation.
yij = β0 + β1Mj +X
′
ijβ2 + ij (3.1)
where yi,j is a outcome variable of individual i in household j. It is either
employment status, or total hours spent in paid work, household production
or other household activities. Xij is a vector of controls - individual and
household characteristics that influence individual i’s productivity and local
labor market conditions. Mj is an endogenous binary variable that takes the
value of 1 if household j has at least one migrant - 0 otherwise, and ij is the
unobserved error term.
3.4.1 Identification
The decisions to migrate and work are selective processes which depend on
observed and unobserved household and individual characteristics such as
asset level, taste for work, human capital level, opportunities at home and
abroad etc. Cross-sectional analysis of migration’s effect on labor supply can-
not identify a causal relationship because of the endogeneity of migration and
household labor supply. Unobserved household and individual characteristics
that influence labor supply are likely to influence the decision to migrate as
well. Similarly, households may endogenize labor supply decisions and hence,
earned income while making migration decisions. Thus, estimated effects of
migration on labor supply will be biased using the OLS strategy. To address
the potential endogeneity bias, this paper exploits a very popular instrument
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in the literature: the local historical migrant network serves as an instrumen-
tal variable (IV) for the current migration decision. Specifically, using the
2001 Nepal Census I compute the percentage of international migrants from
a Village Development Committee (VDC)6 as an instrument for migration
in 2010-2011 as in (3.3). Following is the equation for migration decisions.
Mijc =α0 +X
′
ijcα1 + α2Zijc + νijc (3.2)
where Mi,j is an identifier that individual i lives in household j with or
without a migrant, Xijc is a vector of controls as defined in equation (3.1).
Zijc, defined in (3.3), is an exogenous instrumental variable that must sat-
isfy as good as randomly assigned, the first stage, and the exclusion criteria
conditions. The 2001 migration decisions are likely to be random to the
2011 labor supply and migration decisions as migrants from a community in
2001 would not have anticipated the community’s labor market conditions
in 2011, which satisfies as good as randomly assigned condition. However,
migration networks provide information about the economic opportunities at
the destination, potential costs, and might reveal migrations’ impact on their
family’s wellbeings to the community, which might influence other commu-
nity members’ migration decisions (first stage). Similarly, as long as a decade
lagged unobserved community characteristics do not influence individual’s la-
bor supply in 2011, the 2001 community level migration shares are unlikely
to feature in the 2011 labor supply equations. Hence, the instrument is likely
to affect the outcome only through the endogenous variable, satisfying the
exclusion criteria condition. Following is the instrument.
IV1 =
MIG2001,c
POP2001,c
(3.3)
where MIG2001,c is the total number of people living abroad in 2001 from
a VDC c and POP2001,c is the population of the VDC c in 2001. It is im-
portant to note that the IV estimates are likely to be greater than the OLS
estimates as the instrumental variable approach identifies the causal impact
6Village Development Committee (VDC) is the lowest level of administrative unit.
Similar to a municipality, it is responsible for the proper use and distribution of state
funds and local level service delivery. Depending on the size, it may represent a single
community or multiple communities. It is divided into 9 subdivisions called wards and
currently there are 3,276 VDCs in Nepal.
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of treatment on outcome only on the compliers; that is, IV can recover only
the local treatment effect (LATE) (Angrist, 1991).7
The historical migrant networks are extensively used in the literature to es-
timate current levels of migration. Migrant networks, which are ties between
migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants at the origin through bonds of
kinship, friendship, and shared community origins, might be the most im-
portant mechanism for international migration (Massey, 1988). Sociologists
and anthropologists have been studying the role of networks on migration
for a long-time (Tilly and Brown, 1967; Mitchell, 1969; Choldin, 1973; Hugo,
1981) and economists have also found that networks play an important role
in migration decisions (Ha¨gerstrand, 1957; Greenwood, 1969; McKenzie and
Rapoport, 2007; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007; Foged and Peri, 2013). This
is because migrant networks reduce the potential hazards at both the des-
tination and the origin and decrease the cost of relocation (Massey, 1988;
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007).
Historically inernational migration networks are region specific in Nepal.
For example, most of the people joining Indian and British armies in the
1930’s (and up to the present day) were Gorkhas from the Pokhara region
when the recruitment started. Similarly, people from the southern plains
migrated after the beginning of the extensive cultivation of tea in north-
7 OLS assumes treatment to have homogeneous effect. It estimates an average slope,
which, in reality, might not be true as there are likely to be heterogeneous responses to
the treatment. Let y be a potential outcome, d be a potential treatment and z be an
instrument, then under the assumptions of independence, exclusion and monotonicity IV
is a LATE. Independence assumption states that difference in outcome (y) and difference
in treatment (d) between zi = 0 and zi = 1 should capture the causal effect of the
instrument on outcome and treatment. This is satisfied when as good as randomly assigned
condition in IV is fulfilled. The exclusion assumption, y(di, zi = 0) = y(di, zi = 1) for
di = 0, 1, is same as the exclusion criteria condition in IV. Whereas, the monotonicity
assumption states that the instrument, if it has any effect, should affect everyone in the
same direction i.e. d1i ≥ d0i or d1i ≤ d0i. Given these assumptions, IV = LATE =
E(yi | zi = 1)− E(yi | zi = 0)
E(di | zi = 1)− E(di | zi = 0) = E(y1i − y0i | d1i > d0i). Notice that the denominator
is just the shares of compliers i.e. the percentage of the sample that participate in the
treatment only because of the instrument. So, when there is treatment effect heterogeneity,
IV estimates the causal effect of treatment on outcome only among compliers. In our
case, compliers are those who decide to migrate due to the higher share of migrants in
the community in the past. Since all three assumptions are likely to be satisfied, the
estimated IVs in the paper are LATEs. Contrarily , under the homogeneity assumption
or the perfect compliance, the denominator would be 1 and hence, LATE = IV = ITT
(intention to treatment effect), which is what OLS assumes. Since share of compliance is
always less than or equal to 1, the LATE is always greater than the ITT.
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ern India (Seddon et al., 2001). People from Far-Western villages in Nepal
tend to migrate to a same destination in India as their co-villagers (Thieme,
2006). Figure (B.3) shows the top ten origin districts for labor-employment
migration at present. These top districts, which are located mostly in South-
Eastern Terai, account for 36.5% of the total labor-related migration from
Nepal between 2008 and 2014.
In order to investigate the role of past community level migration on cur-
rent levels of migration in the community, I calculate the shares of migrants
in 2001 and 2011 to a particular destination country from a VDC using the
2001 and 2011 Nepal Censuses. Then, for each destination country, I regress
the share of migrants to the destination from a VDC in 2011 on the share of
migrants from the same VDC to the same destination in 2001.8 Estimated
correlations for the top four destination countries are presented in Figure
(3.4). There is a strong correlation between historical and current level mi-
gration shares. Coefficients are either closer to 1 or greater than 1 and are
highly significant.9 Additionally, I regress the number of migrants from a
VDC to a particular destination country in 2011 on shares of migrants from
the VDC that went to the same destination in 2001. Estimations are pre-
sented in Table (3.2). Again, the 2011 migration levels are highly correlated
with the 2001 destination specific propensity scores to migrate.
A potential complication with the instrument is that, although lagged by
a decade, lagged unobserved VDC characteristics can influence labor supply
decisions. Historically, migrant sending communities might be systematically
different to those less migrant sending communities on economic and labor
market characteristics. High historical migration might be linked to bad eco-
nomic conditions at the origin or remittances might have improved the local
economic conditions over time. Depending on these conditions, IV estimates
might be biased downward or upward. To address this problem, I control for
a host of community level economic characteristics such as poverty rate, illit-
eracy rate, unemployment, and inequality within a VDC.10 Even so, I cannot
claim with certainty that the instrument captures no unobserved VDC char-
acteristics that triggered the past migration and influenced the present labor
8 For detailed calculations of shares of migrants and regression equations see the notes
of the figures and tables.
9These results hold for other destination countries as well.
10It is more appropriate to control the community level characteristics at the baseline,
but due to the data limitation I use the 2011 community conditions as the controls.
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supply. However, the identification is at least as valid as those used in pre-
vious studies. Furthermore, I create an additional instrument, average GDP
growth between 2001 and 2011 of the top 8 destination countries in 2011 and
interact it with the share of migrants to those destinations from a VDC in
2001 as in (3.4).
IV2 =
8∑
i=1
MIG2001,i,c
POP2001,c
X GDP Growth01−11
(3.4)
where MIG2001,i,c is international migrants in 2001 from a VDC c to des-
tination i and POP2001,c is the population of a VDC c in 2001. The top
eight destination countries in 2011 are India, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
Kuwait, the UAE, the UK, and the USA. GDP Growth01−11 is the average
GDP growth of the top 8 countries between 2001 and 2011. Since the GDP
growth of the destination countries is exogenous to the local labor market
conditions the interacted term is likely to be exogenous as well. I report
results from both IV1 and IV2 in the main specification. Despite the binary
endogenous variable, I use the linear 2SLS estimation strategy as suggested
by Angrist and Pischke (2009). Because of the binary endogenous variable,
the conditional expectation function (CEF) associated with the first-stage
might be nonlinear. One can use a nonlinear first-stage and use the pre-
dicted probabilities as an instrument in a garden-variety 2SLS as suggested
by Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Wooldridge (2010) to avoid ‘’forbidden
regression” in the second step. However, this requires making distributional
assumption of the first-stage CEF. In contrast, with the linear 2SLS, one
need not worry whether the first-stage is linear (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
11
3.5 Results
A linear estimation of equation (3.2) using IV1 (equation 3.3), and IV2 (equa-
tion 3.4), are presented in Table (B.2) columns (1) and (2) respectively.11 Co-
efficients on both the instruments are highly correlated with the household’s
11With a linear estimation, one would be worried about predicted probabilities from the
first-stage not being within 0 and 1. I performed the check and all the predicted values in
the estimated models are within the range.
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migration decisions. Adults in VDCs with higher proportions of migrants in
2001 were more likely to live in a household with at least one international
migrant in 2011. Interestingly, there is a positive relationship between local
unemployment rate and illiteracy rate. The negative correlation between the
migrant outflows and the local market conditions results in downward biased
OLS estimates of the impact on the labor market outcomes (Foged and Peri,
2013).
The OLS estimates of specification (3.1) are presented in columns (3) and
(4), the 2SLS using IV1 are presented in columns (5) and (6) and IV2 are
presented in columns (7) and (8) of table (B.2). The dependent variables are
weekly hours supplied for wage-employment and self-employment. I use all
the adults, both employed and non-employed in wage and self-employment.
Technically, not working is equivalent to observing 0 hour of labor supply,
therefore, including people who do not work in the sample and assigning 0
hour to their labor supply does not create the problem of sample selection.
The estimated effects are a combination of intensive and extensive margins.
Columns (3), (5) and (7) are estimated wage labor supply equations while
(4), (6) and (8) are self-employment labor supply equations.
Overall, the estimates of β2s, coefficients on X’s in equation (3.1), are
comparable across the estimation strategies. βˆ2’s direction corresponds well
with the economic intuitions. Individual characteristics, age, and household
head status strongly determine the level of labor supply for both the wage and
self-employment. It is not surprising that women, in Nepal, are less likely
to work outside their homes, and the supply of wage-hours increases with
years of schooling. Similarly, household characteristics, and land ownership
decrease wage-hours and increases time spent in self-employment. Owning
a home and being from a higher social caste, Brahman/Chhetri, discourage
adults from working.
The coefficient of interest, βˆ1, which is the coefficient on migration deci-
sion in equation (3.1) is statistically significant across all the econometric
techniques used for time spent in wage employment. While comparable with
each other, IV estimates are significantly greater in magnitude than the OLS
estimate. As discussed earlier, OLS suffers from selection bias and the nega-
tive correlation between the local market conditions and the migration flows
is likely to bias the effects downward. Furthermore, the 2SLS can recover
the impact only on the compliers i.e. local average treatment effect (LATE),
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which is always greater than the intention to treat effect (ITT).7 Both the
instruments are reasonably strong, with a high correlation between the en-
dogenous variable and the instruments. F -statistics of the first stage are
always above 60, which are greater than the threshold value of 10 researchers
usually consider below which one might run into the problem of weak instru-
ment (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
Results from the IV regressions suggest that having a migrant in the house-
hold discourage the left-behind members from working in wage-employment.
Adults from migrant-families decrease their weekly hours of labor supply for
wage-employment by about 8 hours when compare to the adults from the
non-migrant households. This is a decrease of almost one official work day.
The direction of the effect is consistent with the prediction of the standard
labor supply model. The income transfers through remittances increase the
reservation wages of non-migrating members, which is likely to discourage
people working in market employment. Migration has a negative effect on
self-employment; however, both the IV results are small in magnitude and
statistically not different from 0. As discussed earlier, these IV results are
combinations of intensive and extensive margins. Separating these effects
provides better insight into the economic behavior of the left-behind mem-
bers and may assist better in policy design.
I apply the following strategy to separate out effects on intensive and
extensive margins. I use a binary employment status, 1 for employed - 0
otherwise, as the dependent variable to estimate the impact on extensive
margins. To examine the impact on intensive margins, I analyze the hours
supplied for a particular employment by limiting the sample to those who
are engaged in that employment. That is, depending on the left-hand side
outcome variable, the analyzed sample is conditioned on being employed in
that particular sector.
Tables (3.3) and (3.4) reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of migration on
wage employment and self employment outcomes, respectively, by sex using
IV1 as the instrument. Panel A of the tables shows the impacts on extensive
margins while panel B shows the effects on intensive margins. Again, the in-
strument is reasonably strong with all F -statistics from the first stage above
the threshold value of 10 except for the hours supplied for non-agricultural
wage employment, which is at 7.1. Both male and female adults from the mi-
grant sending families have smaller involvement in wage-employment, both
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on extensive and intensive margins when compared to adults from families
without migrants. Meanwhile, migration has greater negative effect on left-
behind men’s propensity to participate in market employment than women’s,
31.1% vs 20.5%, (Table 3.3, Panel A). However, among working adults, left-
behind women supply fewer hours in wage-employment than the left-behind
men (Table 3.3, Panel B), which could be a result of Nepali women, if em-
ployed outside their homes, having mostly part-time jobs. At the same time,
having migrants in the family affects left-behind women’s self-employment
decisions on both extensive and intensive margins, but not men’s. Compared
to women from households without migrants, women in households with
migrants are 28.0% more likely to be engaged in self-employment, mostly
working in their own farms. However, among those employed, women de-
crease weekly hours worked by 13 hours (Table 3.4). Overall, migration
has negative effect on all the left-behind household adults’ involvement in
wage-employment but it is only women who increase their involvement in
self-employment. In a country with traditional household norms and social
culture, where women tend to be subordinate to men, it is not surprising that
only women redistribute their time allocation in response to sending some
family members abroad.
Table (3.5) presents the 2SLS estimates of the impacts of migration on the
time spent in household production and other activities by the left-behind
adults and children using IV1 as the instrument.
12 Sending some members
abroad has 0 effect on time allocation in household activities of left-behind
male adults and boys. Women and girls, on the contrary, significantly de-
creased their weekly hours, 7.8% and 4.1% respectively, in less productive
activities and increase their weekly hours in more productive activities more
than proportionally, 8.2% and 5.5% respectively.
When a household sends some of its members aboard, there are several
pathways through which non-migrating member’s labor supply is affected.
First, the income transfers through remittances increase the valuation of
12Fetching water, collecting firewood and dung, taking care of animals, making mats,
knitting, weaving, tailoring and processing preserved food are classified as household pro-
duction activities. Whereas, minor house repair, cooking food, cleaning, laundry, dishes,
babysitting, and taking care of the elderly are categorized as other household activities.
They are classified as such because the CBS takes into account only the time spent on
former activities while calculating unemployment. Male and females are ages between 18
and 60 while boys and girls are ages between 6 to 17.
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leisure of left-behind members making leisure more appealing. Second, be-
cause of the decrease in the household’s stock of labor hours, left-behind
members might overburden themselves by adding the role vacated by the
migrants onto their own workload. Third, households might realign their
priorities and redistribute the remaining stock of labor time once they send
members abroad. In order to distinguish the later two pathways, I add weekly
hours supplied by the left-behind household members across all activities.
The results are presented in table (B.3). The second scenario is true neither
for the left-behind women nor men. As a matter of fact, non-migrating male
members increase their weekly leisure consumption by 18 hours by cutting
their involvement in all forms of employment (wage + self-employment). This
fits well with the first scenario rather than the later two. To isolate the first
path, of impacts through income transfers, one has to model migrants’ deci-
sion to send back remittances, which requires a new identification strategy
and potentially a new instrument. Due to limitations in the data, I believe
the analysis is beyond this papers’ scope. Meanwhile, the aggregate effect
is statistically 0 for the left-behind women members, which corresponds well
with the third scenario. In Nepal, while left-behind males increase their
leisure consumption in response to sending members abroad, women realign
their priorities and assume the roles in home production and self-employment
- roles likely to have been vacated by the migrants.
The differential impacts between the left-behind male and female members
are most likely to be a result of differential bargaining power male and female
members have within a household. Bargaining heterogeneity, however, is
not limited to gender differences. Even within a gender group, members
might have different levels of bargaining, creating heterogeneous responses
to migration within the group. Among female members, older females and
household heads are likely to have a higher level of bargaining than other
female members in the family. Table (B.4) presents 2SLS results of the
impact of migration on total labor supply by women’s age (Panel A) and
women’s household head status (Panel B). Consistent with the hypothesis,
older women from migrant-household supply substantially less overall labor
hours (16) mostly by reducing their hours in wage and self employment (13).
In contrary, migration has no effect on younger women. At the same time,
when a household sends its members abroad, it negatively affects overall
labor supply of women who are head of the household but has no effect on
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other female members’s labor supply (Table B.4, Panel B). It is plausible
that depending on each member’s bargaining power within a household, the
decision to send members aboard have differential impacts on each left-behind
member’ labor supply decision.
3.5.1 Heterogeneous Effects
As with the sex of the left-behind members, household’s migration decisions
are likely to affect different groups within the household differently. I divide
the sample by skill level, age, and the household head status to analyze
the potential treatment effect heterogeneity. Table (3.6) presents the 2SLS
estimates by skill level. Adults with school leaving certificate (SLC) or more
are defined as high skilled.13 It is only the low skilled left-behind members
that are affected by the migration. There is statistically zero effect on labor
supply of high skilled adults. While less likely to participate in market jobs,
low skilled adults are more likely to be involved in self employment activities.
At the same time, low skilled adults, if employed, supply less weekly hours for
both wage-employment and self-employment. The differential impact by skill
level is reasonable as high skilled workers are likely to be already involved
in more formal and permanent jobs that have higher opportunity costs of
switching.
Tables (3.7), and (3.8) present the effect of migration on labor supply
from the 2SLS estimation using IV1 as an instrument by age and household
head status respectively. Adults with ages between 18 to 40 are defined as
young adults. Irrespective of age, migration affect the left-behind members
similarly, both younger and older adults decrease their participation in wage
employment while increase participation in self-employment. Likewise, both
type of adults have similar responses in their intensive margins - lower weekly
labor supply (Table 3.7).
Although outmigration of some family members has similar effect on the
intensive margins for wage-work and own work, there is a significantly differ-
ent effect on the participation rate by household head status. The left-behind
13All the students whether in private or public schools that follow Nepali education
system, have to take the school leaving certificate (SLC) exam at the end of tenth grade.
All schools in the country follow the system with very few exceptions, which follow the
Indian or American system. It is mandatory that students pass the exam to continue their
studies further within the country and qualify for most of the government and private jobs.
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household heads are 41.4% less likely to participate in paid work compared
to 23.1% of the other household members. Concurrently, outmigration of
family members does not affect the household head’s decision to participate
in self-employment activities but significantly increases other members’ in-
volvement, 29.8% (Table 3.8). This corresponds well with the intuition that
the household heads are likely to have higher bargaining power within the
household and are likely to receive remittances sent by the migrants, which
in turn, may further increase their bargaining power.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper I use a unique source of nationally representative data during
the period that Nepal experienced a boom in outmigration. The data set
contains detailed information on time allocation of every individual in the
household, which allows me to extend the analysis further and answer the
question that previous studies on the topic could not answer in Nepal. Using
the NLSS III data set, this paper explores the impact of migration on labor
supply of the left-behind household members both on extensive and intensive
margins for wage-employment, self-employment, and household activities.
The paper also provides an answer to the question, what are the remaining
members in the households engage in instead of work employment?
I find that having international migrants in the family discourage members
staying behind from participation in wage-employment. This is true for both
male and female members. However, female members increase participation
in self-employment, almost entirely through subsistence farming. The pa-
per also finds that both self-employed and wage-employed adults decrease
weekly hours of labor supply and only women in the migrant-sending house-
hold increase time in household activities. Findings presented in the paper
suggest that male-dominated migration forces women to realign priorities
and reallocate time from market-work to farming and household activities.
In contrast, because of the income transfers, men now value their leisure
more and decrease their overall labor supply. These are reasonable findings
in a country where the traditional household norms and social culture see
women as subordinate to men.
The question of the impact of outmigration on the well-being of the left-
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behind members is of importance for Nepal, which already has high levels
of outmigration and the trend for outmigration is on the rise. The neoclas-
sical micro theory identifies wage and employment opportunity differentials
between the place of origin and the place of destination as the main cause
of migration. Therefore, women switching from the formal labor market to
self-employment should speed-up the process of equalization of wages and
opportunities between the two places (Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2009). How-
ever, with the opening of new destinations, economic incentives abroad, and
increasingly simpler migration processes, outmigration from Nepal will not
decline anytime soon. International migration for labor-employment from
Nepal, however, is risky.14 Many Nepali emigrant laborers find themselves
working in hazardous conditions, work long hours, face delays in getting paid,
and some even lose their lives (Kaphle, 2014). It is imperative that Nepal
put in place a broad set of policies that protect the welfare of migrants, many
of which are breadwinners in their families, and safeguard the wellbeing of
the left-behind members.15
The results presented in the paper may play an important role in de-
signing some of these policies, especially in protecting the wellbeing of the
remaining household members. They highlight the need for tailored policy
initiatives that target specific subpopulations. Male-dominated outmigration
pushes left-behind women to withdraw from wage-employment and increase
the labor supply in their own farms. Policy initiatives should be focused on
improving the rural wage labor markets, which would allow households to
hire workers to replace those who migrate. Additionally, these policies may
help in insuring households against the negative migrant-related shocks if
they can encourage the left-behind members to remain in the formal wage-
employment, which may have higher returns than self-employment.
14International migration from Nepal, especially for labor, is costly and required an
extensive planning ahead. It requires obtaining passport and visa, purchasing ticket and
saving up or borrowing for the associated costs. Similarly, most of the international work-
related migration involves migration brokers who charge high fees for their services and
there are contractual agreements in place between migrants and hiring agency ahead of
migration and reversing the decision once made can be very costly (Bhattarai, 2005).
15See McKenzie and Yang (2015) for reviews of different policies about migrations.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: International Migration Trend from Nepal
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Figure 3.2: Household Income- Kernel Density
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Figure 3.3: Rate of Labor Market Participation - All Adults
Note: Sample is limited to working-age (18 to 60) population. Figures are created using
fractional polynomial regression. Non-wage income is monthly per-capita.
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Figure 3.4: Correlation Between 2001 and 2011 Proportions of Migrants by
Major Destination Countries.
Data Source: 2001 and 2011 Nepal Census. Linear fit is Yj,d,11 = α0 + α1Yj,d,01, where
Yj,d,11, and Yj,d,01 are share of migrants to destination d from VDC j in 2011 and 2001
respectively. Share of migrants is calculated as Yj,d,t =
Mj,d,t
POPj,t
, where Mj,d,t is number
of migrants from VDC j to destination d in year t. POPj,t is the population of VDC j in
year t.
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Table 3.2: Migration Network: Dependent Variable - Number of
Migrants in 2011 (1,000)
All VDCs in Nepal NLSS VDCs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of migrants 2001 3.758*** 3.779*** 6.606*** 6.714***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.676) (0.678)
Constant 0.013*** 0.001 0.037*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002)
District Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Observations 100880 100880 11648 11648
R2 0.145 0.161 0.060 0.097
Data Source: 2001 and 2011 Nepal Census. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Standard errors are clustered at VDC level. Estimated
model is Mj,d,11 = β0 + β1Yj,d,01, where Mj,d,11 is number of migrants, in 1,000, to
destination country d from a VDC j in 2011. Yj,d,01 is share of migrants to destination
d from a VDC j in 2001. Share of migrants is calculated as Yi,d,t =
Mj,d,t
POPj,t
, where
Mj,d,t is number of migrants from VDC j to destination d in year t. POPj,t is the
population of VDC j in year t.
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Table 3.3: 2SLS Estimation of Labor Supply by Gender- Wage Employment
Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Wage Emp. Agri. Non-Agri. Any Wage Emp. Agri. Non-Agri.
Panel A: Labor market participation
Household with migrant -0.205* -0.049 -0.221** -0.311* 0.027 -0.371**
(0.104) (0.083) (0.088) (0.175) (0.114) (0.185)
Observations 9597 9597 9597 7282 7282 7282
Wald χ2 1236.455 576.071 1744.580 941.219 476.251 858.504
F -test 1stage 70.938 70.938 70.938 41.195 41.195 41.195
Panel B: Hours supplied
Household with migrant -15.219** 7.292 -26.255* -13.564* 2.955 -13.505*
(6.826) (6.134) (13.613) (7.066) (4.996) (7.730)
Observations 2222 1069 1264 3623 773 3189
Wald χ2 2004.359 205.487 920.637 1538.916 314.929 1475.447
F -test 1stage 18.791 16.894 7.140 37.343 20.071 31.814
Controls
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
VDC characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: 2SLS estimates are reported in the table. Share of international migrants in a VDC in 2001 is used as an
instrument for the estimations. Sample is working age (18 to 60) adults and standard errors are clustered at VDC
level. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Individual controls are age age2, years of
education, marital status, and household head identifier. Household controls are female HH head, share of male and
female adults, share of elderly, share of children, amount of land-owned, house ownership and social caste. Similarly
VDC level controls are, unemployment rate, poverty rate, illiteracy rate, inequality (Gini), and urban/rural location.
Regions are Kathmandu, other urban areas, Western hills, Eastern hills, Western Terai, and Eastern Terai. Sample
in Panel B is conditioned on being employed in that particular sector. Log of hourly wages is added as an extra
individual control.
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Table 3.4: 2SLS Estimation of Labor Supply by Sex- Self Employment
Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Self Emp. Agri. Non-Agri. Any Self Emp. Agri. Non-Agri.
Panel A: Labor market participation
Household with migrant 0.280*** 0.308*** -0.098 0.141 0.205 -0.179
(0.089) (0.113) (0.087) (0.120) (0.148) (0.166)
Observations 9597 9597 9597 7282 7282 7282
Wald χ2 8883.913 15715.418 703.258 7294.166 18469.293 841.418
F -test 1stage 70.938 70.938 70.938 41.195 41.195 41.195
Panel B: Hours supplied
Household with migrant -13.030*** -6.460* -24.345 -10.252 -5.819 4.337
(4.559) (3.787) (16.457) (6.781) (4.098) (15.669)
Observations 6358 5550 1557 5160 4006 2109
Wald χ2 525.033 434.614 504.186 2193.401 662.555 863.127
F -test 1stage 61.724 58.076 10.609 42.797 35.274 11.702
Controls
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
VDC characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: 2SLS estimates are reported in the table. Share of international migrants in a VDC in 2001 is used as an
instrument for the estimations. Sample is working age (18 to 60) adults and standard errors are clustered at VDC
level. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Individual controls are age age2, years of
education, marital status, and household head identifier. Household controls are female HH head, share of male and
female adults, share of elderly, share of children, amount of land-owned, house ownership and social caste. Similarly
VDC level controls are, unemployment rate, poverty rate, illiteracy rate, inequality (Gini), and urban/rural location.
Regions are Kathmandu, other urban areas, Western hills, Eastern hills, Western Terai, and Eastern Terai. Sample
in Panel B is conditioned on being employed in that particular sector.
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Table 3.6: 2SLS Estimation of Labor Supply by Skill Level
Wage Employment Self Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Skilled High Skilled Low Skilled High Skilled
Panel A: Labor market participation
Household with migrant -0.205** -0.486 0.199*** 0.324
(0.098) (0.305) (0.069) (0.346)
Observations 14054 2825 14054 2825
Wald χ2 3577.578 997.890 3864.717 2175.469
F -test 1stage 68.765 8.179 68.765 8.179
Coefficient 1stage 1.925*** 1.460*** 1.925*** 1.460***
Panel B: Hours supply
Household with migrant -15.028*** 1.032 -13.064*** 5.048
(5.754) (11.830) (4.454) (14.563)
Observations 4714 1131 10319 1199
Wald χ2 2170.635 505.787 1130.111 1815.099
F -test 1stage 33.235 7.061 63.906 6.082
Coefficient 1stage 1.820*** 1.665*** 1.921*** 1.503**
Controls
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
VDC characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: High skilled adults are defined as adults with 11 years or more of education. Sample in
Panel B is conditioned on being employed in that particular sector. Log of hourly wage is added
as an extra individual control for column (1) and (2). 2SLS estimates are reported in the table.
Instrument used for 2SLS is share of international migrants in a VDC in 2001 (IV1). Sample is
working age (18 to 60) adults and standard errors are clustered at VDC level. Standard errors
in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Individual controls are age age2, years of
education, gender, household head identifier, and marital status. Household controls are female
HH head, share of male and female adults, share of elderly, share of children, amount of land-
owned, house ownership and social caste. Similarly VDC level controls are, unemployment rate,
poverty rate, illiteracy rate, inequality (Gini), and urban/rural location. Regions are Kathmandu,
other urban areas, Western hills, Eastern hills, Western Terai, and Eastern Terai. Coefficient
1stage is the estimated coefficient on the exogenous instrument in the first-stage.
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Table 3.7: 2SLS Estimation of Labor Supply by Age
Wage Employment Self Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Young Adults Old Adult Young Adults Old Adults
Panel A: Labor market participation
Household with migrant -0.292*** -0.260** 0.252** 0.236***
(0.113) (0.122) (0.103) (0.085)
Observations 10861 6018 10861 6018
Wald χ2 2028.588 1552.717 15778.586 3651.974
F -test 1stage 58.207 50.061 58.207 50.061
Coefficient 1stage 1.836*** 1.937*** 1.836*** 1.937***
Panel B: Hours supply
Household with migrant -13.546* -13.516** -8.632* -14.457**
(7.380) (5.618) (5.037) (5.925)
Observations 3913 1932 6901 4617
Wald χ2 2379.303 1482.415 2401.545 545.837
F -test 1stage 31.766 24.765 52.713 43.511
Coefficient 1stage 1.645*** 2.078*** 1.804*** 1.957***
Controls
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
VDC characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Young adults are ages between 18 and 40 while old adults are ages between 41 and 60.
Sample in Panel B is conditioned on being employed in that particular sector. Log of hourly wage
is added as an extra individual control for column (1) and (2). 2SLS estimates are reported in
the table. Instrument used for 2SLS is share of international migrants in a VDC in 2001 (IV1).
Sample is working age (18 to 60) adults and standard errors are clustered at VDC level. Standard
errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Individual controls are age age2, years of
education, gender, household head identifier, and marital status. Household controls are female HH
head, share of male and female adults, share of elderly, share of children, amount of land-owned,
house ownership and social caste. Similarly VDC level controls are, unemployment rate, poverty
rate, illiteracy rate, inequality (Gini), and urban/rural location. Regions are Kathmandu, other
urban areas, Western hills, Eastern hills, Western Terai, and Eastern Terai. Coefficient 1stage is
the estimated coefficient on the exogenous instrument in the first-stage.
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Table 3.8: 2SLS Estimates of Labor Supply by Household Head Status
Wage Employment Self Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Head Other Members Household Head Other Members
Panel A: Labor market participation
Household with migrant -0.414*** -0.231** 0.125 0.298***
(0.147) (0.100) (0.098) (0.091)
Observations 5791 11088 5791 11088
Wald χ2 906.861 1882.340 6353.722 8786.879
F -test 1stage 53.309 62.508 53.309 62.508
Coefficient 1stage 1.633*** 2.030*** 1.633*** 2.030***
Panel B: Hours supply
Household with migrant -17.642** -11.559* -11.369* -10.493**
(7.434) (6.610) (6.662) (4.285)
Observations 2772 3073 4450 7068
Wald χ2 2009.570 2551.071 943.402 1107.469
F -test 1stage 24.419 30.862 50.477 57.718
Coefficient 1stage 1.515*** 2.032*** 1.647*** 2.036***
Controls
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
VDC characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: 2SLS estimates are reported in the table. Instrument used for 2SLS is share of international migrants
in a VDC in 2001 (IV1). Sample is working age (18 to 60) adults and standard errors are clustered at VDC
level. Standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Individual controls are age age2,
years of education, gender, household head identifier, and marital status. Household controls are female
HH head, share of male and female adults, share of elderly, share of children, amount of land-owned, house
ownership and social caste. Similarly VDC level controls are, unemployment rate, poverty rate, illiteracy
rate, inequality (Gini), and urban/rural location. Regions are Kathmandu, other urban areas, Western
hills, Eastern hills, Western Terai, and Eastern Terai. Coefficient 1stage is the estimated coefficient on
the exogenous instrument in the first-stage. Sample in Panel B is conditioned on being employed in that
particular sector. Log of hourly wage is added as an extra individual control for column (1) and (2).
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CHAPTER 4
UNFORTUNATE MOMS AND
UNFORTUNATE CHILDREN: IMPACT OF
NEPALESE CIVIL WAR ON WOMEN’S
STATURE AND INTERGENERATIONAL
HEALTH
4.1 Introduction
The environmental conditions experienced in utero and in early life have
profound influence on human biology and long-term health (Golden, 1994;
Martorell et al., 1994; Forsdahl, 1977; Barker, 1992; Bateson et al., 2004;
Gluckman et al., 2007, 2008). Similarly, early life conditions have lasting and
significant impacts on adulthood economic outcomes (see reviews by Strauss
and Thomas, 2008; Currie and Vogl, 2013). These results are highly relevant
in the context of civil conflicts, which represent sources of considerable human
suffering, death and property destruction. Despite the potential of conflict to
contribute to lasting impacts on health, the empirical evidence on long-term
and intergenerational effects of conflict on health is limited.1 Lack of conflict
data at detailed geographic units provide a significant challenge in measuring
the consequences of conflicts precisely.
In this paper, I investigate the impacts of early childhood exposure to
Nepal’s 1996-2006 civil conflict on women’s final adult height and on second-
generation health using the 2016 Nepal Demographic Health Survey (NDHS)
1Previous studies have documented long-run effects at the cross-country level, sug-
gesting conflicts have large and negative immediate effects on overall economic growth.
However, the recovery to equilibrium is rapid (see review by Blattman and Miguel, 2010).
Correlated with war exposure, the literature has extensively documented long-run ef-
fects of exposures to stress on mental health (Persson and Rossin-Slater, 2018), height
and diseases (Bozzoli et al., 2009), birth weight (Camacho, 2008; Quintana-Domeque and
Rdenas-Serrano, 2017), and education and socioeconomic status (Almond, 2006). Pre-
vious research on conflict has mostly focused on human capital accumulation during or
shortly after conflict (Akresh and De Walque, 2008; Bundervoet et al., 2009; Valente, 2014;
Akresh et al., 2014; Pivovarova and Swee, 2015). A few recent studies have focused on the
long-term impact of conflict on human capital accumulation, with some finding no effect
(Miguel and Roland, 2011) and others (Akresh et al., 2012; Len, 2012; Justino et al., 2014;
Palmer et al., 2016; Akbulut-Yuksel, 2017) finding significant negative impacts.
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and village level variation in conflict intensity. By exploiting the detailed ge-
ographic information on conflict incidents (village-level conflict intensity), I
am able to identify the effects of exposure to conflict more accurately than
previous research.2 The literature on the consequences of war, including in
Nepal3 has thus far mostly focused on conflict variation at a broader regional
level (see Valente, 2014, 2015; Pivovarova and Swee, 2015; Akresh et al.,
2012). Moreover, this study extends the literature on legacies of war by doc-
umenting the long-term effect of exposure to conflict on women’s final stature
development. Along with Akresh et al. (2018), which examines the impacts
of Biafran war using the variation in exposure to the war by ethnicity, this
is among the first papers to document the intergenerational transmission of
the impact of early childhood conflict exposure on second generation health.
Nepal experienced a decade-long violent civil conflict between 1996 and
2006, which resulted in more than 13,000 fatalities, significant destruction of
infrastructure, severe hindrance in delivery of basic services and generated
pervasive and strong feelings of fear, insecurity, and stress among its citizens.
I use Informal Sector Service Center’s (INSEC) records of conflict victims to
create casualty-level data set with exact geographical locations (villages) and
dates of incidents. I merge the village-level conflict intensity with the 2016
Nepal Demographic Health Survey (NDHS), which is a nationally represen-
2A typical approach in the literature is to exploit conflict variation at a broader re-
gional level, which has the potential to misclassify one’s exposure to conflict and induce
measurement errors. For instance, using detailed GPS data on distance between survey
villages and conflict sites, Akresh et al. (2014) show that substantial number of households
in Eritrea were misclassified as being in non-conflict region in the Akresh et al. (2012) pa-
per that used less precise regional conflict data and there are significant differences in the
estimated effects of the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict between the two measures of the conflict:
effects are 87-188% larger using the GPS based measure than the regional based measure
of the conflict.
3Previous studies of Nepal’s civil war are mostly focused on understanding the causes of
the war: geographical terrain (Murshed and Gates, 2005; Bohara et al., 2006; Do and Iyer,
2010; Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers, 2015), economic exclusion and poverty (Mur-
shed and Gates, 2005; Onesto, 2005; Do and Iyer, 2010), inequality (Murshed and Gates,
2005; Macours, 2011; Nepal et al., 2011), and lack of political representation (Murshed
and Gates, 2005; Bohara et al., 2006; Macours, 2011). The little evidence documenting
the consequences of the war, thus far, is focused on district level disaggregation and re-
sults are mixed - little to zero impact on human capital accumulation (Valente, 2014;
Pivovarova and Swee, 2015), increased miscarriages (Valente, 2015) and positive impact
on women employment (Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers, 2015). Libois (2016), on
the other hand, using conflict measurement at more detailed geographical area (distance
from the conflict sites) find significant negative immediate impact on consumption and
income. Failure to capture the substantial conflict heterogeneity across villages within
district, thus, may explain the little or no impact of conflict at district level.
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tative survey of the female population aged 15 to 49. I limit the analytical
sample to women who were either born before or who were in utero at the
start of the war in February 1996 to assess the lasting impact of conflict on
height. In 2016, these women were old enough (20 to 49) to be sampled
in the ever-married NDHS 2016 women sample and had documented survey
responses about their children that can be used for second-generation analy-
sis. Limiting the sample to women born before the conflict’s start date also
reduces potential confoundedness through selective fertility and migration
(further discussed in empirical strategy section 4). I rely on the biomedical
literature that height development in human beings is characterized by rapid
growth during the first three years of life, followed by lower level of constant
growth and then a secondary growth spurt during adolescence (Figure C.5),
and classify women into three treatment cohorts, namely: ages 0 to 3, 4 to
8, and 9 to 15 at the start of the war in February 1996. While women in age
cohort 0 to 3 would have been exposed to conflict their entire three stages
of growth, the age cohorts 4 to 8 and 9 to 15 would have been exposed only
in their latter stages of growth. I define women ages 16 to 21 in 1996 as a
comparison group because they would have passed their pubertal ages and
gained full adult height by the time of the conflict’s start in 1996. I also in-
clude women ages 22 to 29 as a second control group to validate parallel-trend
dynamics in difference-in-difference specification.
This research makes two primary contributions to the literature on the
legacies of war. First, using the variation in exposure to conflict, as mea-
sured by months of war, by birth cohort and village of residence, I find that
conflict and, in particular, exposure starting in child’s infancy, has a highly
significant and negative impact on womens final adult height. Findings are
robust across model specifications and measures of conflict. In validating the
difference-in-differences estimation strategy used, I find no evidence of pres-
ence of non-parallel dynamics nor of selective migration and fertility. These
results are significant in the face of growing evidence of the lasting impacts of
stunting and slow growth in height early in life on overall physical, biological
and cognitive development, school achievement, economic productivity and
maternal reproductive outcomes (see review by Dewey and Begum, 2011).
Additionally, given the established literature on the existence of a height
premium (Persico et al., 2004; Case and Paxson, 2008; Vogl, 2014; Bargain
and Zeidan, 2017) these results have important economic importance.
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A second contribution: I find that the mothers’ exposure to conflict is
detrimental for their children’s health, especially child weight as measured by
weight-for-height, weight-for-age and BMI z-scores. Results are robust to al-
ternative measures of conflict intensity including the one defined at mother’s
district of birth. I find strong evidence that the women exposed to conflict
during childhood have more children and live in poorer households as adults.
The combination of these two factors may result in meaningful decreases
in parental ability to invest in children. However, other unobserved factors
such as stress and genomic changes may also influence the intergenerational
transmission.
This paper links to two important strands of economics literature. First,
the established literature of in utero and early life shocks on adult outcomes
(see review by Almond and Currie, 2011) and that insufficient or lack of
parental investment during critical periods of child development can lead
to irreversible damage (Cunha and Heckman, 2007). Second, the paper is
related to the literature providing strong positive intergenerational human
capital transmission (Currie and Moretti, 2003, 2007; Almond et al., 2012;
Justino et al., 2014; Bhalotra and Rawlings, 2013).
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the
background on Nepal’s civil conflict, major events that helped shape the war,
and the physical and economic costs of the war. Conflict intensity from the
INSEC’s database and individual data from the 2016 NDHS are discussed in
section 3. Section 4 presents empirical strategies for evaluating both the first
and second-generation impacts. Empirical results along with identification
validation and potential mechanisms for intergenerational transmission are
presented in section 5 and concluding remarks are presented in section 6.
4.2 Background
Nepal is a landlocked country between India and China. Because of its
highly mountainous and rugged terrain and lack of adequate infrastructure
and economic development, most parts of the country remain remote, and
access to basic services remains unattainable to many. With two-thirds of its
30 million inhabitants (estimated as of July 2017) relying on agriculture and
a quarter living under the poverty line, Nepal is one of the least developed
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nations in the world (CIA World Factbook, 2019) and is among the lowest
in health, sanitation, primary education and electricity in South Asia.
Figure C.1 shows the administrative divisions of Nepal before the imple-
mentation of a new constitution in 2015. The country was divided into five
geographically homogeneous development regions, which were further divided
to form 75 districts. Districts were further divided into rural (village devel-
opment committee, VDC) and urban (municipalities) areas, which were the
lowest level of administrative units. At the time of the 2011 population cen-
sus, Nepal consisted of 3,914 VDCs and 58 municipalities (Central Bureau
of Statistics, 2012). I calculate conflict intensity at the level of these 3,972
local administrative areas.4
4.2.1 Conflict in Nepal
For most of modern history, Nepal was governed by absolute monarchs. In the
early 1990s several political parties launched pro-democracy street protests,
known as the “Jana Andholan” (People’s movement), leading to the emer-
gence of multi-party democracy and the introduction of a new constitution.
Despite participating in the 1991 legislative democratic elections and win-
ning 9 of the 205 parliamentary seats, the Communist Party of Nepal Maoist
(CPN-M) launched an armed struggle, the so-called “People’s War”, against
the state on February 13, 1996 (or in Nepali calendar 2052 Falgun 1 Bikram
Sambat). A week before the conflicts start, the CPN Maoist submitted a
40-point memorandum to the government and warned of armed militant
struggle if demands were not met. Demands included drafting a new consti-
tution through an election of a constituent assembly; land redistribution; and
political equality for all castes, language groups, and women. The govern-
ment refused to meet the demands of the Maoists. In response, the Maoists
attacked an agricultural bank and three police posts in rural western Nepal
and formally launched the “People’s War”.
Over the following decade, the insurgency developed into an entrenched
and brutal country-wide civil war. By the end of the insurgency, conflict
related killings were recorded in 73 of the 75 Nepalese districts. Figure 4.1
presents the timeline of the war including major events that shaped the con-
4For convenience, throughout the paper I refer to these local administrative units as
villages although some of them are urban municipalities.
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flict and monthly casualty numbers. As part of the Maoists’ strategy, in
the early years of the insurgency they launched a guerrilla warfare mostly
harassing police forces and garnering support in a few rural areas with com-
munist strongholds (Thapa and Sijapati, 2004). Nepal’s remote terrain,
under-development, extreme rural poverty, deeply rooted caste and ethnic
discrimination, sentiments of political and economic exclusion among rural
communities, and lack of government presence in rural areas propelled the
Maoists’ cause further (Onesto, 2005). The initial inability of the govern-
ment to recognize the underlying problems that fueled the conflict and to
acknowledge the connection between armed conflict and political, economic,
and social grievances of the period enabled small communist political elites
to mobilize a large base and eventually challenge the government militarily
and politically (Kreuttner, 2008).
The year 2001 was a crucial moment for the insurgency. In June 2001, the
killing of King Birendra along with most of his immediate family members
in a royal massacre shocked the nation. The King’s brother, Gyanendra, was
then crowned King. A conspiracy theory emerged centering on Gyanendra’s
possible involvement in the massacre and questioning the findings of the of-
ficial investigation further destabilized the country, increasing distrust in the
government and the King (Thapa and Sijapati, 2004). A state of emergency
was declared in November 2001 and the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) officially
got involved in the war after the Maoists walked away from a two-month
long ceasefire and attacked an RNA barrack. Thereafter, the conflict inten-
sified and extended geographically. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, most killings
occurred after 2001. However, the insurgency drastically changed its course
after King Gyanendra, citing prolonged conflict and growing attacks by the
Maoists, dismissed the elected government, placed major political figures
under arrest, and assumed direct control over the country in February 2005.
Joining the widespread disapproval of the King’s actions, the Maoists formed
a pact with seven major political parties to present a common front against
the monarchy. This eventually led to a signing of a peace accord in November
2006 (or 2063 Mangshir Bikram Sambat), the formation of an interim seven
party plus the Maoists coalition government, and an official end to the war.
At the time of the signing of the peace agreement, the death toll of the war
had reached more than 13,000 (Table 4.1).
The CPN Maoist’s presence across the country over the course of the con-
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flict varied greatly. While the Maoists had a weak presence in urban areas
– failing to control even a single city or a district headquarters – they domi-
nated rural Nepal. In October 2003, they declared control over 80% of rural
areas (Onesto, 2005) and in many places established fully functional local
governments and law courts of their own. They also, however, selectively
targeted government forces, attacking army barracks and police posts in ur-
ban areas and destroying local government buildings (Do and Iyer, 2010).
There were widespread human rights violations and abuses throughout the
insurgency by both the government forces and the CPN Maoists (OHCHR,
2012). Physical assault, abduction, and torture of civilians, and looting of
individual properties by the Maoists were reported extensively throughout
the conflict (Bohara et al., 2006). The security forces, on the other hand,
were the major perpetrators of sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and disap-
pearances of civilians and were accused of murder, torture, mutilation, and
other cruel and inhumane treatment of civilians to extract information from
anyone they deemed appropriate (OHCHR, 2012).
4.2.2 Consequences of the Civil Conflict and Mechanism
The conflict had widespread impact on economic development and severely
hampered delivery of government services. The Maoists’ unofficial motto of
“Destruction before construction” was very popular among its cadres and
was heavily advertised (Nepal, 2004). Maoists destroyed key infrastructures
linking urban areas to their rural strongholds and sabotaged public delivery
systems. Maoists, often, targeted rural bridges that linked rural to urban
areas and district headquarters, and in many parts of the country, destroyed
health posts, drinking water systems, public communication systems, and
schools (Jha, 2008). Between 1996 and 2003, physical infrastructure worth
at least $250 million was destroyed (Mahat, 2006) and the cost of the conflict
was estimated at $66.2 billion (Ra and Singh, 2005).
The conflict in Nepal is likely to have affected adult health and economic
outcomes in multiple ways including direct physiological and mental stress,
nutritional shocks and reduced access to healthcare.5 First, the conflict
severely affected the delivery of government services in rural areas; in partic-
5See Akresh et al. (2018) for the discussion of mechanisms through which stress and
inadequate resources during civil conflict is likely affect health.
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ular, decreasing health care delivery. Hundreds of community health posts
were destroyed; several health care workers were killed; many fled their posts;
and cold-chain delivery of vaccines became unsustainable (Singh, 2004). Sec-
ond, the conflict likely led to direct physiological and mental stress on resi-
dents, especially rural residents. As reported in Table 4.1, by the end of the
conflict, more than 13,000 people lost their lives, and more than 1,500 people
were either disappeared, injured, or disabled. Among the family members of
these casualties (estimated between 400,000 and 500,000), many suffered from
mental and psychological trauma (Media Foundation, 2011). Third, many
lost their sources of income, were displaced, widowed, and many children were
orphaned. Fourth, the complete disruption of public delivery systems came
as a major shock to nutrition and food security, especially in the northern
region that had relied heavily on the government-subsidized rations.
4.3 Data
One of the major impediments to analysis of conflict is the lack of conflict
data at sufficiently granular geographic scale. Most of the literature on the
legacies of war therefore is focused on assessing the effects of conflict intensity
at relatively high geographical levels. For example, previous studies exploring
the determinants of Nepal’s civil conflict (Murshed and Gates, 2005; Bohara
et al., 2006; Do and Iyer, 2010; Macours, 2011) and the consequences of
the conflict (Valente, 2014; Pivovarova and Swee, 2015; Menon and van der
Meulen Rodgers, 2015) exploit variation in intensity of the insurgency at
district level or even higher geographical units. Defining conflict variables
at broader geographical level measures individuals exposure to conflict less
precisely and can create measurement error. Moreover, significant hetero-
geneity in geography, socioeconomic status and development among areas
within districts can creates difficulty in addressing the association between
the determinants of war at district level and explained variables of interests,
likely leading to omitted variable bias.
In contrast, this analysis uses detailed and geographically granular conflict
intensity data; i.e. village-level insurgency. As households within a village
tend to be highly homogeneous in socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and live
in the same geographical terrain, this paper is able to avoid many of the
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concerns induced by the imprecise measure of individual’s exposure to con-
flict. Additionally, combining these high-resolution conflict data with the
2016 Nepal Demographic Health Survey (NDHS 2016) allows me to explore
the impacts of the conflict on the children of individuals who were exposed
to the war in their own childhoods.
4.3.1 Conflict Data
I use the Informal Sector Service Center’s (INSEC) records of the conflict
victims to create conflict intensity variables. INSEC is an active Nepalese
non-governmental human rights organization. Throughout the war, INSEC
documented human rights violations and abuses extensively and its archive
of the casualties provides detailed information on each victim’s demographic,
social and economic characteristics. The database is considered the most reli-
able data source on casualties of the conflict. Numerous studies including Do
and Iyer (2010); Nepal et al. (2011); Valente (2014, 2015) and Libois (2016)
have used the database. I extract demographic, educational achievement,
social and economic characteristics, and political affiliation of each victim.
Most importantly, I extract exact geographical location (village) and the date
of the incident.
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics of the war fatalities. In total the
INSEC dataset contains information on 14,982 victims; most (13,210) are
fatal casualties. More than 60% of the casualties are perpetrated by the
state. The CPN Maoists deny exploiting the grievances among ethnic groups
regarding political, social and economic exclusion to advance their agenda.
However, the majority of their cadres belonged to ethnic groups such as
Magars, Gurungs, and Dalits of the hills and mountains. It is, therefore,
not surprising that the majority of casualties among the Maoists are ethnic
minorities (60% not reported) and more than half of the total victims are
also from the minority groups. Apart from attacking security forces, the
Maoists also frequently targeted upper caste civilians, especially Bramins
and Chhetris; these upper castes the Maoists labeled as counterrevolutionary
elements. The average age of the victims is 28.3 years and almost 90% are
male. Many were actively involved in politics- 54% are affiliated to either
the rebel party or other political parties.
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The conflict intensity varied greatly over time. I summarize the number
of monthly casualties and major events that helped shape the insurgency in
Figure 4.1. As illustrated, the period after 2001 when the country was under
the state of emergency and the RNA was actively involved was the bloodiest.
The conflict lasted for total of 131 months from February 1996 to November
2006. Using information on each victims village and date of incident, I define
months of warv in a village, v, as the baseline conflict intensity variable,
constructed as follow:
conflictv = months of warv =
131∑
m=1
1(casualtyvm)
where, 1(casualtyvm) = 1 if casualtyvm > 0
(4.1)
and subscripts v and m index a village and a month since the beginning of
the war i.e. m takes the value of 1 for February 1996 and 131 for November
2006. Variable casualtyvm is number of casualties in a village v in a month
m.
Villages in Nepal experienced different levels of conflict as illustrated in
Figure 4.2, which depicts the number of months each village experienced
conflict out of the total 131 months of the war. The intensity of the con-
flict varied substantially across villages within districts. Defining the conflict
intensity as in Equation (4.1), however, may create a possibility of under
measuring the conflict intensity for example, a village could be under the
siege of the Maoists, reducing access to public services but without any casu-
alties; similarly, one-off destruction of infrastructure could have longer-term
ramifications. Unfortunately, we do not have records on infrastructure dam-
ages during the conflict. Nonetheless, total months of exposure to conflict
and casualty count is used extensively in the literature to measure conflict
intensity and assuming classical measurement error, because of the tendency
to attenuate towards zero, the estimated coefficients will provide lower bound
of the conflict impacts. Additionally, I use several other measures of conflict
intensity as below:
conflictv = number of casualtiesv =
131∑
m=1
casualtyvm (4.2)
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conflictvN1 = months of warvN =
131∑
m=1
1(casualtyvNm) (4.3)
conflictvN2 = number of casualtiesvN =
131∑
m=1
casualtyvNm (4.4)
conflictv50a = months of warv50 =
131∑
m=1
1(casualtyv50m) (4.5)
conflictv50b = number of casualtiesv50 =
131∑
m=1
casualtyv50m (4.6)
Conflict intensity based on Equation (4.2), measure of total casualties in
a village over the duration of the war, is illustrated in Figure C.2. Again,
the measure exhibits significant variation across villages and the intensity
pattern is highly similar to Figure 4.2. The next four Equations (4.3) to (4.6)
are defined at higher geographic level with the consideration for potential
spatial spillovers – conflict in nearby villages may induce stress, limit one’s
access to health care or other services. While Equations (4.3) to (4.4) are
months of war and casualty counts, respectively, in a village including in
its contiguous neighboring villages, Equations (4.5) to (4.6) report months of
war and casualty count in a village including the villages around 50-kilometer
radius from the center of the village.
4.3.2 Individual Data
I also use the 2016 Nepal Demographic Health Survey (NDHS 2016) in the
analysis. The survey was implemented by New ERA under the aegis of the
Ministry of Health of Nepal and was funded by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). The data collection took place between
June 19, 2016 and January 31, 2017.
The NDHS 2016 is a nationally representative survey of the female pop-
ulation ages 15 to 49. The sampling frame for the survey was based on the
updated version of the 2011 Nepal Population Census. After the implemen-
tation of the 2015 constitution, based on the population several VDCs and
Municipalities within districts were merged to form rural development areas
and urban areas. The old Village Development Committees (VDC) in the
rural and enumeration areas (EAs) in urban places essentially form primary
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sampling units (PSU) for the 2016 NDHS. In the final sample, 383 clusters
or PSUs were selected with probability proportional to their population size
(see Ministry of Health, 2017). Figure C.3 illustrates the coverage of the
survey. All 75 districts except Manang and Mustang were sampled; how-
ever, these two districts also had zero casualties during the conflict and are
excluded from the baseline analysis. As illustrated in Figure 4.3 (months of
war) and Figure C.4 (casualty count), conflict intensity varied significantly
across the 383 NDHS villages (clusters).
Within the selected DHS clusters, 30 randomly selected households were
interviewed, and all women aged 15 to 49 who were permanent residents or
visitors who stayed in the household the night before were eligible for the
interview. A sub-sample of about half of the households were selected for
biomarker information. All children aged 0 to 59 months and women 15 to 49
years in these households were administered the anthropometry, hemoglobin,
and blood pressure measurements. I limit the analytical sample to those that
are born before or in utero during the start of the conflict in February 1996
so that they are old enough to be sampled in the ever-married NDHS 2016
women sample and have children that can be incorporated in the second-
generation analysis. The final analytical sample size is 4,421 women ages 20
to 49 at the time of the survey (0 to 29 at the start of the conflict) and their
2,168 under age 5 children.
Table 4.2 summarizes women’s health outcomes and their exposure to con-
flict and demographic characteristics. I divide women into two cohorts ages
0 to 15 (treatment) and 16 to 29 (control) at the time of the start of the con-
flict. While the women in the former cohort would have still been in a period
of physical growth during the conflict years, the latter cohort would have
already gained full adult height (detail discussion is presented in empirical
strategy section 4). On average, women in the sample are 151.6 centimeters
tall, with the younger treated cohort 0.46 cm taller on average. Similarly,
compared to the control cohort, treated cohorts are less likely to have had
any incidence of pregnancy loss, report having had fewer live births, were
slightly younger at first birth, attained more years of education, and were
less likely to be employed at the time of the survey. However, there is no
difference in economic status (wealth index) between the two groups.
By construction, the older cohort faced zero level of conflict during the
first fifteen years of life (Panel B.1). Balance in lifetime exposure to conflict
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between the two sets of women (Panel B.2) is reassuring for the empirical
strategy used in section 4, which implies that the two groups do not come
from different types of sampled clusters. On average, women are 33.4 years
old with treatment and control cohorts being 27.9 and 41.8 years old respec-
tively (Panel C). Women in treatment groups are more likely to live in a
household with a female head, are more likely to be of lower caste, and are
less likely to be from Eastern Development region. All other controls are
balanced between the groups.
Summary statistics of the children sample is presented in Table 4.3. Chil-
dren are divided into treated and control group by their mother’s age at the
start of the conflict. 47% of the children are girls and on average tend to be
the second child (Panel C). There is no difference in control variables (Panel
C) and health outcome variables between the two groups except treated chil-
dren are slightly taller. Panel B reports mothers exposure to conflict. Again,
it is reassuring that there is no disparity in their mothers lifetime conflict
experience.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
Women surveyed in the NDHS 2016 experienced different levels of exposure
to conflict intensity according to their village of residence and year of birth.
The identification strategy exploits this variation, specifically, the variation
in exposure to the conflict during the individual’s critical period of physical
growth.
Height development in humans is characterized by three distinct stages.
There is a rapid growth during the first three years of life, followed by a
lower level of constant gain in height until the start of adolescence and then
a second growth spurt during adolescence ending in gaining full adult height
(Tanner et al., 1966a,b; Beard and Blaser, 2002; Bozzola and Meazza, 2012).
Figure C.5 demonstrates height velocity curves for a typical boy and a typical
girl. Under adequate nutritional and environmental conditions, the height
growth rate is highest during infancy, 26 centimeters per year, and progres-
sively declines until around age three, then stabilizes around 6 centimeters
per year until the start of puberty (Beard and Blaser, 2002; Bozzola and
Meazza, 2012). Pubertal height spurt among girls starts after age nine,
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peaks at about twelve years, and stops around the age of 15 (Figure C.5).
I borrow these stylized facts from the clinical and bio-medical literature
to establish causality. NDHS collects individuals’ month and year of birth,
which I use to create the age of women at the start of the conflict in February
1996. Figure 4.4 presents cohorts by age at the start of the conflict and
potential exposure to conflict at different stages of their physical growing
periods. As demonstrated in Figure C.5, girls past their pubertal age i.e.
cohorts aged 16 to 21 and 21 to 29 in 1996 (control 1 and 2 respectively)
would have gained full adult stature by the time of the start of the conflict,
and the effect of the conflict should be minimal or zero. I use cohort 16 to 21
as the main comparison group and use cohort 22 to 29 as a control placebo
experiment in a difference-in-difference specification. Based on their growing
phases at the beginning of the conflict, I create three conflict-exposed cohorts.
Although in the important phase of adolescence height spurt, girls aged 9 to
15 (treatment 3) would have faced conflict only in their third phase of height
growth. While girls aged 4 to 8 (treatment 2) would have been exposed to
conflict in the second and third stages of growth, cohort 0 to 3 (treatment 1)
would have been exposed to conflict through the entire growing period (all
three stages).6 In the baseline specification, I define conflict intensity at the
village level, hence, all five cohorts from any given village would have been
exposed to the same total amount of conflict during their lifetimes. However,
the exposure would have started at different times of their lives.
4.4.1 First Generation Impact
To explore the impact of early childhood exposure to conflict on adult out-
come, I employ the following estimation strategy:
Yimntcvdr =βc(conflictv × λc) + conflictv + λc + αt + ηm
δv + γ
T
r +Xi + ωn + εimntcvdr
(4.7)
where Y is an outcome of a woman i born in month m and year t, inter-
viewed in month n, and residing in village v, district d and development
6These five cohorts aged 0 to 3, 4 to 8, 9 to 15, 16 to 21, and 22 to 29 at the start of
the conflict in 1996 would become 20 to 23, 24 to 28, 29 to 35, 36 to 41, and 42 to 49 at
the time of the NDHS 2016 survey.
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region r. While women’s adult stature is the main outcome of interest, I also
explore conflicts impact on women’s reproductive health, sexual behavior,
educational attainment, employment, and wealth. The independent variable
of interest, conflictv × λc, is constructed as a vector of age-cohort specific
coefficients. The baseline conflict intensity variable is months of war in a
village; however, I also estimate the same equation using all the other con-
flict variables defined in the data section. Equation (4.7) also includes the
main conflict variable, conflictv, and cohort fixed effects, λc, as part of the
independent variables. While αt are year of birth fixed-effects, ηm are month
of birth fixed effects added to control for any seasonality - whether women
were born in peak or lean season. While δv are village (NDHS cluster) fixed
effects, ε is a random, idiosyncratic error term.7 Equation (4.7) also includes
five development-region-specific trends, γTr , to isolate variance in a cohort’s
outcome in deviation from the long-run trend in her development region
of residence. The five development regions were relatively homogeneous in
terms of development, geographical terrain and ethnic composition before
the war.
The socioeconomic status of the household is likely to play a significant role
in child development and would be desirable to control for in the regression.
Albeit observed ten years after the end of the civil war during the time of
the survey, household characteristics may still be influenced by the conflict.
Xi, therefore, includes only variables that are time-invariant. Contrary to
the Maoists’ denial, ethnicity played an important role in the insurgency.
Xi, therefore, includes indicators for belonging to a high caste. In addition,
month of the survey interview fixed effects, ωn, are included in the regressions
to control for the variation in seasonality due to the timing of the survey.
βcs in Equation (4.7) are the main coefficients of interest. Under a stan-
dard difference-in differences model assumption and, in particular, under the
assumption that there is no correlation between village level conflict and un-
observed factors varying with village and birth year cohort within the devel-
opment region, βc coefficients indicate the causal impact of early childhood
exposure to civil conflict on adult stature. While interpreting the results,
given the set of fixed effects in Equation (4.7), βc do not identify the effects
7I also estimate equation 6 using district fixed effects instead and the results are robust.
All the standard errors are clustered at the village level to allow for the correlation among
error terms within village.
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at a national level. Rather effects are identified due to womens exposure to
conflict by village of residence and birth year cohort net of birth year trends
common to all the villages within the development region. The goal of the
paper is to measure the total effect of the conflict on one’s life and specifica-
tion 7 does exactly that. Rather than measuring the impact of exposure to
conflict at a specific period of one’s life, it measures the cumulative impact
of exposure during one’s entire growth period.8
Studies exploring the determinants of the Nepal’s civil conflict have ad-
vanced several arguments regarding the insurgency heterogeneity across Nepal
including geographical terrain (Murshed and Gates, 2005; Bohara et al., 2006;
Do and Iyer, 2010; Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers, 2015) economic ex-
clusion and poverty (Murshed and Gates, 2005; Do and Iyer, 2010), inequal-
ity (Macours, 2011; Nepal et al., 2011), and lack of political representation
(Murshed and Gates, 2005; Bohara et al., 2006; Macours, 2011). These de-
terminants of variation in insurgency intensity are, therefore, likely to be
correlated with the outcomes of interest, threatening the validity of the iden-
tification. However, all these studies have focused on the determinants of
the conflict at the district level. Therefore, the application to village level
conflict are at most minimal because unlike districts, villages in Nepal are
highly homogeneous in terms of ethnic composition, socioeconomic status,
and geography. A major advantage over previous studies of the conflict is
that this paper uses a detailed geographical level conflict intensity allowing
for the inclusion of village-level fixed-effects, which eliminates any village-
level time-invariant factors. The timing of the beginning of the conflict in
women’s lives within a village therefore forms the comparison divide in the
estimation strategy.
Selective fertility and endogenous migration are other major concerns re-
8A typical approach in the literature is to measure conflict based on one’s exposure at
specific age and use fixed effects models to identify ages or age-periods during which the
exposure was most critical as below:
Yimntvdr =β0 + β1 × Exposure during 0 to 3 years + β2 × Exposure during 4 to 8 years+
β3 × Exposure during 9 to 15 years + αt + ηm + δv + γTr +Xi + ωn + εimntvdr
Conflict variables are defined as woman’s exposure to conflict during her age of 0 to 3, 4
to 8 and 9 to 15 years and all other variables have the same meanings as in Equation (4.7).
The results are presented in Tables C.1 to C.2. While important in identifying what part
of one’s life was important, the specification does not identify the overall impact of the
conflict.
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garding the identification strategy. As discussed in the data section, I limit
the analytical sample to those who were already born or in utero during the
start of the conflict in 1996. Purely on identification prospective, it helps
limit the potential confoundedness between the explained variables of inter-
est and selective fertility and migration. For instance, the strategy helps
mitigate the scenario in which after grasping the seriousness of the war, cou-
ples that are highly concerned about their children’s health in high conflict
areas may choose to delay having children or migrate to low conflict areas
to start a family. However, it could be true for the periods prior to the start
of the conflict that in anticipation of the war concerned couples may have
delayed having children or may have migrated. Detailed robustness checks
are presented in the empirical results section.
4.4.2 Intergenerational Health Impacts
The gap between the start of the Nepals civil conflict and the time of the
NDHS 2016 survey is sufficient enough that I can explore the impacts the
conflict had on the children of women who were exposed to the war in their
childhood. Anthropometric measures were collected for children under the
age of 5 at the time of the survey and hence I limit the second-generation
sample to children under 5 in 2016. I employ the same strategy as in equa-
tion 6 and add child specific controls to estimate. Following the estimation
equation:
Yjklnimtcvdr =βc(mother’s conflict exposurev ×mother’s cohort(λc))
+ mother’s conflict exposurev + λc + αt + ηm + δv
+ γTr + +Xi + µk + θl + pin +Xj + εjklnimtcvdr
(4.8)
where Y is a health outcome of a child j whose anthropometrics were mea-
sured in month n, was born in month k and year l to a woman i who was
born in month m and year t, and resides in village v, district d and de-
velopment region r. Child health endowment is defined as function of all
mothers controls and exposure to war as defined in section 4.1 and child spe-
cific characteristics. θl are childs birth-year fixed effects. As with mothers,
child month of birth fixed effects, µk, are included to account for season of
birth. Similarly, child anthropometric measures are sensitive to the timing
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of the measurement; in particular child weight, hence, Equation (4.8) also
includes month of measurement fixed effects, pin. ε is a random, idiosyn-
cratic error term and all the standard errors are clustered at the village level
to allow for correlation among error terms within villages. Xj is a vector
of time-invariant child controls dummy variables equal to one if the child
is a girl and if the child is a twin and child birth order fixed effects. As in
Equation (4.7), βcs are the coefficients of interest and have the same mean-
ing as in Equation (4.7) but identify to the impact of mothers childhood
exposure to conflict on her child’s outcomes. The equation under the stan-
dard assumptions of difference-in-differences models provides estimates of the
causal impact of conflict on second-generation health.
4.5 Results
In this section, first I present the impact of childhood exposure on adult
stature and establish validity for the identification strategy. Second, I report
impact on health and economic outcomes that are very important to women’s
well-being, but also provide additional explanation for the impact on second-
generation health. Finally, I present the health impacts on the children of
women who were exposed to the war in their childhoods.
4.5.1 Impact on Women’s Stature
Table 4.4 presents the impact of early childhood exposure to conflict on adult
stature using difference-in-differences Equation (4.7). The conflict intensity
variable used is months of war in the village of residence. While the outcome
variable, height, in columns 1 to 3 is measured in centimeters, columns 4 to
6 present height-for-age standard deviation (HAZ). The possibility of “non-
parallel dynamics” in the difference-in-differences estimation could be prob-
lematic. Because of difference in overall trends (health, education, poverty,
environmental etc.), changes in adult stature could vary systematically across
villages and, in particular, there could be mean reversion. Given the data
structure, I can, however, test for the identification assumption. Besides the
control group (aged 16 to 21 in 1996), women in age cohort 22 to 29 in 1996
would have gained full adult height by the start of the conflict, hence, the
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changes in adult height between these two cohorts should not differ system-
atically across villages. Age cohort 22 to 29 is therefore included in all the
regressions as a control to validate the identification assumption.
Village fixed effects are included in all specifications. I start estimation
with no additional controls (column 1) and progressively include extra con-
trols. Column 3 is the full baseline specification. The estimated differences-
in-differences for cohort 22 to 29 are close to 0 in size and statistically not
different from 0 across all specifications and measures of height. This pro-
vides strong evidence that the difference-in-differences coefficients of interests
are not driven by inappropriate identification assumptions.
Exposure to civil conflict only during the pubertal spurt appears to have no
significant effect on adult height. Across all specifications, conflict had sta-
tistically zero impact on height of the women aged 9 to 15 in 1996 compared
to women in the control group. On the surface, this finding is slightly at odds
with Akresh et al.’s (2018) analysis of Biafran war, where they find conflict
intensity during womens adolescent years to have significantly negative im-
pact on their adult stature. However, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, Nepal’s
conflict started as a small-scale rebellion and only after 2001 developed into
countrywide brutal civil war. Unlike the other two treatment cohorts in the
paper, most women in this age group would have escaped the most brutal
phase of the civil conflict during their growing period. In addition, my iden-
tification strategy differs from Akresh et al.’s (2018) in that women in this
age group start facing conflict only during their adolescent years.
Women aged 4 to 8 in 1996, on the other hand, would have just entered
or already be in their adolescent spurt years when the conflict started to
intensify in 2001.Therefore, it is not surprising to see the cumulative violence,
which was at a lower level in the second growth stage and intense in the third
stage, has significant and negative impact on their adult stature. Effects vary
between 0.67 to 0.71 millimeters (0.011 to 0.012 sd) across the specifications.
The coefficient in the full model can be interpreted as: an additional month
of exposure to civil war during the latter two stages of the growing period
decreases final adult height by 0.071 millimeters or 0.012 sd.
Besides being a period of a rapid growth, the first three years are also
the most sensitive period to environmental influences on height in human
beings (Schmidt et al., 1995). Early childhood height at ages 2 (Luo and
Karlberg, 2000) and 5 (Satyanarayana et al., 1986), is a strong predictor of
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final adult height. Similarly, the pubertal growth spurt plays an important
role in determining the final adult stature (Case and Paxson, 2008). Women
in the age group 0 to 3 in February 1996, who would have been exposed to
conflict during all three phases of growth, therefore would suffer the most
from the conflict compared to the other age groups. On average, girls aged
0 to 3 in 1996 suffered a reduction in adult height of 1.36 millimeters or
0.023 standard deviations due to an additional month of exposure to conflict
during their entire period of physical development (Columns 3 and 6). The
effect size is twice as big as the effect on the cohort aged 4 to 8 (0.071mm
and 0.012 sd) that experienced same level of violence but only after the age
of 3, hence signifying the importance of environmental influences on height
during the first three years. The result is highly significant and robust across
all specifications and for both measures of height ranging from 1.22 to 1.36
mm and 0.021 to 0.023 sd reduction in adult height.
Figure 4.5 presents the impact of exposure to conflict starting at different
ages using the baseline specification. Again, conflict exposure in first 8 years
of life reduce adult height, however, ages 0 to 3 are the only ages that are
statistically significant. As discussed in the data section, I define the conflict
intensity variable multiple ways and results using the baseline specification
are presented in Table 4.5. Conflict intensity used in column 1 is the number
of casualties in one’s own village of residence. Consistent with the earlier
findings, among women who were aged 0 to 3 and 4 to 8 in 1996, increased
casualties in the village of residence significantly decreased their final adult
stature. In columns 3, 4 and 5, I define war intensity as months of war in-
cluding the contiguous neighboring villages and within a 50-kilometer radius
from the village center. Again, the results are robust, especially among age
cohort 0 to 3.
Height has long been recognized as an important factor influencing indi-
viduals professional and personal success. Results presented in this section,
thus, have important economic significance. Taller workers receive a wage
premium. An additional inch of height is associated with 1 to 3 percentage
increase in earning among the British and American adults (Persico et al.,
2004; Case and Paxson, 2008). There is even greater height premium in lower
income settings: an additional centimeter of height is associated with a 2 per-
cent increase in hourly earnings both in Mexico (Vogl, 2014) and Indonesia
(Bargain and Zeidan, 2017). Using the results from Indonesia and Mexico,
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a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation implies that an additional month of
conflict exposure starting at infancy is associated with a decrease in hourly
earnings of 0.27 percent.
4.5.2 Identification Validation
In this section, I present additional evidence in support of the estimation
strategy. In addition to the possible presence of non-parallel dynamics dis-
cussed in the earlier subsection, selective migration and fertility are other
major threats to the identification strategy. The conflict intensity variable
is defined at the level of an individual’s village of residence at the time of
the survey. Systematic sorting by economic and physical status between the
stayers at high conflict villages and movers from the high conflict to low con-
flict villages is of concern, which will lead to overestimation of the impact of
conflict. Unfortunately, I do not observe womens village of birth. However,
the 2016 NDHS asked each individual how long she has been residing at
the place where she was surveyed and if not her entire life, the name of the
district from which she migrated. Twenty-six percent of the women in the
sample are living in a different district. Although the survey did not collect
the information, marriage is the most likely reason for womens migration, as
most women in Nepal move to their husband’s home permanently from their
maternal home, which is also likely to be their place of birth.
I define conflict at the level of women’s districts of birth (district they
moved from) and estimate the same specification as Equation (4.7) except
with district of birth fixed effects and region of birth trends and present
the results in Table 4.6. Columns 1 to 3 examine the presences of differ-
ences in migration patterns between the control and treated cohorts. The
difference-in-differences across the specifications are zero, suggesting no selec-
tive migration. Columns 4 to 9 re-estimate the main results from Table 4.4.
The differences-in-differences estimates, although reduced in magnitude, are
statistically significant and in the same direction as in the main specification
for age cohort 0 to 3. Villages within district are highly diverse and defining
conflict at the district level takes away that variation. Additionally, I limit
the sample to women living in the village where they were surveyed their en-
tire life and estimate Equation (4.7). The results are presented in Table C.3.
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The effect sizes are comparable to the baseline results in Table 4.4. These
results, overall, suggest there is minimal or no selective migration among the
women in the sample.
Limiting the sample to women already born at the start of the conflict
limits the scope for confoundedness through selective fertility. However, prior
to the start of the conflict couples that were highly concerned about their
childrens health may have delayed having children in anticipation of the war.
If true, we expect to see significantly different level of births between high
and low conflict areas periods just before the start of the war. However,
the conflict lasted for a decade and concerned couples may have had to wait
for the full decade to have a child a highly unlikely scenario. To formally
examine this issue, I use the information on district of birth and year of birth
from every individual observed during the 2001 Nepal Population Census and
calculate yearly district birth rates. As reported in Figure 4.6, there is no
difference in birth rates between the districts experiencing above and below
the median conflict intensity (months of war). Table C.4 reports regression
results for the same test and we see no difference in periods long before and
just before the start of the conflict.
4.5.3 Impact on Fertility, Education, Employment and
Wealth
Estimates in Table 4.7 show the impact of conflict on reproductive health and
fertility using the baseline specification. Early childhood exposure to conflict
has no significant impact on probability of miscarriage or of stillbirth among
women in age cohorts 9 to 15 and 4 to 8 in 1996. Women experiencing conflict
during their entire growth period, however, are significantly more like to have
had stillbirth or a miscarriage: each additional month of conflict exposure
increases the risk of stillbirth by 0.03 and of miscarriage by 0.06 percentage
respectively. Valente (2015) finds similar results that pregnancies that were
exposed to Nepal’s conflict were more likely to result in a miscarriage. There
is no significant impact on the probability of abortion. Women exposed to
conflict during their early growing periods have significantly more live births,
0.024 and 0.013 more births per month of exposure among cohorts aged 0 to
3 and 4 to 8 in 1996 respectively. The impact of conflict on the number of
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infant deaths is zero (column 5).
Impacts of early childhood exposure to conflict on other fertility outcomes
are presented in Table 4.8. The conflict has statistically no impact on the
likeliness of contraceptive use (column 1), number of women’s sex partners,
age at first sexual intercourse and age at first birth. There are also no
significant differences between women in control and treatment groups on
their age at first cohabitation with their domestic partner and number of
marriages and unions. Additionally, there is no difference in the smoking or
chewing tobacco habits of women in treatment groups and control group.
Table 4.9 shows impact on women’s human capital accumulation, employ-
ment and wealth. While there is no significant impact on years of education,
women in age cohort 0 to 3 are significantly less likely to have completed
a school leaving certificate (SLC). The lack of results in years of schooling
are consistent with Valente (2014) and Pivovarova and Swee (2015). Both
examine the conflict’s impact on human capital accumulation. Similarly,
there is no impact on the probability of being employed. However, women
exposed to conflict are significantly more likely be employed in agricultural
sector. As a measure of a households cumulative living standard, the DHS
reports a wealth index using ownership of easy to collect assets, materials
used in housing construction, and access to type of water and sanitation fa-
cilities (see Rutstein and Johnson, 2004). Women exposed to conflict early in
their childhood are likely to live in households with poorer living conditions
(column 7). The wealth factor score is lower by 977 and 675 per additional
month of exposure to conflict among women aged 0 to 3 and ages 4 to 8
in 1996 respectively. In addition to providing information on women’s adult
living conditions, outcomes discussed in this subsection provide a window to
what types of households the children of individuals exposed to conflict in
early childhood are living in. Therefore, these effects are likely to provide
explanations for the second-generation health impacts presented in the next
subsection.
4.5.4 Impact on Intergenerational Health
The intergenerational impacts of conflict on health are presented in Ta-
ble 4.10. As discussed in section 4.2, the estimation strategy used is the
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same as for the first generation, except I add child-specific controls. The
sample consists of children under the age 5 whose anthropometrics were
measured. I also include children born to women aged 22 to 29 in 1996
to provide support for the identification validation required by difference-in-
differences assumptions. The falsification test supports that identification
strategy, as estimates for all outcomes for children born to the experimental
control cohort of mothers are statistically zero.
Although statistically imprecise, mothers’ exposures to conflict negatively
affects child’s height (column 1). Children born to women in all the three
treatment groups are shorter by 0.005 to 0.011 standard deviations for their
age. Child development in terms of weight gain is significantly hampered by
mother’s exposure to conflict in her childhood. Compared to children born to
the control cohort of mothers, an additional month of mother’s exposure to
conflict during her entire growth period decreases her child’s weight for height
z-scores by 0.030 standard deviations (5.2 percent less than control mean).
Exposure to conflict starting at older age is even more severe for second-
generation weight for height. Women in cohorts age 4 to 8 and 9 to 15 in
1996 have children 0.039 and 0.041 standard deviations lighter for their height
(6.7 and 7.1 percent less than the control mean). All the coefficients are esti-
mated precisely. Column 3 reports the conflicts impact on second-generation
weight-for-age. Mother’s exposure during her childhood, again, has signifi-
cant negative impact on child weight-for-age, especially among children born
to women in the cohort aged 9 to 15 in 1996. Additionally, maternal war
exposure is strongly associated with significant lower body mass of children
(column 4). As with the weight-for-height, the impact size is increasing with
the age at which the mother started experiencing war. Compared to the con-
trol, mothers exposed in all three stages, the latter two stages, and the final
adolescence stage (aged 0 to 3, 4 to 8, and 9 to 15 at the start of conflict),
have children with lower BMI by 0.031, 0.040, and 0.044 standard deviations
respectively. Alternatively, an extra month of exposure led to a decrease
in children’s BMI by 0.030 to 0.044 standard deviations. These results are
consistent with Akresh et al. (2018), in that the adolescent exposure to con-
flict has strongest impacts on second-generation health. Table C.5 presents
the same results using other conflict measures discussed in section 3 and the
results are robust across all conflict definitions.
As a robustness check, Table 4.11 presents the intergenerational impact
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using conflict intensity based on mother’s district of birth. The estimate
shows stronger results than when defining maternal exposure to conflict at
the level of village of residence. Compared to the children of women in the
control group, weight-for-height z-scores are significantly less among children
of women in the treatment group. The impact size between the treatment
groups are highly comparable. Similarly, impacts on weight for age and
BMI have similar strong negative impacts. These coefficients are smaller
than those reported in table 11 but are more precisely estimated. In both
the specifications, we observe negative but statistically zero impact on child
height. However, at this stage of physical growth, children may be too young
to develop stunting and negative impacts on weight measurements provide
strong indication for future stunting.
Channels for intergenerational transmission of maternal exposure to con-
flict to child may vary greatly. In addition to unobserved factors such as the
physiological stress and genomic changes, the intergenerational transmission
may be working through the maternal health, education or wealth endow-
ment or through early childhood investment (Cunha and Heckman, 2007).
Results presented in section 5.3 are likely to explain some of these channels.
Nepalese women exposed to conflict during their childhood development are
more likely to have had pregnancy losses and at the same time have more live
births (Table 4.7). Although I find no evidence for sexual behavioral changes
(Table 4.8), women are less likely to have completed SLC, and most work
on their own farms (Table 4.9). Additionally, highly significant in terms of
parental ability to invest in children, exposed women have significantly less
wealth. Combined with having more children, this drastically decreases par-
ent’s ability to invest in children during their critical period of development.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper exploits variation in conflict at a detailed geographical level to es-
tablish causality between early childhood exposure to conflict and women’s
final stature. Additionally, along with Akresh et al. (2018), this paper is
among the first to document the intergenerational transmission of the im-
pact of early childhood conflict exposure on second generation health. Nepal
experienced a decade-long violent civil conflict between 1996 and 2006, which
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resulted in more than thirteen thousand fatal casualties, significant infras-
tructure damages, severe hindrance in delivery of basic services and generated
extreme fear, sense of insecurity and stress among its citizens. Considered the
most reliable, I use INSEC’s database on the conflict casualties and create an
individual level victims’ data set with exact geographical location (village)
and dates of the incidents. This allows me to exploit variation in conflict
intensity at the village level for identification.
Fueled by international remittances, Nepal enjoyed consistent economic
growth and poverty reduction (Uematsu et al., 2016) during the period of
conflict. The country also made significant improvement in other dimen-
sions of development including health (Headey and Hoddinott, 2015) and
non-income based multidimensional poverty (OPHI, 2013). These aggregate
development trends, however, may mask disparities at a more disaggregated
level due to significant variation in conflict intensity. The little research doc-
umenting the consequences of the war thus far is focused on district-level
disaggregation, and results are mixed - little to zero impact on human cap-
ital accumulation (Valente, 2014; Pivovarova and Swee, 2015) and positive
impact on women employment (Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers, 2015).
Libois (2016), on the other hand, using conflict measurement at a more de-
tailed geographical level (distance from the conflict sites) finds significant
negative immediate impact on consumption and income. Failure to capture
the substantial conflict heterogeneity across villages within district may ex-
plain the lack of evidence of conflict effects at the district level.
In contrast, I exploit variation in early childhood exposure to conflict by
birth cohort and village of residence to estimate the impact of conflict inten-
sity, as measured by months of war, on adult height. Using the 2016 NDHS
women sample, I find that conflict and, in particular, exposure starting very
early in one’s growing period, has highly significant and negative impact on
final women’s adult height. Findings are robust across (i) model specifica-
tions and (ii) measures of conflict. In validating the difference-in-differences
estimation strategy used, I find no evidence of presence of non-parallel dy-
namics nor of selective migration and fertility. These results aligned with the
biomedical literature that early childhood conditions are highly significant in
determining final height early life stunting increases the risk of being short
as an adult (Golden, 1994; Martorell et al., 1994). Conditions in the fetal
period and early years after birth are profound in influencing human biology
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and long-term health. Responses to lack of adequate nutrition of developing
fetus may be coded permanently, which is likely to increase later life health
hazards (Barker, 1992). Similarly, early years of life are highly susceptible to
environmental influence on height (Schmidt et al., 1995). Nepalese children
growing up during the conflict experienced substantial levels of physiological
and mental stress, and for many, mostly in rural areas under the control of
the Maoists, it was a major nutritional shock and reduced access to health-
care. These are likely mechanisms at work and describe the results presented
in the paper.
As sufficient time gap between the start of the conflict and the time of the
NDHS 2016 allows me to explore the impacts of the conflict on children of
the women who were exposed to conflict in their childhood. I find that the
mothers’ exposure to conflict is detrimental for their children’s health. Al-
though imprecise, impacts on children’s height-for-age z-scores are negative.
Results for children’s weight-for-height, weight-for-age and BMI z-scores, on
the other hand, are precisely estimated and again negative. Results are ro-
bust to alternative measure of conflict intensity (mother’s district of birth).
To explore possible intergenerational transmission mechanisms, I investigate
the impacts on mother’s economic and fertility outcomes. I find that women
exposed to conflict during childhood have more children and live in a house-
hold with significantly less wealth. The combined effect of the two likely
result in drastic decreases in the parental ability to invest in children.
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4.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Conflict timeline
Source: Author’s calculation based on the INSEC’s archive on the conflict victims.
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Figure 4.2: Conflict intensity heterogeneity: Months of war
Source: Author’s calculation based on the INSEC’s archive on the conflict victims.
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Figure 4.3: Conflict intensity heterogeneity: Months of war and NDHS 2016
clusters
Source: Author’s calculation based on the INSEC’s archive on the conflict victims.
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Figure 4.5: Impact on women’s adult height (cm) by age at start of the war
Treatment 3 Treatment 2 Treatment 1
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Note: Figure presents coefficients on interaction between exposure to months of war and
age at start of the civil war in main specification.
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Figure 4.6: Births per 1000 district population using the 2001 Nepal
population census
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Note: High conflict areas are defined as districts that experienced above median level of
conflict intensity (months of war). Birth rates are calculated using individuals observed
in the 2001 Nepal population census and their year of birth.
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of the victims of civil war in Nepal
Total casualties 14982 Political affiliation (%)
Killed 13210 Nepali Congress 3.19
Disappeared 998 CPN-UML or ML 1.50
Injuried 774 CPN Maoist (rebel) 48.32
Other parties 0.91
Perpetrator No affiliation 46.07
State 9208
Maoist 5302 Occupation (%)
Other 472 Agriculture 21.01
Wage laborer 2.27
Age (mean) 28.34 Employed 1.47
Female (%) 11.10 Teacher 1.68
Police 11.92
Social caste (%) Army 6.53
Bramin or Chettrey 44.76 Lawyer 0.05
Janajati, Aadibashi or Dalit 46.82 Doctor 0.04
Madeshi or Muslim 6.25 Politician 43.89
Other 2.17 Social worker 0.16
Rights activists 0.03
Education (%) Sports personality 0.05
Bachelors degree or more 2.61 Driver 0.23
Intermediate 7.30 Student 5.50
Secondary school 26.26 Journalist 0.03
Lower secondary school 21.99 Businessman 1.57
Primary school 14.32 Ex-security personnel 0.01
Literate 15.05 Other, not clear 3.56
Illiterate 12.47
Source: Author’s calculation based on the INSEC’s archive on the conflict victims (http:
//www.insec.org.np/victim/).
Note: While classes 8 to 10 are defined as secondary school, 6 and 7 are lower secondary
school. Nepali Congress (Democratic) and Nepali Congress are combined as one as the
former was formed due to a vertical split of Nepali Congress into two in 2002. However, the
parties merged into one in 2007. Similarly, Communist Party of Nepal - Marxist Leninists
(CPN-ML) was reunited with the Communist Party of Nepal - Unified Marxist Leninists
(CPN-UML) in 2002 but few members refused to go along the merger forming a new party
with the same name. Party’s sister organizations and student wings are also accounted for
while assigning party affiliation.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics of women aged 20 to 49 at time of
the survey
Age at start of the war in 1996
Variables
0 to 29 0 to 15 16 to 29
Difference
(All women) (Treatment) (Control)
Panel A: Outcomes
Height (cm) 151.56 151.75 151.28 0.46***
[5.50] [5.45] [5.56] (0.17)
Weight (kg) 52.04 51.36 53.05 -1.69***
[10.05] [9.52] [10.73] (0.31)
Body mass index 22.63 22.29 23.14 -0.85***
[4.06] [3.86] [4.30] (0.12)
Pregnancy loss (yes=1) 0.28 0.27 0.30 -0.04***
[0.45] [0.44] [0.46] (0.01)
Total births 2.88 2.25 3.81 -1.56***
[1.65] [1.20] [1.77] (0.04)
Age at first birth 19.74 19.54 20.04 -0.51***
[3.19] [2.99] [3.45] (0.10)
Years of education 3.83 5.05 2.04 3.01***
[4.25] [4.30] [3.48] (0.12)
Employed last 12 months (yes=1) 0.72 0.69 0.76 -0.07***
[0.45] [0.46] [0.43] (0.01)
Wealth index factor score 3879.78 3274.44 4776.24 -1501.79
[96436.27] [93601.64] [100507.35] (2957.08)
Panel B: Exposure to conflict
B1: During 0-15 years
Months of war 1.72 2.87 0.00 2.87***
[4.63] [5.71] [0.00] (0.14)
Number of casualties 3.12 5.22 0.00 5.22***
[10.76] [13.53] [0.00] (0.32)
Months inc. neighboring villages 6.22 10.43 0.00 10.43***
[11.08] [12.73] [0.00] (0.30)
B2: Whole life
Months of war 5.45 5.49 5.39 0.10
[8.27] [8.28] [8.26] (0.25)
Number of casualties 10.41 10.55 10.20 0.35
[20.85] [21.01] [20.60] (0.64)
Months inc. neighboring villages 18.67 18.71 18.61 0.10
[14.42] [14.40] [14.45] (0.44)
Panel C: Controls
Current age 33.48 27.85 41.83 -13.99***
[8.07] [4.45] [3.93] (0.13)
Female headed HH (yes=1) 0.34 0.37 0.30 0.07***
[0.47] [0.48] [0.46] (0.01)
Hight caste (yes=1) 0.39 0.37 0.41 -0.04***
[0.49] [0.48] [0.49] (0.01)
Rural (yes =1) 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.00
[0.35] [0.34] [0.35] (0.01)
Eastern region 0.19 0.18 0.21 -0.02**
[0.39] [0.39] [0.40] (0.01)
Central region 0.24 0.24 0.25 -0.00
[0.43] [0.43] [0.43] (0.01)
Western region 0.21 0.21 0.21 -0.00
[0.41] [0.41] [0.41] (0.01)
Mid-western region 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.02
[0.41] [0.42] [0.40] (0.01)
Far-western region 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.01
[0.34] [0.35] [0.34] (0.01)
Number of women 4,421 2,639 1,782 4,421
Note: Standard deviations are in brackets and standard errors are in paren-
theses and significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics of children under 5 at time of the
survey in 2016
Mother’s age at start of the war in 1996
Variables
0 to 29 0 to 15 16 to 29
Difference
(All women) (Treatment) (Control)
Panel A: Outcomes
Height/age sd -1.55 -1.52 -1.85 0.33***
[1.34] [1.33] [1.39] (0.11)
Weight/age sd -1.35 -1.33 -1.50 0.17*
[1.07] [1.06] [1.16] (0.09)
Weight/height sd -0.65 -0.65 -0.62 -0.03
[1.10] [1.09] [1.15] (0.09)
Body mass index sd -0.51 -0.51 -0.45 -0.06
[1.11] [1.11] [1.14] (0.09)
Panel B: Mother’s exposure to conflict
B1: During 0-15 years
Months of war 3.17 3.43 0.00 3.43***
[6.01] [6.17] [0.00] (0.49)
Number of casualties 5.83 6.29 0.00 6.29***
[14.28] [14.74] [0.00] (1.16)
Months inc. neighboring villages 11.79 12.73 0.00 12.73***
[13.10] [13.16] [0.00] (1.04)
B2: Whole life
Months of war 4.69 4.73 4.10 0.63
[7.42] [7.41] [7.64] (0.61)
Number of casualties 8.85 8.92 8.09 0.82
[18.74] [18.55] [20.92] (1.53)
Months inc. neighboring villages 17.15 17.20 16.54 0.66
[13.73] [13.73] [13.83] (1.12)
Panel C: Controls
Child sex (girl=1) 0.47 0.48 0.42 0.06
[0.50] [0.50] [0.49] (0.04)
Child birth order number 2.36 2.16 4.97 -2.81***
[1.57] [1.25] [2.53] (0.11)
Child is a twin (yes =1) 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01
[0.11] [0.11] [0.14] (0.01)
Female headed HH (yes=1) 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.03
[0.47] [0.47] [0.46] (0.04)
Hight caste (yes=1) 0.36 0.37 0.32 0.04
[0.48] [0.48] [0.47] (0.04)
Rural (yes =1) 0.89 0.89 0.93 -0.03
[0.31] [0.31] [0.26] (0.03)
Eastern region 0.18 0.18 0.24 -0.06*
[0.39] [0.38] [0.43] (0.03)
Central region 0.27 0.27 0.28 -0.01
[0.44] [0.44] [0.45] (0.04)
Western region 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.04
[0.40] [0.40] [0.37] (0.03)
Mid-western region 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.00
[0.42] [0.42] [0.41] (0.03)
Far-western region 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.03
[0.34] [0.34] [0.31] (0.03)
Number of children 2,168 2,007 161 2,168
Note: Standard deviations are in brackets and standard errors are in parentheses
and significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4.10: Second generation health impact
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Height for Weight for Weight for Body mass
age sd height sd age sd index sd
(HAZ) (WHZ) (WAZ) (BMIZ)
Mother’s age 22 to 29 × 0.048 -0.032 0.005 -0.045
Mother’s exposure to conflict (0.046) (0.032) (0.040) (0.028)
Mother’s age 9 to 15 × -0.010 -0.041** -0.034* -0.044***
Mother’s exposure to conflict (0.033) (0.017) (0.020) (0.015)
Mother’s age 4 to 8 × -0.005 -0.039** -0.025 -0.040**
Mother’s exposure to conflict (0.030) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017)
Mother’s age 0 to 3 × -0.011 -0.030** -0.025 -0.031**
Mother’s exposure to conflict (0.027) (0.015) (0.020) (0.014)
Observations 2,165 2,163 2,169 2,164
Adjusted R-squared 0.131 0.114 0.132 0.110
Mother and other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Children contrls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of clusters 373 373 373 373
Control mean (Mother’s age 16 to 21) -1.836 -0.580 -1.472 -0.423
Note: Sample is children aged 0 to 59 months at the time of the survey. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at
the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Treatment on the treated estimates are reported based on a difference-in-difference
specification. Standard errors are clustered at village level. Mother’s age in the table refers to mother’s
age at the start of the war. Comparison cohort is children born to mothers whose age was 16 to 21 at the
start of the war. Children born to mother’s cohort 22 to 29 is a second comparison group that serves as
a placebo test. Mother’s controls are mother’s years of birth fixed effects, mother’s month of birth fixed
effects, region specific trends. Household controls are indicator for high caste, female headed households,
and whether residing in a rural area. Child controls are indicator if child is a girl, a twin, birth order fixed
effect, and fixed effects for child years of birth, month of birth, and month of anthropometric measurements.
Reported outcomes are z-scores based on the WHO anthropometric measurement standards.
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Table 4.11: Second generation health impact by mother’s district of birth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Height for Weight for Weight for Body mass
age sd height sd age sd index sd
Mother’s age 22 to 29 × 0.016 -0.007 -0.001 -0.011
Mother’s exposure to conflict (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Mother’s age 9 to 15 × -0.006 -0.014** -0.016** -0.015**
Mother’s exposure to conflict (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Mother’s age 4 to 8 × -0.003 -0.013** -0.012** -0.015**
Mother’s exposure to conflict (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Mother’s age 0 to 3 × -0.003 -0.013** -0.012** -0.016***
Mother’s exposure to conflict (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 2,165 2,163 2,169 2,164
Adjusted R-squared 0.181 0.094 0.130 0.095
Mother and household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Children controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s district of birth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of clusters 74 74 74 74
Control mean (Age 16 to 21) -1.836 -0.580 -1.472 -0.423
Note: Conflict is defined at district level i.e. mother’s district of birth. Sample is children aged 0 to 59
months at the time of the survey. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Treatment
on the treated estimates are reported based on a difference-in-difference specification. Standard errors are
clustered at village level. Mother’s age in the table refers to mother’s age at the start of the war. Comparison
cohort is children born to mothers whose age was 16 to 21 at the start of the war. Children born to mother’s
cohort 22 to 29 is a second comparison group that serves as a placebo test. Mother’s controls are mother’s
years of birth fixed effects, mother’s month of birth fixed effects, region specific trends. Household controls
are indicator for high caste, female headed households, and whether residing in a rural area. Child controls
are indicator if child is a girl, a twin, birth order fixed effect, and fixed effects for child years of birth, month
of birth, and month of anthropometric measurements. Reported outcomes are z-scores based on the WHO
anthropometric measurement standards.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I present research on three topics in development eco-
nomics, with overarching theme being the long-term implications of positive
and negative shocks on rural poor’s economic wellbeing. First paper of this
dissertation implements a quantifiable measure of household resilience and
demonstrates its application and relevance in the context of an impact eval-
uation. Results from the impact evaluation find that a one-off transfer of
assets and training increased household development resilience; the inter-
vention shifted the conditional transition distribution of households’ asset
holdings upward, increasing expected asset holdings and decreasing condi-
tional variance. Findings demonstrate that attention to conditional variance
in impact on assets provides important insights into program effectiveness
and persistence of estimated effects.
Resilience as a household outcome offers important advantages for impact
analysis. Because it is based on the full distribution of household welfare,
the development resilience measure provides a more complete picture of in-
tervention impacts, yielding insights into household capacity to avoid falling
into poverty in the foreseeable future. In particular, estimation of the condi-
tional moment functions allows for nonlinear persistence, which can improve
forecasting of households’ future states. In addition, the conditional moment
functions make it possible to distinguish whether estimated effects are pri-
marily attributable to changes in the conditional mean or the conditional
variance. These inferences are especially significant for households at or near
the poverty threshold. Our finding that a substantial share of households in
the analysis are asset non-poor and yet not resilient illustrates this point. Re-
silience measurement yields policy relevant insights into household well-being
that conventional measures like poverty headcount miss.
Resilience estimation results suggest that the multifaceted approach fo-
cused on improving well-being through transfers, decreasing downside risk,
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and changing underlying structural barriers to economic progress, can have
lasting impact on households’ ability to accumulate and retain productive
assets and to withstand covariate and idiosyncratic shocks. We argue, more-
over, that resilience theory can guide development practitioners in the design
and evaluation of future anti-poverty programs. Our findings suggest that
standard impact evaluation measurements are insufficient to establish house-
holds resilience against future poverty spells and should be complemented,
where possible, by estimation and evaluation of higher moments of the house-
hold welfare distribution.
The second paper uses a unique source of nationally representative data
during the period that Nepal experienced a boom in outmigration that al-
lows one to explore the impact of migration on labor supply of the left-
behind household members both on extensive and intensive margins for wage-
employment, self-employment, and household activities. The paper also pro-
vides an answer to the question, what are the remaining members in the
households engage in instead of work employment?
The paper finds that having international migrants in the family discour-
age members staying behind from participation in wage-employment. This
is true for both male and female members. However, female members in-
crease participation in self-employment, almost entirely through subsistence
farming. The paper also finds that both self-employed and wage-employed
adults decrease weekly hours of labor supply and only women in the migrant-
sending household increase time in household activities. Findings presented
in this chapter suggest that male-dominated migration forces women to re-
align priorities and reallocate time from market-work to farming and house-
hold activities. In contrast, because of the income transfers, men now value
their leisure more and decrease their overall labor supply. These are reason-
able findings in a country where the traditional household norms and social
culture see women as subordinate to men.
In the third paper, in addition to presenting long-term health effects on
first generation, I show that the impact of exposure to violent conflict during
childhood persist into second generation. I exploit variation in conflict at
a detailed geographical level to establish causality between early childhood
exposure to conflict and women’s final stature. Additionally, this study is
among the first to document the intergenerational transmission of the impact
of early childhood conflict exposure on second generation health. Nepal ex-
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perienced a decade-long violent civil conflict between 1996 and 2006, which
resulted in more than thirteen thousand fatal casualties, significant infras-
tructure damages, severe hindrance in delivery of basic services and gener-
ated extreme fear, sense of insecurity and stress among its citizens. Using
the variation in early childhood exposure to conflict by birth cohort and
village of residence and the 2016 NDHS women sample, I find that conflict
and, in particular, exposure starting very early in ones growing period, has
highly significant and negative impact on final womens adult height. Find-
ings are robust across (i) model specifications and (ii) measures of conflict.
In validating the difference-in-differences estimation strategy used, I find no
evidence of presence of non-parallel dynamics nor of selective migration and
fertility. These results aligned well with the biomedical literature that early
childhood conditions are highly significant in determining final height early
life stunting increases the risk of being short as an adult.
As sufficient time gap between the start of the conflict and the time of
the NDHS 2016 allows me to explore the impacts of the conflict on children
of the women who were exposed to conflict in their childhood. I find that
the mothers’ exposure to conflict is detrimental for their children’s health, in
particular, children’s weight-for-height, weight-for-age and BMI z-scores. Re-
sults are robust to alternative measure of conflict intensity (mother’s district
of birth). To explore possible intergenerational transmission mechanisms, I
investigate the impacts on mother’s economic and fertility outcomes. I find
that women exposed to conflict during childhood have more children and live
in a household with significantly less wealth. The combined effect of the two
likely result in drastic decreases in the parental ability to invest in children.
125
REFERENCES
Adams, R. H. and Page, J. (2005). Do international migration and re-
mittances reduce poverty in developing countries? World development,
33(10):1645–1669.
Ahmed, A. U., Rabbani, M., Sulaiman, M., and Das, N. C. (2009). The
impact of asset transfer on livelihoods of the ultra poor in Bangladesh.
BRAC Research Monograph 39, Research and Evaluation Division, BRAC,
Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Akbulut-Yuksel, M. (2017). War during childhood: The long run effects of
warfare on health. Journal of health economics, 53:117–130.
Akresh, R., Bhalotra, S., Leone, M., and Osili, U. O. (2012). War and
stature: growing up during the nigerian civil war. American Economic
Review, 102(3):273–77.
Akresh, R., Bhalotra, S., Leone, M., and Osili, U. O. (2018). First and
second generation impacts of the biafran war. NBER Working Paper 23721,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Akresh, R., Caruso, G. D., and Thirumurthy, H. (2014). Medium-term health
impacts of shocks experienced in utero and after birth: Evidence from
detailed geographic information on war exposure. NBER Working Paper
20763, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Akresh, R. and De Walque, D. (2008). Armed conflict and schooling: Evi-
dence from the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The World Bank.
Almond, D. (2006). Is the 1918 influenza pandemic over? long-term effects
of in utero influenza exposure in the post-1940 us population. Journal of
political Economy, 114(4):672–712.
Almond, D. and Currie, J. (2011). Killing me softly: The fetal origins hy-
pothesis. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3):153–172.
Almond, D., Currie, J., and Herrmann, M. (2012). From infant to mother:
Early disease environment and future maternal health. Labour Economics,
19(4):475–483.
126
Amuedo-Dorantes, C., Georges, A., and Pozo, S. (2010). Migration, remit-
tances, and children’s schooling in haiti. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 630(1):224–244.
Angrist, J. D. (1991). Instrumental variables estimation of average treatment
effects in econometrics and epidemiology. Working Paper 115, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly harmless econometrics: An
empiricist’s companion. Princeton university press.
Antle, J. M. (1983). Testing the stochastic structure of production: A flexi-
ble moment-based approach. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics,
1(3):192–201.
Antman, F. M. (2010). Adult child migration and the health of elderly
parents left behind in mexico. American Economic Review, 100(2):205–08.
Antman, F. M. (2011). The intergenerational effects of paternal migration on
schooling and work: What can we learn from children’s time allocations?
Journal of Development Economics, 96(2):200–208.
Ashenfelter, O. (1978). Estimating the effect of training programs on earn-
ings. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 60(1):47–57.
Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (1985). Using the longitudinal structure of earn-
ings to estimate the effect of training programs. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 67(4):648–60.
Ashley, S., Holden, S., and Bazeley, P. (1999). Livestock in Poverty-Focused
Development. Livestock in Development (Organisation), Crewkerne, UK.
Bandiera, O., Burgess, R., Das, N., Gulesci, S., Rasul, I., and Sulaiman, M.
(2017). Labor markets and poverty in village economies. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 132(2):811–870.
Banerjee, A., Duflo, E., Goldberg, N., Karlan, D., Osei, R., Pariente´, W.,
Shapiro, J., Thuysbaert, B., and Udry, C. (2015). A multifaceted program
causes lasting progress for the very poor: Evidence from six countries.
Science, 348(6236):1260799.
Banerjee, A. V. and Duflo, E. (2007). The economic lives of the poor. The
journal of economic perspectives, 21(1):141–167.
Bardhan, P. K. (1984). Work patterns and social differentiation: Rural
women of West Bengal. In Binswanger, H. and Rosenzweig, M., editors,
Contractual Arrangements, Employment and Wages in Rural South Asia.
Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut.
127
Bargain, O. and Zeidan, J. (2017). Stature, skills and adult life outcomes:
Evidence from indonesia. The Journal of Development Studies, 53(6):873–
890.
Barker, D. J. (1992). The fetal origins of adult hypertension. Journal of
hypertension. Supplement: official journal of the International Society of
Hypertension, 10(7):S39–44.
Barrett, C. B. and Constas, M. A. (2014). Toward a theory of resilience
for international development applications. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 111(40):14625–14630.
Barrett, C. B., Garg, T., and McBride, L. (2016). Well-being dynamics and
poverty traps. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 8:303–327.
Barrett, C. B., Marenya, P. P., McPeak, J., Minten, B., Murithi, F., Oluoch-
Kosura, W., Place, F., Randrianarisoa, J. C., Rasambainarivo, J., and
Wangila, J. (2006). Welfare dynamics in rural Kenya and Madagascar.
The Journal of Development Studies, 42(2):248–277.
Bateson, P., Barker, D., Clutton-Brock, T., Deb, D., D’udine, B., Foley,
R. A., Gluckman, P., Godfrey, K., Kirkwood, T., Lahr, M. M., et al. (2004).
Developmental plasticity and human health. Nature, 430(6998):419.
Beard, A. S. and Blaser, M. J. (2002). The ecology of height: the effect
of microbial transmission on human height. Perspectives in Biology and
Medicine, 45(4):475–498.
Bhalotra, S. and Rawlings, S. (2013). Gradients of the intergenerational
transmission of health in developing countries. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 95(02):660–672.
Bhattarai, P. (2005). Migration of Nepalese Youth for Foreign Employment:
Problems and Prospects : (a Review of Existing Government Policies and
Programmes). YOAC.
Binzel, C. and Assaad, R. (2011). Egyptian men working abroad: Labour
supply responses by the women left behind. Labour Economics, 18:S98–
S114.
Blattman, C., Green, E. P., Jamison, J., Lehmann, M. C., and Annan, J.
(2016). The returns to microenterprise support among the ultrapoor: A
field experiment in postwar Uganda. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics, 8(2):35–64.
Blattman, C. and Miguel, E. (2010). Civil war. Journal of Economic litera-
ture, 48(1):3–57.
128
Bohara, A. K., Mitchell, N. J., and Nepal, M. (2006). Opportunity, democ-
racy, and the exchange of political violence: A subnational analysis of
conflict in nepal. Journal of conflict resolution, 50(1):108–128.
Bozzola, M. and Meazza, C. (2012). Growth Velocity Curves: What They
Are and How to Use Them, pages 2999–3011. Springer New York, New
York, NY.
Bozzoli, C., Deaton, A., and Quintana-Domeque, C. (2009). Adult height
and childhood disease. Demography, 46(4):647–669.
Brown, R. P. and Conneil, J. (1993). The global flea market: migration,
remittances and the informal economy in tonga. Development and Change,
24(4):611–647.
Bundervoet, T., Verwimp, P., and Akresh, R. (2009). Health and civil war
in rural burundi. Journal of human Resources, 44(2):536–563.
Calvo, C. and Dercon, S. (2007). Vulnerability to poverty. CSAE Working
Paper 2007-03, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of
Oxford.
Camacho, A. (2008). Stress and birth weight: evidence from terrorist attacks.
American Economic Review, 98(2):511–15.
Carter, M. R., Little, P. D., Mogues, T., and Negatu, W. (2007). Poverty
traps and natural disasters in Ethiopia and Honduras. World development,
35(5):835–856.
Case, A. and Paxson, C. (2008). Stature and status: Height, ability, and
labor market outcomes. Journal of political Economy, 116(3):499–532.
CEDAW (2003). Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under
article 18 of the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination
against women. Technical report, United Nations.
Central Bureau of Statistics (2012). National population and housing census
2011. National report, Kathmandu, Nepal.
Chaudhuri, S., Jalan, J., and Suryahadi, A. (2002). Assessing household
vulnerability to poverty from cross-sectional data: A methodology and
estimates from Indonesia. Discussion Paper 01102-52, Department of Eco-
nomics, Columbia University, New York.
Choldin, H. M. (1973). Kinship networks in the migration process. Interna-
tional Migration Review, 7(2):163–175.
129
Christiaensen, L. J. and Subbarao, K. (2005). Towards an understanding
of household vulnerability in rural Kenya. Journal of African Economies,
14(4):520–558.
CIA World Factbook (2019). The world factbook - nepal. https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html#. Ac-
cessed: April 05, 2019.
Cisse´, J. D. and Barrett, C. B. (2016). Estimating development resilience: A
conditional moments-based approach. Working Paper 236, African Devel-
opment Bank Group.
Cisse´, J. D. and Ikegami, M. (2016). Does insurance improves resilience?
Measuring the impact of index-based livestock insurance on development
resilience in northern Kenya. Unpublished manuscript, Cornell University.
Cunha, F. and Heckman, J. (2007). The technology of skill formation. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 97(2):31–47.
Currie, J. and Moretti, E. (2003). Mother’s education and the intergenera-
tional transmission of human capital: Evidence from college openings. The
Quarterly journal of economics, 118(4):1495–1532.
Currie, J. and Moretti, E. (2007). Biology as destiny? short-and long-run
determinants of intergenerational transmission of birth weight. Journal of
Labor economics, 25(2):231–264.
Currie, J. and Vogl, T. (2013). Early-life health and adult circumstance in
developing countries. Annu. Rev. Econ., 5(1):1–36.
Das, N. C. and Misha, F. A. (2010). Addressing extreme poverty in a sustain-
able manner: Evidence from CFPR programme. CFPR Working Paper 19,
Research and Evaluation Division, BRAC, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Department of Foreign Employment (2014). Labour migration for employ-
ment a status report nepal: 2013/2014. Technical report, Government
of Nepal, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Department of Foreign
Employment.
Dercon, S. (1998). Wealth, risk and activity choice: Cattle in western Tan-
zania. Journal of Development Economics, 55(1):1–42.
Dewey, K. G. and Begum, K. (2011). Long-term consequences of stunting in
early life. Maternal & child nutrition, 7:5–18.
Do, Q.-T. and Iyer, L. (2010). Geography, poverty and conflict in nepal.
Journal of Peace Research, 47(6):735–748.
130
Dre`ze, J. (1988). Famine prevention in India. WIDER Working Paper 45,
UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, Finland.
Dre`ze, J. (1990). Poverty in India and the IRDP delusion. Economic and
Political Weekly, 25(39):A95–A104.
Emran, M. S., Robano, V., and Smith, S. C. (2014). Assessing the frontiers of
ultrapoverty reduction: Evidence from challenging the frontiers of poverty
reduction/targeting the ultra-poor, an innovative program in Bangladesh.
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 62(2):339–380.
Ferna´ndez-Gimenez, M., Batjav, B., and Baival, B. (2011). Understand-
ing resilience in mongolian pastoral social-ecological systems: Adapting to
disaster before, during and after 2010 dzud–year 1 report. Working Paper
70217, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Ferna´ndez-Gimenez, M., Batjav, B., and Baival, B. (2012). Lessons from
the dzud: Adaptation and resilience in mongolian pastoral socialecological
systems. Working Paper 71844, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Foged, M. and Peri, G. (2013). Immigrants’ and native workers: New analysis
on longitudinal data. Working Paper 19315, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Folke, C. (2006). Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social–
ecological systems analyses. Global environmental change, 16(3):253–267.
Forsdahl, A. (1977). Are poor living conditions in childhood and adolescence
an important risk factor for arteriosclerotic heart disease? Journal of
Epidemiology & Community Health, 31(2):91–95.
Gluckman, P. D., Hanson, M. A., and Beedle, A. S. (2007). Early life events
and their consequences for later disease: a life history and evolutionary
perspective. American Journal of Human Biology, 19(1):1–19.
Gluckman, P. D., Hanson, M. A., Cooper, C., and Thornburg, K. L. (2008).
Effect of in utero and early-life conditions on adult health and disease.
New England Journal of Medicine, 359(1):61–73.
Golden, M. (1994). Is complete catch-up possible for stunted malnourished
children? European journal of clinical nutrition, 48(1):58–71.
Greenwood, M. J. (1969). An analysis of the determinants of geographic
labor mobility in the united states. The review of Economics and Statistics,
51(2):189–194.
Ha¨gerstrand, T. (1957). Migration and area. In Hannerberg, D., Ha¨gerstrand,
T., and Odeving, B., editors, Migration in Sweden: A Symposium, pages
27–158. Gleerup: Lund Studies in Geography.
131
Hallegatte, S., Vogt-Schilb, A., Bangalore, M., and Rozenberg, J. (2017).
Unbreakable: Building the resilience of the poor in the face of natural
disasters. Climate change and development series, World Bank, Washing-
ton,DC.
Headey, D. D. and Hoddinott, J. (2015). Understanding the rapid reduction
of undernutrition in nepal, 2001–2011. PloS one, 10(12):e0145738.
Heifer International (2010). Copperbelt Rural Livelihood Enhancement Sup-
port Project (CRLESP). Project Proposal 21-0151-01, Heifer Interna-
tional, Little Rock, AR.
Holling, C. S. (1973). Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annual
review of ecology and systematics, 4(1):1–23.
Holling, C. S. (1996). Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience. En-
gineering within ecological constraints, 31(1996):31–44.
Hugo, G. J. (1981). Village-community ties village norms and ethnic and
social networks: a review of evidence from the third world. In De Jong,
G. F. and W, G. R., editors, Migration Decision Making, Multidisciplinary
Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countires,
pages 186–224. New York NY Pergamon Press 1981.
Jalan, J. and Ravallion, M. (2001). Household income dynamics in rural
china. Policy Research Working Paper 2706, World Bank, Washington,
DC.
Jha, H. B. (2008). Economics of conflict and peace with focus on nepal.
Dhobighat, Lalitpur. Centre for Economic and Technical Studies (CETS).
Paper submitted to ”New Dynamics of Development: Challenges and
Prospects”.
Jodlowski, M., Winter-Nelson, A., Baylis, K., and Goldsmith, P. D. (2016).
Milk in the data: Food security impacts from a livestock field experiment
in Zambia. World Development, 77:99–114.
Just, R. E. and Pope, R. D. (1979). Production function estimation and
related risk considerations. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
61(2):276–284.
Justino, P., Leone, M., and Salardi, P. (2014). Short- and Long-Term Impact
of Violence on Education: The Case of Timor Leste. World Bank Economic
Review, 28(2):320–353.
Kafle, K., Winter-Nelson, A., and Goldsmith, P. (2016). Does 25 cents more
per day make a difference? The impact of livestock transfer and develop-
ment in rural Zambia. Food Policy, 63:62–72.
132
Kaphle, A. (March 24, 2014). Nepal, once known for farming, now exports
people; migrants earn big but face risks. The Washington Post.
Kaur, S. (2014). Nominal wage rigidity in village labor markets. Working
Paper 20770, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kreuttner, T. R. (2008). The maoist insurgency in nepal, 1996-2001: Impli-
cating for us counterinsurgency doctrine. https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/
citations/ADA505200.
Len, G. (2012). Civil Conflict and Human Capital Accumulation: The Long-
term Effects of Political Violence in Per. Journal of Human Resources,
47(4):991–1022.
Libois, F. (2016). Households in Times of War : Adaptation Strategies
during the Nepal Civil War. Working Papers 1603, University of Namur,
Department of Economics.
Ligon, E. and Schechter, L. (2003). Measuring vulnerability. The Economic
Journal, 113(486):C95–C102.
Lokshin, M., Bontch-Osmolovski, M., and Glinskaya, E. (2010). Work-related
migration and poverty reduction in nepal. Review of Development Eco-
nomics, 14(2):323–332.
Lokshin, M. and Glinskaya, E. (2009). The effect of male migration on em-
ployment patterns of women in nepal. The World Bank Economic Review,
23(3):481–507.
Lokshin, M. and Ravallion, M. (2004). Household income dynamics in two
transition economies. Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics,
8(3).
Luo, Z. and Karlberg, J. (2000). Critical growth phases for adult shortness.
American journal of epidemiology, 152(2):125–31.
Macours, K. (2011). Increasing inequality and civil conflict in Nepal. Oxford
Economic Papers, 63(1):1–26.
Mahat, P. S. (2006). Socio-economic transformation of rural areas for peace
and democracy.
Martorell, R., Khan, L. K., and Schroeder, D. G. (1994). Reversibility of
stunting: epidemiological findings in children from developing countries.
European journal of clinical nutrition, 48:S45–57.
Massey, D. S. (1988). Economic development and international migration
in comparative perspective. The Population and Development Review,
14(3):383–413.
133
McKenzie, D. and Rapoport, H. (2007). Network effects and the dynamics
of migration and inequality: theory and evidence from mexico. Journal of
development Economics, 84(1):1–24.
McKenzie, D. and Rapoport, H. (2011). Can migration reduce educational
attainment? evidence from mexico. Journal of Population Economics,
24(4):1331–1358.
McKenzie, D. and Yang, D. (2015). Evidence on policies to increase the
development impacts of international migration. The World Bank Research
Observer, pages 155–192.
Media Foundation (2011). Healing the wounds: Stories from nepal’s
transitional justice process. Technical report, Media Founda-
tion, Kathmandu, nepal. https://www.mfnepal.org/publication/
healing-wounds-2010/.
Mendola, M. and Carletto, C. (2012). Migration and gender differences
in the home labour market: Evidence from Albania. Labour Economics,
19(6):870–880.
Menon, N. and van der Meulen Rodgers, Y. (2015). War and Womens
Work: Evidence from the Conflict in Nepal. Journal of Conflict Reso-
lution, 59(1):51–73.
Miguel, E. and Roland, G. (2011). The long-run impact of bombing vietnam.
Journal of development Economics, 96(1):1–15.
Ministry of Finance (2014). Economic survey: Fiscal year 2013/14. Technical
report, Government of Nepal Ministry of Finance.
Ministry of Health (2017). Nepal Demographic and Health Survey 2016.
Technical report, Ministry of Health, Nepal, Kathmandu, Nepal.
Mitchell, J. C. (1969). The concept and use of social networks. Bobbs-Merrill.
Mu, R. and van de Walle, D. (2011). Left behind to farm? women’s labor
re-allocation in rural china. Labour Economics, 18:S83–S97.
Murard, E. (2016). Consumption and leisure: The welfare impact of migra-
tion on family left behind.
Murshed, S. M. and Gates, S. (2005). SpatialHorizontal Inequality and the
Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. Review of Development Economics, 9(1):121–
134.
Nandini, A. (1999). Engendered mobilization—-the key to livelihood security:
Ifads experience in south asia. Rome: IFAD.
134
Nepal, L. J. (2004). “destruction before construction”: civil war grips western
nepal, making humanitarian aid difficult, but essential.
Nepal, M., Bohara, A. K., and Gawande, K. (2011). More Inequality, More
Killings: The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. American Journal of Political
Science, 55(4):886–906.
OHCHR (2012). Nepal Conflict Report. Technical report, United Na-
tions Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva.
Available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NP/OHCHR_
Nepal_Conflict_Report2012.pdf.
Onesto, L. (2005). Dispatches From the People’s War in Nepal. Pluto Press.
OPHI (2013). Country Briefing: Nepal Multidimensional Poverty Index
(MPI) At a Glance. Technical report, Oxford Poverty and Human De-
velopment Initiative, University of Oxford, Mansfield Road, Oxford OX1
3TB, UK. Avaialble at: http://www.ophi.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/
Nepal-2013.pdf.
Palmer, M., Nguyen, C., Mitra, S., Mont, D., and Groce, N. (2016). The
long-term impact of war on health. HiCN Working Papers 216, Households
in Conflict Network.
Persico, N., Postlewaite, A., and Silverman, D. (2004). The Effect of Adoles-
cent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height. Journal
of Political Economy, 112(5):1019–1053.
Persson, P. and Rossin-Slater, M. (2018). Family Ruptures, Stress, and
the Mental Health of the Next Generation: Reply. American Economic
Review, 108(4-5):1256–1263.
Pivovarova, M. and Swee, E. L. (2015). Quantifying the microeconomic
effects of war using panel data: Evidence from nepal. World Development,
66:308 – 321.
Pulley, R. V. (1989). Making the poor creditworthy: A case study of the
integrated rural development program in India. Discussion Paper 58, World
Bank, Washington, DC.
Quintana-Domeque, C. and Rdenas-Serrano, P. (2017). The hidden costs of
terrorism: The effects on health at birth. Journal of Health Economics,
56:47–60.
Ra, S. and Singh, B. (2005). Measuring the economic costs of conflict. Work-
ing Paper Series 2, Asian Development Bank,.
135
Rawlins, R., Pimkina, S., Barrett, C. B., Pedersen, S., and Wydick, B.
(2014). Got milk? The impact of Heifer Internationals livestock dona-
tion programs in Rwanda on nutritional outcomes. Food Policy, 44:202 –
213.
Rockmore, M. (2017). The cost of fear: The welfare effect of the risk of vio-
lence in northern uganda. The World Bank Economic Review, 31(3):650–
669.
Rose, E. (2001). Ex ante and ex post labor supply response to risk in a
low-income area. Journal of Development Economics, 64(2):371–388.
Rosenzweig, M. R. and Binswanger, H. P. (1993). Wealth, weather risk
and the composition and profitability of agricultural investments. The
Economic Journal, 103(416):56–78.
Rutstein, S. O. and Johnson, K. (2004). The dhs wealth index. DHS Com-
parative Reports 6, Calverton, Maryland: ORC Macro.
Satyanarayana, K., Prasanna Krishna, T., and S Narasinga Rao, B. (1986).
Effect of early childhood undernutrition and child labor on growth and
adult nutritional status of rural indian boys around hyderabad. Human
nutrition. Clinical nutrition, 40:131–9.
Schmidt, I., Jørgensen, M. H., and Michaelsen, K. F. (1995). Height of
conscripts in europe: is postneonatal mortality a predictor? Annals of
human biology, 22(1):57–67.
Seddon, D., Adhikari, J., and Gurunga, G. (2001). The New Lahures: For-
eign Employment and Remittance Economy of Nepal. Nepal Institute of
Development Studies.
Singh, S. (2004). Impact of long-term political conflict on population health
in nepal. CMAJ, 171(12):1499–1501.
Stark, O. and Lucas, R. E. (1988). Migration, remittances, and the family.
Economic development and cultural change, 36(3):465–481.
Stock, J. H. and Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for weak instruments in linear
iv regression. In Andrews, D. and Stock, J. H., editors, Identification and
inference for econometric models: Essays in honor of Thomas Rothenberg,
pages 80–108. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Strauss, J. and Thomas, D. (2008). Health over the life course. volume 4 of
Handbook of Development Economics, chapter 54, pages 3375–3474. Else-
vier.
136
Tanner, J., Whitehouse, R., and Takaishi, M. (1966a). Standards from birth
to maturity for height, weight, height velocity, and weight velocity: British
children, 1965. i. Archives of disease in childhood, 41(219):454471.
Tanner, J. M., Whitehouse, R. H., and Takaishi, M. (1966b). Standards from
birth to maturity for height, weight, height velocity, and weight velocity:
British children, 1965. ii. Archives of Disease in Childhood, 41(220):613–
635.
Taylor, J. E., Rozelle, S., and De Brauw, A. (2003). Migration and incomes
in source communities: A new economics of migration perspective from
china. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 52(1):75–101.
Thapa, D. and Sijapati, B. (2004). A kingdom under siege : Nepal’s Maoist
insurgency, 1996 to 2003. The Printhouse ; Zed Books : Distributed in the
USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan Kathmandu : New York, updated
ed. edition.
Thieme, S. (2006). Social networks and migration: Far West Nepalese labour
migrants in Delhi, volume 7. LIT Verlag Mu¨nster.
Tilly, C. and Brown, C. H. (1967). On uprooting, kinship, and the auspices of
migration. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 8(2):139–164.
Uematsu, H., Shidiq, A. R., and Tiwari, S. (2016). Trends and drivers of
poverty reduction in nepal : a historical perspective. Policy Research
Working Paper Series 7830, The World Bank.
Upton, J. B., Ciss, J. D., and Barrett, C. B. (2016). Food security as re-
silience: Reconciling definition and measurement. Agricultural Economics,
47(S1):135–147.
Valente, C. (2014). Education and Civil Conflict in Nepal. World Bank
Economic Review, 28(2):354–383.
Valente, C. (2015). Civil conflict, gender-specific fetal loss, and selection: A
new test of the triverswillard hypothesis. Journal of Health Economics,
39:31 – 50.
Venton, C. C., Fitzgibbon, C., Shitarek, T., Coulter, L., and Dooley, O.
(2012). The economics of early response and disaster resilience: Lessons
from Kenya and Ethiopia. Independent report, Department for Interna-
tional Development, London, UK.
Vogl, T. S. (2014). Height, skills, and labor market outcomes in mexico.
Journal of Development Economics, 107:84 – 96.
Woodruff, C. and Zenteno, R. (2007). Migration networks and microenter-
prises in mexico. Journal of development economics, 82(2):509–528.
137
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel
data. MIT press.
World Bank (2006). Nepal - resilience amidst conflict: an assessment of
poverty in nepal, 1995-96 and 2003-04. Technical report, World Bank,
Data.
World Bank (2007). Zambia: Poverty and vulnerabiltiy assessment. Poverty
Assessment 32573, World Bank, Washington, DC.
World Bank (2014a). Migration and development brief 23. Technical report,
World Bank, Migration and Remittances Team, Development Prospects
Group.
World Bank (2014b). World development indicators. Technical report, World
Bank, Data.
World Bank (2016). Investing in urban resilience : Protecting and promoting
development in a changing world. Report 109431, World Bank, Washing-
ton, DC.
World Bank Group (2013). Staff guidance note on the application of the joint
bank-fund debt sustainability framework for low-income countries. Board
Report 82566, World Bank, Washington, DC.
World Development Indicators (2017). Lending interest rate - Zam-
bia. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&
series=FR.INR.LEND&country=ZMB#. Accessed: July 6, 2017.
Yang, D. (2008). International migration, remittances and household in-
vestment: Evidence from philippine migrants’ exchange rate shocks. The
Economic Journal, 118(528):591–630.
Yang, D. and Choi, H. (2007). Are remittances insurance? evidence from
rainfall shocks in the philippines. The World Bank Economic Review,
21(2):219–248.
138
APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR
CHAPTER 2
A.1 Additional Tables and Figure
Figure A.1: Distribution of second moment by treatment and time
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Table A.1: Resilience vs asset poverty - difference-in-difference results
(1) Resilient (2) Asset
(ρˆit > 0.5) Non-poor
Time 1 Original (18 months post treatment) 0.596*** 0.470***
(0.082) (0.088)
Time 1 POG (18 months post treatment) 0.007 0.243***
(0.074) (0.082)
Time 2 Original (42 months post treatment) 0.527*** 0.390***
(0.087) (0.091)
Time 2 POG (42 months post treatment) 0.282*** 0.384***
(0.098) (0.087)
Baseline mean – 0.302
Time 2 impact: % change Original – 129.1
Time 1 impact = Time 2 impact [p-value] 0.463 0.277
Adjusted R-squared – 0.216
Observations 741 741
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
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Table A.2: Treatment effects on poverty, food Security, and asset poverty - Robustness
check using nonlinear estimation
(1) Below (2) Enough (3) Asset
Poverty Line Food Non-poor
Time 1 Original (12 months post treatment) -0.218** 0.181*** 0.468***
(0.094) (0.066) (0.086)
Time 1 POG (12 months post treatment) -0.033 0.111* 0.246***
(0.095) (0.064) (0.084)
Time 2 Original (36 months post treatment) -0.316*** 0.213*** 0.384***
(0.094) (0.068) (0.088)
Time 2 POG (36 months post treatment) -0.066 0.154** 0.383***
(0.095) (0.066) (0.089)
Observations 741 741 741
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Reported are average marginal
effects using logistic regressions. Time 1 and time 2 refer to 12 and 36 months post-intervention except
in column 3, where they refer to 18 and 42 months post-intervention. In Column 1, the poverty line
threshold used is USD 1.90 PPP per person per day, as measured in 2012 prices. Column 2 is an
indicator variable for subjective food security, which takes the value of 1 if the survey respondent report
the household usually or always has enough food to feed all the members. Asset non-poor in column 3
is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if total household asset value is above 308 USD PPP
per person, 0 otherwise. The asset poverty threshold calculation is discussed in Appendix A.2.2.
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A.2 Path Dynamics and Asset Threshold
A.2.1 Well-being path dynamics and treatment (First Stage)
Figure A.2: Asset dynamics
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Notes: Asset includes livestock, bicycle, radio, television, solar panel, motorbike, bed,
hoes, sickle, shovel, slasher, pangas, mortar, sieve, wheel barrow, sprayer, maize sheller,
grain mill, oil press, axe, ox yoke, ox plough, ox cart, livestock shed, feeder, chaff cutter,
fencing, milking buckets and chairs, salt/mineral feeder and ripper/cultivator.
In order to choose the optimal functional form for the polynomial of lagged
well-being we use AIC, BIC, Log likelihood criteria and the LR test. Fig-
ure A.2 presents different fits of the asset holding at time t on its lagged.
The cubic fit and locally weighted regression (Lowess smoothing) of asset
values on lagged values are very similar. From above tests (not shown) and
the graph, we choose cubic (k = 3) as our preferred functional form.
yit = α +
3∑
j=1
θjy
j
i,t−1 + λt + δDit + βXit + it (A.1)
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yit = α +
3∑
j=1
θjy
j
it +
3∑
j=1
φjDit × yi,t−1 + λt + δDit + βXit + it (A.2)
We estimate Equation (A.1) and test if the cubic lagged term (θ3) is signifi-
cant, which provides the evidence of a dynamic asset growth to be S-shaped.
In order to examine whether the treatment has altered the path dynamics
we estimate Equation (A.2) and perform following tests:
H0 : φ1 = φ2 = φ3 = 0 (A.3)
H0 : φ2 = φ3 = δ = 0 (A.4)
H0 : δ = 0 (A.5)
Hypothesis (A.3) tests whether the treatment has altered the rate of change
of the curvature. Hypotheses (A.4) and (A.5) test if the treatment shifted
the growth curve horizontally or vertically respectively.
A.2.2 Transforming consumption threshold to asset threshold
We map the income/consumption poverty line, above which one is considered
non-poor, to asset levels and create an asset base threshold as below:
Log(Cit) = α + γLog(Wit) + βXit + it (A.6)
where, Cit is per capita per day consumption of household i at time t, Wit
is per capita value of total asset at time t of household i and Xit is vector
of controls affecting household’s consumption. We limit analysis to baseline
data only. We subtract the value of asset transfer made to households at the
baseline and estimate (A.6) using OLS. Using the estimated coefficients and
median characteristics of the sample, we map 1.90 USD PPP (P¯ ) consump-
tion to household per capita asset level as:
Log(W¯ ) =
Log(P¯ )− αˆ− βˆXm
γˆ
(A.7)
where P¯ is a consumption poverty line. The hat, (ˆ), caret refers to estimated
coefficients, m subscripts represents the median value of the sample and W¯
is the asset threshold, below which households will be considered vulnera-
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ble to poverty. Figure A.3 presents the consumption poverty line mapping
to asset threshold using baseline data. As shown in Figure A.3 the asset
poverty threshold in natural log is 5.73 (= Log(W¯ ) =⇒ W¯ = exp 5.73 ≈
308 USD PPP).
Figure A.3: Asset poverty line (W¯ )
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A.3 Test for POGs as a comparison group
We normalize the timing of transfer and perform an event-study type of anal-
ysis on the outcome of interests to check whether it could be appropriate to
use POG households as a comparison group for Originals. Unfortunately,
we cannot normalize the transfer amount; first, POGs received an immature
animal whereas the Originals received mature pregnant animals and second,
while the Originals gift was preconditioned on passing on the first female off-
spring from the gift they received, the POGs do not have such requirements.
In the sample, the last of the livestock transfers to POGs were made about
a year before the sixth round of data collection. Therefore, after normalizing
the transfer dates, we can investigate the program effects for one-year post
transfer. We limit the sample to Originals and POGs and estimate the follow-
ing equation (same as the main specification in the paper, Equation (2.6)).
yit = α + Tt +Originali + β(Tt ×Originali) + ηi + it (A.8)
where, yit, is an outcome of interest for household i in period t. The period,
t, takes the value of 0 to indicate the time of the transfer (baseline for all the
Original households) and 1 to refer to one year after the transfer was made.
Tt is a binary variable for period 1. Estimated β’s are reported in Table A.3
(below). As expected, the treatment effects for Originals are different from
POGs after one year for nearly all key outcome variables. Statistically, we
do not see the differences in herd size after one year; the reason for this
is likely explained by the fact that while the POGs gain immature animals
(which likely mature after one year and thereafter begin increasing herd size
in TLU), Originals lose one immature animal. We see the benefits of receiving
the matured animals on consumption; Originals have higher consumption,
less poverty and perceive themselves to be more food secure than the POGs.
Based on these results along with the experimental design discussed in the
text, we do not think using POGs as the comparison group for Originals,
in this particular case, will improve the identification strategy to answer the
questions we explore: what are the effects of a large one-off asset transfer
program on household welfare and resilience to poverty.
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A.4 Cost-benefit calculation
We exploit estimated ITT treatment effects of the program to perform the
cost-benefit analysis. As discussed in the research design section, while the
Original households received both the livestock and training at the baseline,
pass on the gift (POG) households received only training. The Originals,
however, are required to pass on the first female offspring from every female
animal they received through the program. Therefore, the POGs also benefit
from the initial asset transfer; the Originals, however, do not fully reap the
benefits from the initial livestock transfer. Thus, to evaluate the full program
benefits we need to incorporate the benefits POGs enjoy as well. We use
following strategy to calculate the specific program benefit Bˆ:
Bˆ = BO × SO +BP × SP (A.9)
where, BO is the ITT treatment effect for Original households and BP is the
ITT treatment effect on POGs. SO and SP are the shares of Original and
POG program participants respectively. Overall, 35% of the beneficiaries
are Original households while the remaining 65% are POGs. We include
changes in household nondurable consumption, household asset accumulation
and estimated future consumption gains as the program benefits. Following,
Banerjee et al. (2015), we do not include household expenditures on durable
goods as these will be captured in the asset accumulation. We include only
third year changes in asset accumulation in the total benefits. To calculate
future gains in household consumption, we assume the consumption gains
observed in year three last till additional 17 years i.e. we assume program
benefits to last for 20 years. Household second year gains are assumed to be
same as the first-year gains.
Following the joint guideline set by the World Bank Group (2013), we set
the initial social discount rate of 5% but also calculate benefits/cost ratios
using 7% and 10% for sensitivity.
The total project cost was USD 1 million. The program implementing
partner provided us with the detailed budget and the number of beneficiaries.
Although, the costs are spread-out over the duration of the program, we
assume all the costs exist at year 0 and inflate to year three net present value
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given by:
C3 = C0 × (1.05)3 (A.10)
where C0 is the per household total program cost, which includes the value
of direct transfers, trainings costs, staff salaries, and all other program im-
plementing, monitoring and supervision costs at year 0. All the costs are
converted to purchasing power parity (PPP) for cross-country comparison
purposes.
A.4.1 Calculating cost of increasing resilience headcount by
1%
Given the first-order Markov process used to estimate households’ devel-
opment resilience, we cannot estimate resilience at the baseline. However,
given the quasi-randomized program design, Control and Treatments groups
are likely be balance, on average, at the baseline. Assuming balance at base-
line we calculate gain in headcount development resilient rate, Rˆt, at time t
is follow:
Rˆt = R
O
t × SO +RPt × SP −RCt (A.11)
where, ROt , R
P
t andR
C
t , are the headcount resilient rate among Original, POG
and Control households at time t, where t ∈ [18, 33, 42 months]. Again SO
and SP are the shares of Original and POG program participants respectively.
The cost of increasing resilient rate by 1% at time t, Cˆ is calculated as follow:
Cˆt =
Total value of transfers at year 3
Rˆt
(A.12)
Transfer values are inflated from year 0 to year 3 using Equation (A.10).
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A.5 Outcome heterogeneity
Besides physical asset constraints, households may face ability constraints
associated with managing animals. Although households select themselves
into the program and receive basic training and veterinary extension support,
the program effects are likely to be heterogeneous on innate ability for animal
husbandry. Given substantially large livestock gifts, over five times the initial
average asset level (Jodlowski et al., 2016), some families may be persuaded
to engage in animal husbandry even if it makes them worse off than they
otherwise would be from their usual alternatives. Hence, despite the positive
average program benefits, this may be of concern. We use the following
quantile treatment effects (QTE) specification to explore such heterogeneity
in impacts.
Q∆yi(τ) = α(τ) + β1(τ)OGi + β2(τ)POGi (A.13)
where ∆yi is a the difference between the three year and baseline values of
outcomes y for household i. The program impacts on distribution of out-
comes are reported in Figure A.4. Panel A shows the quantile treatment
effects on distributions of total asset value. For both the treatment groups
(Originals and POGs) the effects are more pronounced at higher centiles.
While the impact on asset value is increasing on centiles for Originals, the
treatment effects among POGs at the top centiles are statistically equiva-
lent to zero. Panel B shows the treatment effect on consumption among the
Originals at consistently higher level at each centile except at the extreme
top and bottom centiles where the effects are imprecisely estimated. The
distributional effect on POGs remain non-negative over all the centiles, how-
ever it is imprecisely estimated. It is reassuring to note that all the quantile
treatment effects are non-negative which removes any concern related to the
endowment effect.
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Figure A.4: Three year quantile treatment effects
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Notes: Quantile treatment effect (QTE) estimates of the differences in outcomes between
three-year follow-up and baseline are presented in each panel. Bootstrapped 95% confi-
dence intervals are using 400 replications. In Panel A, assets includes livestock, bicycle,
radio, television, solar panel, motorbike, bed, hoes, sickle, shovel, slasher, pangas, mortar,
sieve, wheel barrow, sprayer, maize sheller, grain mill, oil press, axe, ox yoke, ox plough, ox
cart, livestock shed, feeder, chaff cutter, fencing, milking buckets and chairs, salt/mineral
feeder and ripper/cultivato. In Panel B, consumption expenditures include both food
(value of own production, purchased and gift in the last 7 days) and average weekly non-
food expenditure (clothing, household durables, schooling, medical, alcohol-tobacco and
other home expenditures).
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR
CHAPTER 3
Figure B.1: Migration Trend for Labor-Employment to Top 5 Destination
Countries
Note: Migrants for labor-employment to foreign countries are required to obtain labor
permits from the Department of Foreign Employment. Migrants can apply on their own
or through a recruitment agency. Number reported in the figures are total labor permits
issued to migrants who apply through the services of recruitment agencies.
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Figure B.2: Migration Trend by gender of Migrants
Note: Source is Department of Foreign Employment (2014). Migrants for
labor-employment to foreign countries are required to obtain labor permits from the
Department of Foreign Employment. Migrants can apply on their own or through a
recruitment agency. Number reported in the figures are total labor permits issued to
migrants who apply through the services of recruitment agencies.
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Figure B.3: Top-Ten Districts of Origin for Labor Employment Migration
Note: Source is Department of Foreign Employment (2014). Migrants for
labor-employment to foreign countries are required to obtain labor permits from the
Department of Foreign Employment. Migrants can apply on their own or through a
recruitment agency. Number reported in the figures are total labor permits issued to
migrants who apply through the services of recruitment agencies. These top ten districts
account for 36.5% of the all labor-permits issued between 2008 and 2014.
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Table B.1: Characteristics of Migrants
Mean Standard Deviation
Age 28.109 11.370
Male 0.844 0.363
Relation to HH head 0.546 0.498
(Son/Daughter)
Education level
Illiterate 0.172 0.377
1 to 10 grade 0.537 0.499
SLC/Intermediate 0.205 0.404
College or more 0.086 0.280
Migration to
India 0.440 0.496
Malaysia 0.095 0.294
Middle east 0.247 0.432
Households with migrant 2212 ( 31.1%)
Total households in the sample 7108
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APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR
CHAPTER 4
Figure C.1: Administrative map of Nepal
Note: The map represents administrative areas before the 2015 constitution when Nepal
was divided into 5 development regions, 75 districts and about 4000 rural (village devel-
opment committees) and urban (municipalities) areas.
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Figure C.2: Conflict intensity heterogeneity: Casualty count
159
Figure C.3: Nepal Demographic Health Survey 2016 Coverage
160
Figure C.4: Conflict intensity heterogeneity: Casualty count and NDHS
2016 clusters
161
Figure C.5: Typical growth velocity curve
Source: Adopted from Tanner, Whitehouse, and Takaishi (1966). Archives of disease in
childhood vol. 41,220 (1966): 613-35.
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Table C.2: Impact on first generation adult height (cm) using alternative specification and
alternative measure of conflict
Conflict variable =
Casualty count Including contiguous villages
(1) (2) (3)
Own village Months of war Casualty count
Months of war during 0 to 3 years -0.033 -0.003 -0.007
(0.148) (0.084) (0.040)
Months of war during 4 to 8 years -0.069*** -0.101*** -0.027***
(0.019) (0.034) (0.010)
Months of war during 9 to 15 years -0.021** -0.019 -0.006
(0.010) (0.018) (0.005)
Observations 4,421 4,421 4,421
Adjusted R-squared 0.041 0.041 0.041
Birth year and month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Regional trends and other controls Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of clusters 383 383 383
Outcome mean 151.6 151.6 151.6
Note: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Standard errors are clustered at village
level. All ages in the table refer to age at the start of the war. Other controls include an indicator for high caste
and month of interview fixed-effects. Specification used is Yimtvdr = β0+β1×Exposure during 0 to 3 years+
β2 ×Exposure during 4 to 8 years + β3 ×Exposure during 9 to 15 years +αt + ηm + δv + γTr +Xi + εimtvdr,
where Y is a height of a woman i born in a month m and year t, and residing in village v. district d and
development region r. Conflict variables are defined as women’s exposure to conflict during 0 to 3 years, 4 to
8 years, and 9 to 15 years of age. All other variables have same meaning as the main specification equation
6. Reported in the table are the estimated β1, β2, and β3 coefficients.
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